For Catherine and Caroline
Published in Great Britain and
the United States of America in 2018 by
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Casemate Publishers 2018
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INTRODUCTION
The difference between a river crossing, however wide, and a landing from the ocean is that the failure of a river crossing is a reverse while the failure of a landing operation is a catastrophe My military education and experience in the First World War has all been based on roads, rivers and railroads. During the last two years, however, Ive been acquiring an education based on oceans and Ive had to learn all over again. Prior to the present war I never heard of any landing craft except a rubber boat. Now I think about little else.
General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, US Army, 19391945
Amphibious operations originated in prehistoric times because water transportationbe it by canoes or shipsis more efficient for moving men and supplies (or captives and loot). In modern times amphibious landings have with good reason been called the most complex of military undertakings. They require coordination between land, naval, and air forces. In land combat forces can retreat if things go wrong. In an amphibious operation it is virtually impossible to extract the landing force without catastrophic losses.
To add to the complexity, and risk, the logistics of an amphibious operation are inordinately complex. The attackers must foresee needs, and bring everything required for the operation.
In the ancient world necessary support included spare weapons and armorers, and horses. The support most often overlooked by historians is one all too familiar to modern logisticians: fuel. Horses in particular cannot simply live off of local forage, but require allocations of grain and other feed not always locally available. In the modern era requirements include not only fuel and other vehicle support systems like repair shops, but water systems, waste disposal, food preparation, hospital services, jails for prisoners, heavy construction equipment, and a host of other requirements. A large amphibious operation might best be compared to relocating an entire city.
The first real heyday of amphibious warfare came with the European colonial wars. This new era began with the global Seven Years War of 17561763, and reached its climax in the American War of Independence (17751782) and the War of 1812 (18121814).
Most early amphibious operations were extemporized, and sometimes resulted in botched landings that failed to achieve even local goals (Sullivans Island/Charleston, June 1776) or outright disasters (Marathon, 490 BC). The British landings at Aboukir Bay in Egypt (March 1801) during the Napoleonic Wars saw the first example of the application of modern amphibious tactics, but with the immediate death of the general who formulated them, the lessons were immediately forgotten by mentally ossified generals. In the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars a very simplistic amphibious doctrine began to emerge.
The next great era of amphibious warfare was World War I (1914 1918), but the failure of the Gallipoli campaign (1915 1916) led analysts to conclude that massed firepower had rendered amphibious attacks impossible. However, for the two powers vying for control in the Pacific Ocean, Japan and the United States, the need for amphibious operations was obvious. In the 1930s a modern and detailed amphibious doctrine appeared.
Doctrine is best defined as a set of governing principles by which military operations are conducted to accomplish specific goals. Early doctrine held that usually the success or failure of an amphibious operation lies in factors listed by Antoine-Henri de Jomini (Gnral en Chef, Napolon Bonapartes aide-de-camp) in 1838: rapidity of execution, duping the enemy as to the landing area, topography and hydrography favorable to the attacker, adequate naval gunfire support, artillery support landed as early as possible, and capture of heights dominating the landing beaches.
In 1940, conquest of mainland Europe by Nazi Germany threw all of the carefully crafted Allied plans for a conventional war in Europe out the window. Then in early 1942 the rapid expansion of Imperial Japan made amphibious campaigns an absolute necessity. Allied amphibious campaigns proved critical to expelling the Germans from North Africa, forcing entries into France and Italy, the recapture of southeast Asia, and the reconquest of the numerous Pacific islands.
We will trace the history and evolution of amphibious warfare from the Bronze Age until today, but any discussion of amphibious operations requires an understanding of basic terminology.
An amphibious operation is a military operation launched from the sea with the primary purpose of placing a landing force ashore.
An amphibious raid is a temporary incursion, with a preplanned withdrawal. In the modern era they are most often used to gather intelligence (Bruneval, February 1942), confuse or divert enemy attention (Makin Island, August 1942), to destroy enemy resources or key facilities (St. Nazaire, March 1942), and sometimes simply to test doctrine (Dieppe, August 1942). Raiding is an effective means to allow a weaker force or nation to boost morale, and to harass, distract, and cause dispersion of effort by a stronger enemy. These operations can have strategic results far out of proportion to the damage inflicted (Whitehaven, April 1778). In the era of European colonialism such landings were nearly ubiquitous.
An amphibious demonstration is a show of force with no intent to undertake an actual amphibious attack, encouraging the enemy to concentrate resources in an unfavorable location. Examples are the false landings in southern France used to divert German attention from the actual invasion sites in June 1944, and the threat posed by the American 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade during Operation Desert Storm that pinned major Iraqi forces in place (JanuaryFebruary 1991). A less obvious example was the creation of a phantom amphibious army under George Patton, intended to make the German Army divert resources away from the Normandy coast (MarchJune 1944).