Steven J. Zaloga - T-34-85 vs M26 Pershing: Korea 1950

The Korean War (195053) presents an intriguing opportunity to compare American and Soviet World War II tanks. These erstwhile allies had developed their tanks in the 194344 period to fight German Panzers, only to face one another unexpectedly on a Cold War battlefield. Both the T-34-85 and the M26 Pershing were designed to combat the same foe, the new German Panther tank, which had appeared in action in the summer of 1943. The technical paths taken by the Americans and Soviets were quite different. The T-34-85 was an evolutionary change in the successful T-34 design, substituting a larger turret with an 85mm gun for the earlier smaller turret with its 76mm gun. There was no change in basic tank armor or in other major aspects of the design. As a result, the Soviet Army received its first T-34-85s in early 1944, only about half a year after the program had been initiated. The M26, by contrast, was a fundamentally new design intended to replace the M4 Sherman. Compared to the T-34-85, the US Armys development of the M26 Pershing was quite protracted, the tank not appearing in service until March 1945, more than a year after its program start.

From a purely technical standpoint, a comparison of the T-34-85 against the newer and heavier M26 is not entirely fair. A more approriate comparison would be between the later Soviet T-44 and the M26, which were much closer in their developmental cycles and which were both new designs. Yet the T-44 and M26 Pershing never faced each other in combat, so the point is moot. To add a bit of balance to the comparison, however, this book will more broadly examine the performance of the T-34-85 against all the major types of US medium tanks in Korea, including the M4A3E8, which was closer to the T-34-85 in size and performance.

Korea provides an excellent laboratory for tank warfare, since the major tank-vs.-tank battles were compressed in time to only a few months in the summer and early autumn of 1950. They also took place after the US Army had established a more elaborate operational research effort than had existed in World War II. As a result, there is a great deal of statistical analysis of the tank battles, which helps elucidate the relative performance of the North Korean and American tanks in this conflict.

Snow billows as an M46 of Co. C, US Army 6th Tank Battalion, fires its 90mm gun while supporting the 24th Infantry Division near Song Sil-li, Korea, on January 10, 1952. (NARA)

These studies tended to confirm the results of Allied operational research in World War II. Although military buffs enjoy comparing the purely technical aspects of tank design, such as armor thickness and gun performance, operational research indicates that other factors are far more important in deciding which side prevails in a tank battle. The simplest condensation of the rule of tank fighting is see first, engage first, hit first. Research in both World War II and Korea strongly indicated that the side which spotted the enemy force first had a marked advantage. Tanks in a stationary defensive position had an obvious advantage against tanks moving to contact, since the stationary tanks were more likely to spot the approaching enemy first. But regardless of the situation, target acquisition was central to victory in tank fighting.

Do technological advantages such as better armor and better guns affect the balance of tank battles? Korea provides some strong evidence in this debate, since the US side operated several tank types ranging from the M24 light tank and the M4A3E8 medium tank to the larger M26 and M46 tanks. Since crew performance in the US tanks would be similar if not identical, a comparison of the performance of these types in combat helps to provide an answer. The evidence strongly suggests that the newer and more powerful M26 and M46 did have appreciably higher combat effectiveness in the Korean War than the M4A3E8 Sherman.

Yet it is also worth mentioning that the older and lighter M4A3E8 became the preferred US tank in the later phases of the Korean conflict. While this fact may seem to run against the technical performance issue, it is important to point out that the tactical dynamics of the battlefield changed in late 1950. The North Korean Peoples Army had a sizeable tank force in the summer of 1950, one that had a decisive influence on the battlefield, but the introduction of large numbers of US tanks quickly overwhelmed this force and essentially wiped it out. The Chinese intervention in late 1950 was not accompanied by a significant tank element, and as a result tank-vs.-tank fighting became a rarity in 195153. The primary role of US tanks in the later war years was infantry support. While the M26 and M46 still had firepower and armor advantages over the M4A3E8, the smaller tank had mobility and reliability advantages over the newer tank types.