From August to November 1918 the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) under Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig fought a series of victorious battles on the Western Front that contributed mightily to the defeat of the Imperial German Army. It did so as part of a coalition, and the role of French, Belgian and United States forces should not be forgotten. The BEF itself, it is often forgotten, was a coalition force. While troops from the British Isles provided the core, the four divisions of the Canadian Corps, the five division-strong Australian Corps, the New Zealand Division (by 1918 standards the size of a small corps) and the South African Brigade were powerful accretions of strength. Such formations were both part of the BEF and proto-national armies in their own right. Many, probably most, Dominion soldiers had no difficulty in regarding themselves as both Australians (or whatever) and in some sense British. In September 1918 General Sir Henry Rawlinsons British Fourth Army had a further level of coalition complexity with which to cope. The American II Corps was placed under the tutelage of Lieutenant-General Sir John Monashs Australian Corps. Thus the attack on the Bellicourt Tunnel, the subject of Dale Blairs book, was very much an inter-Allied affair.
Dale Blair is a fine historian who has already written, among other things, Dinkum Diggers, a path-breaking study of the Australian Imperial Forces 1st Battalion. Here he employs a similar forensic approach, giving detailed description and incisive analysis of the operations of the Australian and American II Corps in the Hindenburg Line fighting. British readers who have more than a passing knowledge in the Hundred Days will be familiar with the feats of 46th (North Midland) Division a short distance down the canal: 137 (Staffordshire) Brigade succeeded in forcing a crossing and thereby unlocking the German defences. What happened on the flank, in the Australian/American sector, is much less well known, and Dale Blairs achievement is to tell a complicated story in a highly readable fashion.
Dr Blairs judgements are uncompromising. He, fairly, points the finger of blame at Haig, Rawlinson and Monash for expecting too much of the raw American troops, singling out the Australian Corps commander for particular criticism. Up against a tough enemy protected by formidable defences, neither the inexperienced Americans nor the battle-hardened diggers could be expected to prevail easily. A technological quick fix was not the answer: the battle of 29 September was, he judges, correctly, disastrous for the Tank Corps. Overall, the fighting in the Tunnel sector was, he argues persuasively, a draw. At the end, like two boxers, the AustralianAmerican force was gasping for breath and the Germans, badly battered, were back-pedalling to remain on balance. This is a fair conclusion for this stretch of front, but overall the day was calamitous for the German Army, even if the clean breakthrough that Haig had hoped for did not occur. Forced out of the Hindenburg Line, the prognosis for the German Army on the Western Front and hence Imperial Germany itself was bleak indeed.
Dale Blair has written a book that stands as a distinguished contribution to the military history of the First World War. This detailed study of an important battle adds significantly to our understanding of a critical phase in the fighting. No one writing about or teaching the history of the final offensives of 1918 can afford to ignore it.
Gary Sheffield
Professor of War Studies, University of Birmingham
The writing of this book was partly assisted through the award of an Australian Army History Unit research grant in 2004. This grant allowed me the luxury of travelling overseas to walk the battlefield and to visit archives in the UK.
While in France I was the recipient of wonderful hospitality from longtime friends Claude and Colette Durand and their family. In England, too, I was treated royally by Jenny Stephens and her brother Jeremy while staying in London.
My thanks to Gary Sheffield, who on short notice was able to gain me necessary clearance to access archival records at Kings College and the Imperial War Museum. He has also kindly provided the foreword to this book for which I am grateful.
Mitch Yockelson was particularly helpful in clarifying some aspects of the American involvement in the battle and sharing information.
The book has lain dormant for nearly three years due to unfulfilled promises in Australia so it is with great relief and much appreciation that I acknowledge the enthusiasm for the project by Michael Leventhal at Frontline Books.
My heartfelt thanks to my wife, Non, who, as always, has steered me through the vagaries of the computer while completing the manuscript and who suffered, relatively silently, the long period over which the 1:10,000 map of the battlefield carpeted the rumpus room floor.
After the cessation of hostilities in the First World War, Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash reflected on the actions of his Australian Corps in his book The Australian Victories in France in 1918. He noted that his Corps, numbering nearly 200,000 men as it prepared for the breakthrough battle against the Hindenburg Line, was four times as large as the British Army under the command of the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo. It is likely that the Iron Duke and other Napoleonic generals would have found the nature of warfare so changed by mechanical and technical progress as to be inconceivable to their early nineteenth-century sensibilities. Even more so if consideration was given to the fact that Monashs expanded corps represented only seven of sixty-two divisions making up five British armies stretching from the Channel ports to the Somme river.