Carl Smith - Chancellorsville 1863: Jacksons Lightning Strike

Campaign 55

Chancellorsville 1863

Jacksons lightning strike

Carl Smith Illustrated by Adam Hook

Series editor Lee Johnson Consultant editor David G Chandler

Woods surrounding Chancellorsville were filled with secondary growth that was thick and tough, and made concentrated military maneuvers difficult. The primary growth had been cut for fuel nearly 100 years earlier.

C hancellorsville, a lone farmhouse situated at the junction of two roads a few miles west of Fredericksburg, lies 50 miles north of Richmond and 25 miles east of Culpeper, south of the Rappahannock River and near the eastern edge of the Spotsylvania Wilderness. This area has been so-called from the earliest times because of its thick collection of oak, pine, maple, and dogwood trees interspersed with springy underbrush and dense thickets covering the gently rolling hills of central Northern Virginia. Much of the old growth was cut down to fuel a colonial mine and has been replaced by hardy secondary growth scrub oak and pine thickets. Even today dense brush makes walking the Spotsylvania Wilderness difficult.

Ambrose Everett Burnside was a genial man, chosen to command because other candidates were too political or too controversial. He had designed a carbine, and although only a moderately good soldier, he was a welcome change after McClellan.

The battle of Chancellorsville could more aptly be called the second battle of Fredericksburg because the battle which General Ambrose Burnside started in the frigid December of 1862 involved an inconclusive river crossing and a sound defeat for his assaulting troops. However, Lee did not complete his victory by counter-attacking across the river and driving the Federals off the east bank. The Army of the Potomac loomed dark and foreboding on the winter landscape across the Rappahannock from the nearly destroyed town. An unofficial truce developed in the harsh winter of 1862-63: it was too cold for the Southerners to attack; the Army of the Potomac was too demoralized to launch an offensive; and the ground was too frozen to dig graves. Both sides waited uneasily for spring.

With spring the waiting would end, for Robert E. Lee knew that the South was losing this war of attrition. For the South to win, it had to fight a fast and aggressive war, and not stagnate in fortified camps. Events now in motion would forever change the war.

On the last day of April and during the first week of May 1863, Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson fought off Joseph Hookers well planned major offensive, driving off his superior force and again denying Union troops egress to Richmond. What started as Hookers master stroke became Jacksons and Lees last great victory. When the Chancellorsville campaign ended, the Union had lost over 17,000 troops and the Confederates, 13,000. The Union Army had been defeated soundly and the door to a northern invasion by the Army of Northern Virginia was open. However, the face of warfare, strategy, and ultimately the Civil War, irrevocably changed with Stonewall Jacksons death.

December 1862 was brutally cold, and Burnsides attempted mid-December crossing of the Rappahannock to attack Fredericksburg failed miserably with the terrain, entrenched Confederates, and winter working against him. The Army of the Potomacs morale plummeted and Burnside effected winter quarters almost across the river from Fredericksburg; each day there, Union pickets could see pickets of the army which had stymied their advance and run them back across the icy waters. When Burnside hinted to his Grand Division commanders in early 1863 that he intended another attack in almost exactly the same fashion, they feared great losses. Two went directly to Lincoln without Burnsides knowledge or consent, pleading that the army was not unwilling to fight, but that another costly assault might not only fail in its objective, but might leave Washington and the entire north open to attack if Lee chose to press his advantage. When Burnside next asked to be relieved of command of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln listened.

This view of the 150th Pennsylvania gives a small idea of the Union encampment which the Southerners saw across the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg in the winter of 1862 and spring of 1863.

Lincoln replaced Burnside with Hooker. Although General Joseph Hooker had not been among the generals who had gone to Washington, he had a record of openly criticizing his superiors. In fact, because of this behavior during the Mexican-American War, General Winfield Scott had denied Hooker a commission when the Civil War started. With the support of friends, Hooker went to see Lincoln after First Manassas and commented that he was a better commander than those on the field that day. Although aware of Hookers boastfulness and habit of criticizing superiors, Lincoln was impressed with his self-assurance and gave him a commission. But Henry Halleck, who succeeded Scott, was concerned about Hookers ability to turn his boast into reality.

Hookers nickname (Fighting Joe Hooker) had come about as a result of a miscommunication earlier in the war. A reporter had asked Hooker what he was doing, and he had replied, Fighting. The reporter had quoted him, saying, Fighting Joe Hooker. A telegrapher had missent it as Fightin Joe Hooker. When newspaper reporters nationwide quoted his response, a moniker was born.

Hooker was not known as a loyal subordinate, and when Lincoln replaced Burnside, he warned Hooker that he wanted an officer who would fight and who would use all his troops. The President told Hooker that he had two jobs: to defeat Lees Army of Northern Virginia, and to protect Washington, D.C. Lincoln should have guessed that Hooker was a poor choice when almost immediately upon his appointment Hooker began talking about marching on Richmond.

As Lee was a moving target and Richmond was stationary, Hooker felt that if Richmond fell, the Confederates would be demoralized and the war would end. This was sound theory, but would prove difficult to achieve as long as the Army of Northern Virginia was free to act. Lees army was filled with crack soldiers. Civilians residing in Richmond would worry about Hookers close proximity and would demand Confederate troops to protect their homes and businesses. In so doing they would act as unwitting allies to the North by pressuring Southern leaders to capitulate if the capitol was threatened. However, if Hooker was to defeat Lee he had first to overcome severe internal military problems.

General Thomas Meagher, commander of the famous Irish Brigade, which was nearly decimated following Burnsides orders at Fredericksburg, commanded the remnants of the brigade in the Chancellorsville campaign.

In January 1863 the Army of the Potomac was not an effective fighting force. Morale was at an all-time low, Lee had soundly defeated them, Jackson had run circles around Pope and had burned a Federal supply depot at Second Manassas. The Army of the Potomac was camped opposite the site of one of the Unions worst defeats. Burnsides near-suicidal attack on Fredericksburg had shattered the Irish Brigade in a futile assault across a river and up a steep slope to attack a well-defended hill where the Confederates were entrenched. Where to find the Confederates was not Hookers problem; how to defeat them was. A direct assault was out Burnside had tried and failed. A more sophisticated multi-pronged attack with simultaneous threats to Richmond, Lees troops, and Fredericksburg might confuse Lee and let Hooker bring his entire army into play.