Husserl Edmund - The concept of passivity in Husserls phenomenology

Victor Biceaga 1

(1)

Abstract

For a number of reasons, no phenomenological account of the distinction between activity and passivity can afford to sidestep the question of internal time-consciousness which, in Husserls view, ranks among the most difficult of all phenomenological problems.1 First, temporal syntheses fall within the compass of the passive sphere. Second, as both active and passive synthetic accomplishments are grounded in temporal syntheses, the former can only be understood within the framework provided by the latter. Third, Husserls account of time-constituting consciousness sublates pairs of opposites, such as form/content and constituting/constituted, and invites a similar reconsideration of the relation between activity and passivity.

For a number of reasons, no phenomenological account of the distinction between activity and passivity can afford to sidestep the question of internal time-consciousness which, in Husserls view, ranks among the most difficult of all phenomenological problems. First, temporal syntheses fall within the compass of the passive sphere. Second, as both active and passive synthetic accomplishments are grounded in temporal syntheses, the former can only be understood within the framework provided by the latter. Third, Husserls account of time-constituting consciousness sublates pairs of opposites, such as form/content and constituting/constituted, and invites a similar reconsideration of the relation between activity and passivity.

In this chapter, I take temporal syntheses as illustration of the egos passivity in relation to itself. Time-consciousness is the product of an affection of the self by the self that arises pre-reflectively or non-spontaneously, i.e., independently of the egos control. Naturally, besides temporal syntheses, there are many other objects and experiences of which the ego can be aware pre-reflectively. The pre-reflective awareness accompanying the self-manifestation of the temporal flow of consciousness is peculiar in that it necessarily forestalls the possibility of reflective self-presentation. In the context of the analysis of perceptual experiences, the theme of passivity arises mainly in connection with affection. Affections come to form meaningful sensible patterns passively, that is, with a minimum of active egoic participation rather than altogether independently of it. In the context of the analysis of sedimentation, contents passively stored by consciousness and traditions passively inherited by intersubjective communities form a reservoir of dormant, temporarily deactivated meanings and dispositions that can be retrieved and reactivated through a resolute individual or communal effort. In contrast, temporal syntheses block in advance the possibility of self-presentation. Non-spontaneity marks out the passivity of temporal syntheses as inconvertible into activity. Although Husserl tends to model the relation between activity and passivity on the mutual determination between transverse and horizontal intentionalities, his discussion of the absolute flow of time-consciousness also intimates the possibility of divorcing passivity from its opposite pole of activity. Since a subject cannot be aware only of itself, self-affection must rely on a detour through alterity. Therefore, the regress toward a primordial sphere reveals the porosity of the border between ownness and otherness. I conclude this chapter by arguing that the affinity between passivity and rhythm bridges the gap between the formal temporal scheme of impressions, retentions and protentions, on the one hand, and the association of concrete contents of consciousness, on the other hand.