Copyright 2021 by
The Curators of the University of Missouri
University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Missouri 65211
Printed and bound in the United States of America
All rights reserved. First printing, 2021.
Library of Congress Catalog-in-Publication Data
Names: James, Rawn, author.
Title: The Truman court : law and the limits of loyalty / by Rawn James, Jr.
Description: Columbia, Missouri : University of Missouri Press, 2021. | Includes index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020048216 (print) | LCCN 2020048217 (ebook) | ISBN 9780826222299 (hardcover) | ISBN 9780826274564 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: United States. Supreme Court--History. | Political questions and judicial power--United States--History. | Judges--United States--History. | Truman, Harry S., 1884-1972. | Warren, Earl, 1891-1974. | United States--Politics and government--20th century.
Classification: LCC KF8742 .J36 2021 (print) | LCC KF8742 (ebook) | DDC 347.73/2609046--dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020048216
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020048217
This paper meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48, 1984.
Typefaces: Spinoza and Franklin
PROLOGUE
PRESIDENTS DO NOT NOMINATE LAWYERS to the Supreme Court of the United States hoping that, if confirmed by the Senate, these justices will draft eloquent opinions for the ages. No president has ever complained that a justice he named to the Court failed to become a profound purveyor of legal theory.
Rather, when presidents make lifetime appointments to any of the federal appellate courts, they do so with a politicians imperative: they want votesnot electoral votes but judicial votes. They hope that the judges they appoint will continue to share a worldview with the president who nominated them. This is especially true in the case of nominations to the Supreme Court. As Justice William O. Douglas, who served on the Court for thirty-four years after being nominated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, acknowledged, Most Presidents name Justices who, they think, will vote the way they would vote.
Quite often, of course, this does not happen. A justices perspective may change over time amid both the freedom and burden of a lifetime appointment. Becoming a justice imposes on a person the imperative of determining who he or she wants to be on the Court and in history. With their votes and written opinions, all justices draft the first versions of their own history. This is perhaps why few of them can restrain themselves to presenting workmanlike opinionsshort, easily understood, and efficiently written. Institutional humility has been preached more than practiced by justices for at least a century.
Fate forced Franklin Roosevelt to wait four and a half years before nominating his first justice. In less time than that, his successor, Harry S. Truman, nominated three associate justices and the chief justice. At the dual dawns of the Cold War and the Civil Rights era, Chief Justice Fred Vinson and Justices Harold Burton, Tom Clark, and Sherman Minton formed a formidable bloc on the Court. They were often joined by Stanley Reed to comprise a controlling Court majority.
Trumans first nomination to the Supreme Court was a substantive show of bipartisanship. His second garnered widespread praise from across the political spectrum. His third nomination raised concerns that he was interested in naming only his personal friends to the nations highest court. And his last seemed to confirm these misgivings, despite the nominees legitimate qualifications. Two of the men Truman nominated had served in his administration; the other two had worked closely with him when he was a senator.
With the possible exception of the chief justice, Trumans nominees generated little expectation that they would become pillars of the Court. It seemed to some as though Truman considered Supreme Court seats to be but lofty patronage positions to which he was free to nominate his friends. As legal historian Del Dickson notes, Perhaps unfairly, all four of Harry Trumans Supreme Court appointees are rememberedto the extent that they are remembered at allas a mediocre group of political insiders and presidential cronies.
Admittedly, the men Truman nominated to the Court are more forgotten than disparaged but either assessment misses the point: as doctrinally inconsequential as Burton, Clark, Minton, and Vinson might be individually, their collective performance on the Supreme Courttheir unity and consistent ability to persuade at least one justice to join their ranks to form a majoritydeserves examination and respect. They voted to uphold both questionable and admirable Truman administration policies. They supported the president so reliably that at least one observer at the time referred to them as the four Trumanites. They often supported the president who had nominated them, not from a sense of loyalty, although the sentiment unfortunately sometimes seems to have reared its head, but rather because they agreed with his administration on critical questions of constitutional law.
This allowed Truman to revolutionize the relationship between the president and the Supreme Court. Presidents before Truman tended to engage the Court defensively, only when necessary, when challenged to defend their actions or bills they had signed into law. Roosevelt grew so frustrated with the Courts consistent pattern of striking down New Deal laws that in 1937 he presented a judicial reorganization plan to add justices to the Court so that New Deal legislation might survive judicial review. Swiftly derided as a scheme to pack the Court, Roosevelts proposal died in Congress. Just a few years later, Truman was successfully engaging the Court to advancenot merely to defendhis administrations agenda.
Unlike presidents who came before him, but like nearly every president who has succeeded him, Truman engaged the Supreme Court almost as actively as he engaged Congress. He did this by consistently employing the Department of Justice as an executive agency intent on implementing administration policy through court victories. Truman used the judiciary to advance his political agenda when the Constitution, the Congress, and his conscience allowed no other path. Every president since has followed his lead. The way in which Harry S. Truman revolutionized the relationship between the president and the Supreme Court is the least-explored major facet of his legacy, but its effects have reverberated in nearly every presidential election and Supreme Court nomination since.
CHAPTER ONE
We Must Have Steel.
NIGHTFALLS FULL MOONRISE FAILED TO pierce the gloom that descended on Americas steel-mill towns as the sun set on April 8, 1952. Night fell especially dark in McKeesport, Pennsylvania, because the mills mammoth, fiery Bessemer converter had been shut down. In nearby Clairton and Duquesne, an uneasy quiet prevailed, the massive gear-locked wheels of their mills having ground to a halt. Steamers fell still along the Monongahela River, their skippers unsure whether the coal in their holds from upriver mines would be needed in downriver mills.
Tonight would be cold, with temperatures expected to drop into the low thirties, so steelworkers dressed tightly against the weather to wait together for midnight. In Duquesne they gathered around an old oil drum that someone had fired up to provide warmth. In other mill towns they warmed themselves near pot-belly stoves. Those who could afford to joined a number of those who could not in taverns and bars.