Paul B. Janeczko - Double Cross: Deception Techniques in War

E very year as June approaches, news stories commemorate the Allies 1944 D-day landings in Normandy, France. Some of the stories mention that the landings success hinged on the intricate and well-executed deception campaign that preceded D-day. That campaign, called Operation BODYGUARD, fooled Hitler into thinking that the invasion would come at Pas-de-Calais, France, about two hundred miles northeast of the real landing site. The deception induced Hitler to shift crucial armor units and a significant number of his troops to Pas-de-Calais. Even after D-day, as Allied forces worked to establish their beachhead in Normandy, Hitler remained so convinced that the real invasion was still coming at Pas-de-Calais that he kept his troops there for weeks. Although the war would rage for another year, D-day was a turning point. The days of Hitler and the Third Reich were numbered. And deception had played a key role.

In 1942, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff set up the Joint Security Council to protect the security of information and implement deception operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed the goals of deception as causing the enemy to make false estimates and mistakes in his military decisions and consequent actions, thereby contributing to the accomplishments of tasks in our over-all military mission. Deception has, in fact, played a part in every war throughout history. Sometimes its role has been small, but at other times, as in Normandy in 1944, deception has been instrumental in changing the course of a war and, in some cases, changing history.

Many of the principles and techniques of deception in war have remained unchanged throughout history. But as the technologies of war have developed, deception operations have been quick to incorporate the advancements. For example, the development of telegraphy during the American Civil War provided a fast and reliable way to send information. And the fact that intelligence sent over telegraph wires could be intercepted meant that the medium could also be used to send misinformation. Around the same time, a new mode of travel, the hot-air balloon, began to be adopted for use in reconnaissance, an important component of deception planning. During World War I, the airplane came into its own as an offensive weapon, and it wasnt long before it, too, became a tool of reconnaissance and battlefield damage assessment, both useful in planning deception operations.

The term deception actually encompasses two concepts: cover and deception. As defined during World War II by the Joint Security Council, cover activities are planned measures for disguising or concealing an operation against an objective, whereas deception operations are planned measures for revealing or conveying to the enemy... information... regarding our strategic plans, strengths, dispositions, operations for tactics, with the purpose of causing him to reach false estimates and act thereon.

As author Thaddeus Holt has more elegantly put it, Cover conceals truth; deception conveys falsehood. Cover induces nonaction; deception induces action. Both are geared for a specific result on the part of the adversary. In a World War I example of cover, the Allies camouflaged battlefield observation posts as trees. And Operation BODYGUARD in World War II is a classic example of active deception. Throughout this book, the word deception will be used as an umbrella term to refer to both kinds of operations.

Military strategists rely on the following principles when considering their deception tactics:

Focus: While the customer of a deception is the intelligence agency to which misleading or false information is directed, its target is the enemy commander, because he or she is the one who will make strategic decisions based on the information.

Action: The plan must be designed to make the enemy do something specific that will be of benefit to ones operations.

Coordination of Efforts: Early deceptions were generally initiated by a single person. Roughly at the start of the twentieth century, deception became institutionalized, with more of the work done by committees and agencies within governments. These groups require coordination to avoid duplication of operations and problems when one agency doesnt know what another is doing.

Security: Deception operations must be kept secret, and they must also ensure the secrecy of the military operations with which they are connected.

Credibility: No matter how good a deception plan is, it will fail if the enemy does not believe that the story it tells is possible. The enemy need not believe that the scenario will occur, only that it could occur.

Adaptability: The best deceptions are not cookie-cutter operations, in which a tactic that worked in one battle is blindly followed in the next. They are, rather, carefully tailored to the objectives of military forces, the needs of commanders, and the expertise of intelligence agencies.

Deception techniques used by military strategists include:

Concealment: Hiding military assets with available cover, such as trees, bushes, or buildings.

Camouflage: Hiding military assets through artificial means, such as covering an ammunition supply with a net that looks like foliage. In negative (or passive) camouflage, objects are hidden. In positive (or active) camouflage, dummy military objects are used to mislead the enemy about the strength or placement of assets.

Planted False Information: Feeding false intelligence to the enemy via double agents, news articles, or intentional leaks by diplomats.

Demonstration: Taking actions that indicate preparation for a military action, but without the intent of actually carrying it out.

Feint: A military action designed to draw the enemy out or distract from the main assault. One example is a tactical retreat, carried out in hopes that the enemy will follow and designed to get ones own forces in a better position.

Repetitive Process: A repeated drill or practice maneuver designed to lull the enemy into a false sense of security, making them vulnerable when the drill or practice becomes an actual maneuver.

Apparent Bad Luck or Mistake: Planting false information in such a way that the enemy is fooled into thinking that they have discovered some important intelligence because of an accident or bad luck on the part of the adversary.

Substitution: Replacing something real with something fake or vice versa.

The Lure: Creating a situation the enemy will be drawn into exploiting, only to learn later that it was a trap.

The Double Bluff: One of the riskiest of deceptions, a double bluff allows the enemy to know the truth about an operation in the hope that they will find it too good to believe and ignore it.

Display: Making military assets real, dummy, or a mix of the two visible to the enemy in order to mislead them about ones strengths, position, or intentions.