AFRICA@WAR 26:
THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE
COLD WAR ANGOLAN FINALE, 19871988
Leopold Scholtz
Published in 2016 by:
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Text Leopold Scholtz 2016
Maps drawn by and Camille Burger
Photographs SANDF Archives
Designed & typeset by Farr out Publications, Wokingham, Berkshire
Cover design by Paul Hewitt, Battlefield Design ( www.battlefield-design.co.uk )
ISBN 978-1-909384-62-0
eISBN 978-1-912174-33-1
Mobi ISBN 978-1-912174-33-1
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, manipulated in any retrieval system, or transmitted in any mechanical, electronic form or by any other means, without the prior written authority of the publishers, except for short extracts in media reviews. Any person who engages in any unauthorized activity in relation to this publication shall be liable to criminal prosecution and claims for civil and criminal damages.
Cover: Tanks advancing at full speed during an exercise in the Free State in 1988.
PREFACE
During most of the years of the Border War, I was a journalist at Die Burger , an Afrikaans-language Cape Town newspaper. We journalists knew more about what went on in the war in South West Africa (now Namibia) and the South African military involvement in Angola than the average person in the street. But we did not know all that much more, and what we knew, we could not publish without the permission of the South African Defence Force (SADF) which was not forthcoming with information at all.
What we heard from the other side, SWAPO, the Angolan MPLA government and Fidel Castros Cuba, was unadulterated propaganda. I remember well a press conference in the Netherlands in the late seventies when Sam Nujoma, leader of SWAPO, claimed that his forces had attacked and wiped out an entire South African infantry battalion in the north of SWA. One should only read his memoirs to see the pure drivel emanating from that side.
Having qualified myself as a military historian with a PhD, this frustrated me no end. Even then, I longed for a businesslike analysis in which propaganda and political partisanship would play no role. Alas, after wars end, the political posturing with notable exceptions continued. Politicians, ex-soldiers and even academics from whom one would expect better, continued the war, taking sides and fighting about who won the war.
In the end, I wrote my own history of the war, The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989 (published by Tafelberg in 2013 and Helion in 2015). In that book, I believe I called it as the sources dictated, without fear of favour.
But that book is over 500 pages long. It goes into considerable detail, perhaps too much for the average person whose interest in a far-off conflict is not that intense. So, when I was asked to do a much shorter book about the so-called Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, the climax right at the end of the war, I jumped at the chance. In this little book, readers will find a much shorter analysis of the war, especially of the final nine months. I also try to answer the question who won the battle, without descending into propaganda myself.
I should perhaps declare my personal interest. I am an exreservist soldier who received my military training in 1966 at the Army Gymnasium, a unit which was then regarded as an elite infantry battalion, taking in only volunteers. I then served with the Citizen Force Regiment University of Stellenbosch until the end of 1975, when my service was up. This was exactly when the war started hotting up. I was again recruited for the post-apartheid South African National Defence Force, with whom I served as a reservist staff officer (Captain) in various positions until my retirement.
Above all, however, I am a professional military historian who take my craft very seriously. Truth is what I try to serve, not politics. Whether I have succeeded, is, of course, for others to decide.
INTRODUCTION
Seldom in modern history has there been a military campaign so hotly contested in public memory as the one known as the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. In this campaign elements of the South African Defence Force (SADF), allied with the Angolan rebel movement UNITA, fought against FAPLA, the Marxist Angolan MPLA governments defence force, as well as the Cuban military. Under Soviet guidance, FAPLA launched a huge offensive in August-September 1987 from the village of Cuito Cuanavale southwards to eliminate UNITA, but was stopped on the banks of the Lomba River by SADF units. Together with reinforcements, these then embarked on a counteroffensive in which FAPLA was driven back far northwards, until the Angolans retained only a smallish bridge-head at Tumpo, on the eastern bank of the Cuito River and opposite Cuito Cuanavale itself. There, the final SADF attempts to dislodge the Angolans were rebuffed. And then, far to the west, the Cubans started advancing menacingly southwards toward the South West African (SWA) border, creating uncertainty in the SADF high command that SWA might be invaded.
At the same time, peace talks were started and, with American mediation, these led to the peace accord signed in New York in December 1988.
These are the bare, uncontested facts of Operations Moduler, Hooper and Packer, as they were known in the SADF, Saludando Octubre (the FAPLA name, referring to the October 1917 Revolution in Russia) or Maniobra XXXI Aniversario del Decembarco del Granma (as the Cubans called their contribution, referring to the first landing of Fidel Castro and his guerrilla band in 1956 on the shores of Cuba). But there the consensus ends. Ever since 1988 a furious battle of words has been fought between those who maintain that the SADF achieved a glorious victory, and those who say that the SADF met its nemesis and that this heralded the final downfall of the hated apartheid regime. Among those sympathetic to FAPLA and the Cubans, there has even been talk of South Africas Stalingrad, evoking memories of an enormous blood-bath among the South Africans and a humiliating surrender.
These claims have been hugely exaggerated on both sides. Nevertheless, there is a common thread in these opposing interpretations. The anti-South Africans, if one may use that term, emphasise the fact that the SADF in the end was repulsed at the Tumpo bridgehead during the final weeks of the campaign and that they could not take Cuito Cuanavale. They largely ignore the significance of the rest of the campaign. The South Africans themselves emphasise the victories at the Lomba River and downplay the Tumpo reverses. In fact, one SADF officer, the late Brigadier-General J.N.R. (Junior) Botha during the campaign he was a Colonel and Senior Staff Officer: Operations at Army HQ even maintained that there never was a Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.
Of course, a lot depends on the question whether the SADF indeed wanted to take Cuito Cuanavale. If they did, and failed, one may reason that they were defeated. If they didnt, this assertion becomes much more difficult.
It is clear that they cannot all be correct. In fact, this debate, which may even be called a Second Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, makes the impression that many participants are less concerned with the historical facts than with scoring ideological points or with defending reputations. However, a serious historian cannot be overly concerned with either politics or reputations. He must try and uncover the unvarnished truth. This is the purpose of this little book. Whether I have succeeded, is, of course, not for me to say.