James Falkner - Fire Over the Rock: The Great Siege of Gibraltar, 1779–1783

Nothing but Noble Impartiality drove Spain to try to recover Gibraltar. At least, that was the rather spurious claim made at a time when Great Britain was striving to suppress rebellion in North America. By the summer of 1779, British forces had been engaged for four years in what seemed to be the fruitless task of trying to remain in possession of the American colonies. Considerable attention also had to be devoted to securing important territories in the West Indies, and maintaining influence across the Indian Ocean. Without much doubt, had Great Britain not been so deeply engaged in the task of trying to fight a war in North America, Spain would not have tried to regain Gibraltar in such a fashion. This was particularly so as London had indicated, on several occasions, that the Rock was not really worth holding, and some subtle diplomacy by Madrid might have achieved a great deal of good.

It was not altogether surprising that Spain took advantage of this powerful strategic distraction first to blockade, and then attack, the British garrison on the Rock. The moment must have seemed to King Carlos III and his ministers in Madrid to be very ripe, with British naval and military forces so heavily engaged elsewhere. This was a significant misjudgement. Although few Britons wished to lose the American possessions, troublesome as they were, few also who were well enough informed to come to a judgement thought that the colonies could be held against their will, or that it was worth the enormous effort and expense to do so. Significant numbers of Loyalists were fighting alongside the British to suppress the rebellion, but French support, which could not be properly countered at the time, would prove crucial to the success of the rebels. This was particularly so as so much effort had, because of Spanish opportunism, to be devoted to operations to hold on to Gibraltar and Port Mahon on the island of Minorca, the valuable bases for the Royal Navy in the western Mediterranean.

The rapidly growing British Empire, still in comparative infancy in the 1770s, depended upon trade on the high seas, and security and ease of navigation through the Mediterranean was a key factor in this strategic endeavour. British trade interests in the spice and sugar islands of the Caribbean, across the Indian sub-continent, and in the Mediterranean, were of greater potential value and importance to Great Britain than holding on to rebellious and very unprofitable colonies in North America. No imperial power relished the loss of territory, but the cost could be just too high, especially when that task was fast proving to be fruitless, thanks to French mischief-making. On the other hand, territory that had a tangible and recognizable benefit, such as a naval base in a strategically important location like Gibraltar, a base which actually had the capability to be held, would merit the attention, cost and effort necessary for a prolonged and successful defence a military epic in the making.

The Spanish naval and military commanders found that the British would fight hard to hold on to Gibraltar. This was a campaign that would catch the imagination and admiration of George IIIs subjects, ministers and military commanders alike, in a way that the distant war in North America would not, even if the King seemed less than enthusiastic at times about retaining possession of the Rock. This should have come as no real surprise, for British interest in securing and holding the place as a base for the Royal Navy had a lengthy, if somewhat ambivalent, history, it first having been considered as long ago as October 1625. The Bay of Gibraltar is a very safe and commodious one; a fine port for the trading ships coming from the Mediterranean. by the Spanish King and his ministers in 1779.

Leaving to one side the almost unavoidable problems of alliance warfare, with Spanish and French commanders striving manfully, but not always with success, to work together to good effect, the simple fact was that the British defence of Gibraltar was an operation that could succeed, in a way that the more complex efforts to defend Britains other outpost in the Mediterranean, the island of Minorca, would not. By nature a formidable fortress, if the Rock could not be taken by outright assault and its defences had been greatly improved in the years leading up to the events of 1779 then the garrison might still be blockaded and starved out. There was little chance to grow vegetables, and fresh water was always a concern, having to be gathered from rainfall; every ounce of powder and shot, every stick of firewood, piece of biscuit and scrap of meat, and each strip of linen or shoe-leather, would have to be forced through any blockade, in the teeth of tough resistance. The Royal Navy was found to have the capability to do this, not once (a significant achievement on its own), but in three notable operations, across the 1,100 inhospitable miles of stormy seas from the ports in southern England and Ireland. The Spanish Navy, for a variety of implausible reasons, proved incapable of preventing this resupply, either on the high seas or by imposing a tight enough close blockade, and their French allies were no more successful.