THE YELLOWLEGS
The Story of the United States Cavalry
This edition published in Great Britain in 2018 by Frontline Books, an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd, Yorkshire Philadelphia.
First published by Doubleday & Company Inc., New York, 1966.
Copyright Richard Wormser
ISBN: 978 1 52674 234 6
eISBN: 978 1 52674 235 3
Mobi ISBN: 978 1 52674 236 0
The right of Richard Wormser to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library All rights reserved.
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Introduction
Probably no phase of American history can awaken such loud and bitter disputes as that part played in it by the United States Cavalry, the Yellowlegs, the men who counted their numbers in sabers: There were present three officers and eighteen men of the First Dragoons: twenty-one sabers in all; and seventeen men and an officer of the Eighth Infantry; eighteen rifles.
This is a quotation from a report of Lieutenant, later Major General, P. St. George Cooke to Colonel, later Major General, Stephen Watts Kearny. Writers of regimental and other cavalry annals, no enemies of clichs, always call the former the Grand Old Man and the latter the Father of the Cavalry. So, the description should be accurate.
It isnt. The saber was never a frontier weapon; in the years from the Civil War till the final Massacre at Broken Knee, cavalrymen invariably left their swords behind when they took to the field. It is possible that they still carried them when Cooke was a lieutenant; certainly, his son-in-law, J.E.B. Stuart, was astounded in his first anti-Indian battle by the order to draw saber and charge.
The charge failed, and the cavalrymen dropped off their horses and used their carbines as they should have; because the post-revolutionary cavalryman was a mounted infantryman, a horseman who used his mount to get to the fighting, then got down and shot it out from ground cover.
The first two regiments of United States Cavalry (after the Legions of the Revolution) were called Dragoons. The next was called Mounted Rifles. Then, in 1855, the War Department changed the 1st and 2nd Dragoons to the 1st and 2nd U.S. Cavalry; the Mounted Rifles became the 3rd, and the 1st and 2nd Cavalry six years later became the 4th and 5th.
A Dragoon does what a mounted rifleman does, except he uses a shorter gun, a carbine, to do it with. A cavalry outfit, on the other hand, is supposed by classical definition, which never holds when the bullets are real to be held in reserve behind the infantry when a battle starts. Then, when the foot soldiers have their enemy counterparts on the run, the cavalry flanks and completes the rout.
It is obvious that there never was an Indian tribe on the Plains who would hold still for this sort of treatment; and when the Indians made a stand in the mountains or woods, there was always a rock or a tree to hide behind while the Yellowlegs thundered by.
However, during the Revolution and occasionally during the Civil War classical cavalry tactics were used. How effective they were is disputed; many highly reputable students of the Civil War claim that J.E.B. Stuart could have tipped the scales for the South in several battles if, after using his horsemen as brilliant scouts and flank protectors, he had ordered them into formation to charge infantry.
In the Revolution, one British cavalry officer was so enraged by the failure of Francis Marion and Light-Horse Harry Lee to stand and be killed as a good hussar should that he sent over a message challenging the Yankees to a fixed duel. The reply was that this would be done, twenty riders against twenty riders, after which the Englishman thought better of the whole thing.
In three wars 1812, 1898, and 1917 no American horse action counted at all. Roosevelts Rough Riders so called because they were in Roosevelts regiment, though commanded by Colonel Leonard Wood never took their horses to Cuba with them, nor did the Buffalo Soldiers of the 9th Cavalry, who rescued the elite regiment after it had stuck itself on San Juan Hill.
After the war, the Rough Riders returned to Long Island, picked up their mounts, and rode them up Fifth Avenue triumphantly, for the first cavalry action of the fracas. Fifth Avenue is in New York, and the only enemies encountered were politicians who planned on ruining Theodore Roosevelts career by kicking him into the vice-presidency two years later.
The Yellowlegs were brave, dashing, and Lord knows, hard-working: besides carrying out all the other duties of a soldier, they had the horses and gear to care for.
They profoundly changed the course of American history; they opened up the Santa Fe trail, they eventually drove the Cheyenne and Sioux out of the Plains, and no names were more feared by the enemy than those of Marion and Lee in the Revolution and Stuart and Sheridan in the War between the States.
But they suffered the leaders, that is from a strange two-headedness. They wanted to be cavalrymen, beaux sabreurs, in situations that called for gunmen, carbineers.
Custer, who wore the two stars of a major general within four years of leaving West Point, failed utterly at Little Big Horn; Cooke, as tough an Indian fighter as the Army ever put into the West, was pulled out of the field and sent on recruiting duty after one disastrous battle against the Confederacy.
It is probable that Cooke could have handled Sitting Bull without trouble, that Custer could have overtaken Stuart at the Peninsula. Indians needed frontier methods; Stuarts men could have been defeated by an officer with wartime dash, rather than Regular Army caution.