Christopher Allmand - Aspects of War in the Late Middle Ages

The author and publishers wish to thank the following for permission to reprint articles in this collection:

Boydell Press (1, 12); University of Coimbra Press (2); Shaun Tyas Publishing (3); Centre Europen dtudes Bourguignonnes (4); Centre dHistoire de la Rgion du Nord et de lEurope du Nord-Ouest (5); PUF (6, 7); Presses de lUniversit de Paris-Sorbonne (8); Bibliothque de lcole des Chartes (9); The Institute of Historical Research, University of London (10); Alan Sutton Publishing (11); Liverpool University Press (13); Macmillan (14).

I would like to convey many thanks to the staff of Routledge who showed great patience during the lengthy process of preparing this collection. I would also like to express my gratitude to our four daughters, Catherine, Sarah, Celia and notably, Alison, who gave cheerful encouragement and hours of valuable assistance to this undertaking.

CTA March 2022

DOI: 10.4324/9780429317859-3

The military literature available to men of the Middle Ages was dominated by and, consequently, hugely dependent upon two classical texts, the Strategemata of Frontinus, compiled late in the first century, and the De re militari of Vegetius, written probably in the late fourth or early fifth century. Of these, the more significant was the work of Vegetius, whose influence developed steadily (and not always in a narrow military direction) as time progressed. That, however, is no reason for failing to acknowledge Frontinus, the importance of whose work Vegetius himself recognised in fulsome terms and which was to bequeath the medieval world a rich seam of exempla from which to mine information and ideas regarding military practice in the classical past which might be useful to later generations.

The career of Sextus Julius Frontinus (c. AD 35103) was one of public service, both civil and military. The holder of high office in Rome under a number of emperors, he also served in the army in Germany and in Britain, where he was governor from c. AD 76 to 78. His practical experience as Romes water commissioner was reflected in his De aquis urbis Romae, which describes the system of aqueducts bringing water to the city. Written some years earlier was a work on military science, now lost, to which the Strategemata, composed after AD 84, provided the evidence of stratagems taken from utraque lingua, both languages, Greek as well as Latin. It is this work whose fortune and significance this essay will attempt to trace.

In an introductory statement, Frontinus told his readers how it came into being. He had, he explained, already written a work on military science (res militaris), reducing its practices to a system. However, he felt the need to provide a complementary work which would supply examples of the teachings and recommendations to which he had given prominence in his lost work. The title was to be a Greek one, a collection of examples of wisdom and foresight to inspire commanders and to show them that, if modelled on those offered, their own stratagems were likely to be effective. Encouraged by a desire to save the time of busy men and at the same time underlining the utilitarian nature of the text, he was setting out a series of situations providing real-life historical situations taken from the writings of past authors, among whom Caesar and Livy stand out.

With Frontinus, the reader constantly faces the problem of how to get the better of the enemy who seldom appears to be far away. This creates a certain tension in the readers mind, which is preoccupied by one fundamental question: how, with minimum risk and danger, to emerge victorious from any encounter with the enemy. The successful commander is kept informed and up to date through the use of spies (a theme which will reoccur regularly in the pages which follow), for it is important to be as well informed as possible about the enemys plans, movements, numbers and capabilities. Foreknowledge gives a commander a hidden hold over his rival: he can use it, for example, in a surprise attack which catches the enemy unprepared; the state of unreadiness is the one which every commander must do his utmost to avoid falling into. Likewise, emphasis is placed upon the need to take full advantage of any mistake made by the enemy: the Latin word occasio, which we can translate as opportunity, sums up the need for the leaders of men to be ready to take advantage of any mistake made by the enemy which can lead to one side acquiring an advantage, whether physical or psychological, over the other. The reader of these texts will be impressed by the emphasis which each places upon human reaction to a given situation, and how fear can so easily take over as the guiding influence towards determining which emerges the victor from a meeting between rival armies or forces.

Intended, in its authors view, to complement his own analysis of ways of getting the better of opponents, Frontinus Strategemata consists of some 581 short descriptions of military events or episodes, most only a few lines long. Set out under broad headings in four books and referred to, perhaps significantly, as exempla in both Oxford, Lincoln College, lat. 100,

Without an associated text, however, the impact of the Strategemata was greatly diminished. As Frontinus had been at pains to point out, it was not in itself a work of original thought but a large collection of excerpts recalling past experience, diligently drawn up under practical headings, to bolster a work now lost. While the Strategemata offered evidence of Frontinus sound military sense, of his reading of certain authors, of his ability to put together a dossier, and of his appreciation of how descriptions of past events might be used to encourage those in similar situations in the future, these characteristics alone did not convey bestseller status. Its chance of becoming a useful compendium lay in forming an association with another work to replace the one lost. Only thus could this collection of pices justificatives acquire the authority it needed to become, in any real sense, a valuable tool.

In due course, this necessary association was to occur. When, some four centuries later, Vegetius like Frontinus a state servant but, unlike him, never a soldier came to write his De re militari, he breathed new life into many of the aspects of the fighting of war to which Frontinus had already given prominence. Placing himself firmly in a long tradition of military writers, going back to the Greeks and including Cato the Censor, Cornelius Celsus and Frontinus, Vegetius underlined themes to which Frontinus had given prominence. These included the importance of proper preparation and planning, and the emphasis to be placed upon defeating the enemy not through the weight of numbers but by outwitting him by gaining access to his plans and being ready to use deceit. Stress was also placed upon the need to maintain the morale of the fighting man, and on the important role which the general had in maintaining it. In short, much of what Frontinus had written, which Vegetius was to pick up from him and others who had contributed to the literary expression of the Roman military tradition, was centred upon the need for a thoughtful and human approach to conflict, involving real leadership. The general who planned and anticipated was more likely to leave the battlefield the victor than he who failed in these respects.