Table of Contents
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First published in 2008 by The Penguin Press,
a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.
Copyright Samantha Power, 2008
All rights reserved
Photograph credits appear on pages 595-96.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Power, Samantha.
Chasing the flame : Sergio Vieira de Mello and the fight to save the world / Samantha Power.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
eISBN : 978-1-436-21021-8
1. Mello, Srgio Vieira de, 1948-2003. 2. United Nations. High Commission for Human Rights.
3.War relief. 4. Peace building. 5. Iraq War, 2003Casualties. 6. United NationsBiography.
7. DiplomatsBrazilBiography. I.Title.
D839.7.M45P
341.48092dc22
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For Morton Abramowitz, Stephen Power, and Frederick Zollo
CHRONOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
At 8:45 a.m., on Tuesday, August 19, 2003, five months after the American-led invasion of Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello arrived by car at the headquarters of the United Nations in Baghdad. He had been unusually quiet on the drive over, and his bodyguards thought that he was showing signs of the strain of an ever less relevant UN presence and a collapsing security situation.
Having worked his entire adult life for the UN, Vieira de Mello, a fifty-five-year-old Brazilian, had plenty of experience with frustration. In his thirty-four years of service, he had moved with the headlines, working in Bangladesh, Sudan, Cyprus, Mozambique, Lebanon, Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Congo, Kosovo, and East Timor. He spoke Portuguese, English, French, Italian, and Spanish fluently and dabbled in several other languages. He had been rewarded for his talents with the toughest assignment of his career: UN envoy to Iraq.
He was suited for the job not because he knew Iraqhe didntbut because he had amassed so much experience working in violent places. He could perhaps show the Americans what to doand what not to do. He had long ago stopped believing that he brought the solutions to a places woes, but he had grown masterful at asking the questions that helped reveal constructive ideas.
Work had always been a place of refuge, and when he entered the UNs Baghdad base at the Canal Hotel he took the stairs up to his third-floor office, greeting staff members along the way. He spent the morning reading the latest cable traffic from UN Headquarters in New York and responding to e-mails.
In the late morning his security guards prepared a convoy to take him to the Green Zone, the fortified district where the American and British Coalition administrators had set up their base in Saddam Husseins abandoned palaces. He was scheduled to meet with L. Paul Bremer, the American administrator of Iraq, and a delegation of U.S. lawmakers from Washington.
By noon his armored sedan was ready to go, but just then Bremers office called. The flight bringing the U.S. congressional delegation to Baghdad from Kuwait had been delayed, and the lunch meeting would have to be canceled. He telephoned Carolina Larriera, his fiance, who was an economic officer in the mission. Ive been spared, he said. Do you want to grab a sandwich? Larriera said she couldnt because she had to send out invitations for an upcoming conference by 5 p.m. He told her he was counting the daysfortytwo remainingbefore they would fly to Brazil for a months holiday.
UN officials had not expected to play a significant political role in Iraq. In the run-up to the war, the White House had scorned the UN, likening it to the ineffectual League of Nations.Vice President Dick Cheney had said that the UN had proven itself incapable of dealing with the threat that Saddam Hussein represents, incapable of enforcing its own resolutions, incapable of meeting the challenge we face in the twenty-first century.
But in the weeks following the toppling of Saddam Husseins statue in Baghdad, it had become clear that U.S. soldiers were going to need help. Suicide bombings had not yet begun, but widespread looting had, and those who had so easily dislodged the Iraqi dictator seemed increasingly lost when it came to managing the turbulent aftermath of his reign. European leaders who felt they had been snubbed back in March, when the United States and Britain had chosen to go to war, now agreed with Washington on one issue: Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, should deploy a team of specialists to help speed the day that Iraqis regained control of their country.
Vieira de Mello was chosen to head that team because of his vast experience, but also because a few weeks before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, he had done something few UN officials before him had managed: He charmed George W. Bush. In a meeting in the Oval Office, Vieira de Mello had criticized U.S. detention policies in Guantnamo and Afghanistan and pressed the president to renounce torture; yet Bush had warmed to him as a man.When the day came to choose an envoy, Annan appointed Vieira de Mello, believing he was the one man whose advice the Bush administration might heed. Annan also knew that his charismatic colleague was the rare troubleshooter who could secure the simultaneous backing of the American, European, and Arab governments.