John Hughes-Wilson Colonel - The Secret State: A History of Intelligence and Espionage

THE

SECRET
STATE

A HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE
AND ESPIONAGE

COLONEL JOHN HUGHES-WILSON

This book is dedicated to the memory of:

Victor Andersen

British Intelligence Services

Val Heller

US Defense Intelligence Agency

Major Andrew Nightingale

Intelligence Corps and Special Air Service Regiment

Colonel John K. Moon

US Military Intelligence

Corporal Oliver Thomas

Intelligence Corps

The Latin phrase sub rosa means under the rose and is used in English to denote secrecy or confidentiality.

The rose as a symbol of secrecy has a history dating back to ancient Egypt. The Romans sometimes hung a rose above the table being used for diplomatic negotiations. In medieval times pictures of five-petalled roses were often carved on confessionals, indicating that what was said within would remain secret. In the council chambers of Henry VIIIs palaces a stylised Tudor rose covered the ceiling of the private chamber where confidential decisions of state were made.

The rose is now used by many nations as the badge of intelligence and security.

Contents

Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general
conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements
surpass those of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

ABOUT THIS BOOK

This is a book that has its roots in Military Intelligence Blunders, first written in 1999. It sold well and a second, updated edition came out in 2004 after the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center and the invasion of Iraq. That too became a best-seller and I was both surprised and heartened to see that the book has since been translated into six languages, including Turkish and Japanese, and has become recommended reading by intelligence agencies, as well as a text book for a number of university courses on intelligence.

Since 2004 much has changed however and in this new book, which is much wider in scope than its predecessors, I have tried to capture some of these changes and assess their impact to give the reader a much broader view of the whole subject of intelligence. Hence its title: On Intelligence, However, unlike Clausewitzs monumental 1832, On War, this work on intelligence is intended to avoid the pitfalls of the now dated German meisterwerk.

For a start it is meant to be readable. With a book that is an important issue. It would be interesting to discover just how many people (let alone academic military historians) have actually read all eight volumes and all the complexities of von Clausewitz in the original German. I suspect, rather like the CommunistSocialist bible, Das Kapital, very few folk have actually read and absorbed the masters deep thoughts, let alone understood the linguistic subtleties and nuances contained therein.

On Intelligence is therefore not intended as a ruminative academic stroll through historic events to reach some broad reflective conclusions, before getting completely lost in the thickets of philosophy and Hegelian dialectic. Rather it is intended as an up-to-date analysis of intelligence in the recent past, and how its impact has affected great events. Wherever possible, case studies and hard examples are analysed in some detail, looking for answers rather than the unfinished metaphysical reflections that so characterise On War. There are some tough lessons to be learned from intelligence failures especially today, and from intelligence successes, too.

But On War and On Intelligence do both share a common aim. In von Clausewitzs own words from long, long ago: To write a book that will not be forgotten after two or three years.

Most of us have read press accounts and books about the events that unfold on these pages. But very few of us have seen the events from the inside. The inside implies knowledge: and knowledge means power.

By inside, I do not mean the views of politicians or the other self-satisfied classes like senior civil servants or even those very grand journalists who often write memoirs on the lines of, Well, as the president said to me...

The real insiders knowledge is always the intelligence that was available at the time. It was that secret intelligence that shaped events and made the people who took the decisions into heroes or villains. This book tries to lift the veil on what really happened behind the scenes in the intelligence world during some of the most well-known military events that have shaped our lives. It tries to show why decisions were made, for good or ill, by a number of famous and not so famous characters, based on the intelligence and the secrets they had to work with at the time. This book tends to highlight intelligence mistakes and blunders (carefully concealed from the taxpayer who paid for them) for the simple reason that they are more interesting than the far more numerous successes of intelligence.

The book also identifies numerous deceptions, lies and cover-ups. Not all of these were committed to deceive the enemy. Turning over stones invariably lets a harsh light onto some creatures of the shadows. There are many intelligence officers and government officials, in all regimes, who prefer to keep their role and decisions secret, and thrive on secrecy in order to protect their careers and way of life. It guarantees their income, their status and their pensions. Secrecy is everything to them and far too often it is not for any motives of national security. In this desire to cover things up, they are too frequently encouraged and joined by their political masters.

In this they are only outclassed by their bosses, those very senior civil servants and securocrats of every countrys administration, who equally thrive and prosper in the sure and certain knowledge that access to secret intelligence has given them the ultimate benefit of the mistress or harem: power without responsibility. But, like their political masters, good intelligence officers should always have the courage of their convictions, and be ready to show moral courage by taking responsibility for their advice. Intelligence is, after all, about predicting the most likely future, not just regaling concerned decision makers with hot new facts. That is called news. CNN, the BBC, Fox, Sky News and now the immediacy of social media do the rolling 24/7 news agenda far better than any intelligence agency, as every professional modern intelligence officer knows. However, when careers are at stake that is a hard precept to follow.

If I had to offer a motto for any intelligence officer I would unhesitatingly quote the 1950s American Friends (Quaker) phrase, Speak Truth unto Power. That phrase has since been long associated with the British Civil Service. To be able to give honest and objective advice to ministers has always been seen as something that all impartial civil servants and intelligence officers should be able to do. Sadly, in their complicity over the scandal of Tony Blair and Alastair Campbells use of a notoriously misleading (if not downright mendacious) sexed-up intelligence dossier to convince Parliament and the British people to enter the 2003 Iraq War, Whitehalls not so faceless intelligence bureaucrats let their calling and their countrymen down badly.

The various case studies in the book are intended to provide an accessible and readable narrative of the events they describe, accompanied by some professional intelligence insights into how those events came about and unfolded. They tread a delicate path between the laboriously footnoted and exhaustive detail of the academic PhD tome, and the trivial, flippant (and often inaccurate) popular history of cheap journalism. Where possible, quotations are clearly indicated. For those who would like to delve into the stories in more detail, a short reading list is provided so that they can be better informed about events and individuals. History is, after all, a never ending argument.