Nance - Sabers through the Reich World War II corps cavalry from Normandy to the Elbe

Sabers through the Reich

BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS

The Battles and Campaigns series examines the military and strategic results of particular combat techniques, strategies, and methods used by soldiers, sailors, and airmen throughout history. Focusing on different nations and branches of the armed services, this series aims to educate readers by detailed analysis of military engagements.

SERIES EDITOR: Roger Cirillo

An AUSA Book

SABERS THROUGH THE REICH

WORLD WAR II CORPS CAVALRY FROM NORMANDY TO THE ELBE

WILLIAM STUART NANCE

Foreword by Robert M. Citino

UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY

Copyright 2017 by The University Press of Kentucky

Scholarly publisher for the Commonwealth,

serving Bellarmine University, Berea College, Centre College of Kentucky, Eastern Kentucky University, The Filson Historical Society, Georgetown College, Kentucky Historical Society, Kentucky State University, Morehead State University, Murray State University, Northern Kentucky University, Transylvania University, University of Kentucky, University of Louisville, and Western Kentucky University.

All rights reserved.

Editorial and Sales Offices: The University Press of Kentucky

663 South Limestone Street, Lexington, Kentucky 40508-4008

www.kentuckypress.com

Maps and figure by Mariann K. Nance. Photographs from the WWII Signal Corps Photo Collection, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Cataloging-in-Publication data is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 978-0-8131-6960-6 (hardcover : alk. paper)

ISBN 978-0-8131-6962-0 (epub)

ISBN 978-0-8131-6961-3 (pdf)

This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials.

Manufactured in the United States of America.

Fiddlers Green

Halfway down the trail to Hell,

In a shady meadow green

Are the Souls of all dead troopers camped,

Near a good old-time canteen.

And this eternal resting place

Is known as Fiddlers Green.

Marching past, straight through to Hell

The Infantry are seen.

Accompanied by the Engineers,

Artillery and Marines,

For none but the shades of Cavalrymen

Dismount at Fiddlers Green.

Though some go curving down the trail

To seek a warmer scene.

No trooper ever gets to Hell

Ere hes emptied his canteen.

And so rides back to drink again

With friends at Fiddlers Green.

And so when man and horse go down

Beneath a saber keen,

Or in a roaring charge of fierce melee

You stop a bullet clean,

And the hostiles come to get your scalp,

Just empty your canteen,

And put your pistol to your head

And go to Fiddlers Green.

Traditional American cavalry poem/song.
First appeared in print in the Cavalry Journal in 1923, though tradition has it that the words existed long before.

Contents

Illustrations

Maps

Photographs

Figure

Foreword

Bill Nance begins with a bold statement: Much of what we know about American operational art in the Second World War is incomplete or wrong. It is hard not to smile when reading that line: a bold declaration of independence and purpose by a younger scholar. For someone who has been in the field for a while, such a sentence invariably provokes a defensive reaction. After all, Nance is challenging those of us who have been researching and writing on this topic for decades. Can he back it up?

The answer is yes. Sabers through the Reich deals with a well-defined and circumscribed topic: the operations of U.S. mechanized cavalry groups (MCGs) in the European theater in World War II. Nance is an active duty officer in the army, a cavalryman through and through. Indeed, when he studied under me as a graduate student at the University of North Texas, I occasionally had to remind him that the U.S. Army no longer has a cavalry branch! He knows cavalrythe men, the mission, and the equipmentas well as anyone in the world. The result is a highly detailed account of the MCG in Europe that is unlikely to be superseded anytime soon, if ever.

But at the same time, Nance goes well beyond a mere descriptive account and makes a point that is worth pondering about the nature of the U.S. Army, about its wartime operations, and about the true character of its doctrine. Think of the stereotypes that still pervade the literature. The Germans invented Blitzkrieg, wedding new machines to a traditionally mobile vision of war to produce lightning victories. The Red Army had deep battlewave after wave (or perhaps echelon after echelon) of men and tanks attacking along the same axis, breaking through the defenders and striking hundreds of miles into the depth of the enemy position.

And the U.S. Army? Well, here we are stuck with a decidedly un-glamorous broad front advancedivisions, armies, and corps advancing in lockstep, carefully staying aligned with friendly forces on both flanks, grinding ahead inexorably due to the overwhelming dominance of the hyper-efficient U.S. industrial complex. Think of Courtney Hodges and the operations of the U.S. 1st Army. They got the job done in the European theater, but no ones ever going to make a movie about Hodgess art of war. Or think of Eisenhowers generalship. Few list him among the great operators of military history or even World War II. In fact, the kudos he receives are usually those which accrue to the successful CEO or personnel manager. You can imagine him running IBM and reliably turning an annual profit.

The stereotype of the broad front advance has never been completely true, of course, but every stereotype grows from a seed of truth. Our view of the U.S. Army in World War II arose from a number of sources: the memoirs of the German officer corps, who tended to sniff at their American counterparts as being more concerned with security than with seizing opportunities in battle; the later, distasteful wars in Korea and Vietnam, in which U.S. operations were often clumsy and muscle-bound. But the truth is there. Eisenhower really did employ a broad-front strategyarmies moving forward from horizon to horizon across the countryside, and it was arguably just the ticket to beating the Wehrmacht in 1944 and 1945 with minimal friendly casualties.

But at the operational level, especially at the level of the corps, the picture was very different. As Nance shows chapter and verse, U.S. commanders employed their MCGs in an extremely innovative manner, using them to hold vast stretches of front so that the actual fighting divisions could bulk up on narrow sectors and concentrate overwhelming power against designated portions of the German defenses. The Wehrmacht could rarely draw a bead on just where the Americans were about to attack, and indeed, the U.S. Army could shift its point of main effort (its