Preface
In his memoirs, former Secretary of State Cordell Hull states that in 1934 the United States was at the Oriental crossroads of decision. One road led to acquiescence to Japanese expansion. The other road led to resisting that expansion, with force if necessary. Hull remembers why he and President Roosevelt chose the second road. But Hulls recollection of the events of 1934 was faulty. He and his colleagues in the State Department did not advise curtailing Japanese ambitions. Instead, they merely continued the policy of nonrecognition and espoused the ideals of the Open Door. That approach achieved nothing.
Nevertheless, Hulls memory serves us well by reminding us of the critical nature of decision making in the early New Deal period. The United States was at a crossroads where many policy decisions intersected. The country had to select the appropriate direction for American policy in Europe, Latin America, and Africa, as well as the Orient. Crises occurred in each area that presented the Roosevelt administration with difficult choices. Selecting the appropriate path was made more arduous by the overriding need for the new administration to rehabilitate a devastated economy at home.
During the early New Deal period, from 1933 to 1937, the State Department assisted Roosevelt in the formulation of foreign policy decisions. At that time, the department enjoyed greater influence than it was to have later on when Roosevelt participated more directly in foreign affairs. For the most part, its influence was not beneficial. The department stubbornly adhered to principles or universal formulas or doctrines that did not fit the demands of particular situations. The Open Door policy, the Good Neighbor policy, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement program, the nonrecognition doctrine, neutrality, and noninterference all failed in one way or another to achieve the lofty goals they were supposed to achieve. There was, moreover, an excessive reliance on diplomatic techniques: signing treaties, reaching agreements, attending international meetings, and extending or withholding recognition of governments. In short, there is nothing to suggest that the State Department, despite its impressive array of professional diplomats and technical advisers, possessed any greater wisdom than the president.
To date, little has been written on the influence of the State Department on New Deal diplomacy. We have studies like Robert Dalleks, which survey the entire era from a presidential perspective, or studies that deal with single problems, like Robert A. Divines work on neutrality and Armin Rappaports and Dorothy Borgs on the bilateral relationship with Japan.
Like Feis, I believe that 1933 was an important year in foreign affairs as well as domestic. Unlike Feis, I have not limited the study to one year but have extended it to 1937, when Roosevelt began to take direct control of foreign policy. I also emphasize different aspects of the department in that period. Whereas Feis concentrates on personalities and events, I concentrate on ideas and policy. Furthermore, I disagree with his favorable interpretation, and I present a critical view of the recommendations the department made.
At the outset, I want to express my gratitude to those people who, in one way or another, made the completion of this book possible.
At Rutgers University I was fortunate in having two men with entirely different viewpoints supervise my work. The late L. Ethan Elliss seminar in the diplomacy of the 1930s was an exercise in the Rankian school of writing wie eseigentlich gewesen. Later, I learned from Lloyd Gardner to appreciate history as Lord Acton described it: as the record of truths revealed by experience... [and] an instrument of action and power that goes to the making of the future.
Good criticism is often difficult to find, and I consider myself very fortunate in having received the comments of several knowledgeable readers. Warren Sussman read the initial draft of this book. Wayne Cole subsequently corrected some flaws in my approach to the arms embargo controversy. Harold Hyman patiently sorted out both substantive and stylistic errors as the work neared completion.
I am also indebted to the staffs of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the Houghton Library of Harvard University, the Hoover Institution of Stanford University, the Yale University Library, the manuscript division of the Library of Congress, and the National Archives. I appreciate the opportunity I had to read the manuscripts under their care.
Two journals, Mid-America and The Historian, graciously allowed me to include in this book two articles I had written and they had published. is based on my article The State Department and Collective Security, 1933-34, The Historian 33, no. 2 (February 1971), 248-63.
Marlene Bennett, an extraordinary typist, created order out of chaos. My colleagues, Sally Black and John Pappas, proofread the book and made it even more orderly.
We were now at the Oriental crossroads of decision. There were two courses open to us. One was to withdraw gradually, perhaps with dignity, from the Far East. This meant acquiescence in the nullification of our treaty rights, the closing of the Open Door, further Japanese appropriation of pieces of China and other territory, relinquishing the protection of our citizens and abandoning them to unequal competition with Japanese-operated monopolies....
The other course was to continue to insist on the maintenance of law, on our legitimate rights and interests in the Far East, and on observance of the treaties and declarations that guaranteed an independent China and pledged equality to all nations, nonintervention, nonaggression, and peaceful settlement of disputes in the Orient. This meant a firm, though not an aggressive, policy toward Japan, especially in the light of her evident plans of territorial expansion by force. It meant adequate military preparedness....