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Text originally published in 1994 under the same title.
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ANALYSIS OF GERMAN OPERATION ART FAILURES
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN
1940
by
John Turner Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Introduction
This paper analyzes the 1940 German Air Operation called The Battle of Britain which was the prelude to the aborted Operation Sea Lion. Sea Lion was to be a seaborne invasion by the German Army. It was to take place following the Luftwaffes establishment of air superiority over both the English Channel and England. This paper does not get into the actual strategic or operational aspects of Sea Lion itself because Reich-Marshall Herman Goring Head of the German Air Ministry and Commander-in Chief of the Luftwaffe, was unable to establish air superiority over Britain. As a result, Hitler called off Operation Sea Lion on September 17, 1940.
The paper does analyze whether the Reich-Marshal Herman Goring, the Operational Commander for the German Air Operation used Operational Art ideas and techniques. The analysis is approached from the German side rather than the allied.
Background to The Battle of Britain
On 10 May 1940, Germany began the drive against France. Soon after dawn on Thursday, 18 June 1940, France surrendered and the British fighting forces were retreating across the channel to England. In only 39 days Germany had accomplished against France what had been impossible for them to do throughout all the years of World War I: The conquest of France. In addition to France, Hitler now controlled Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Poland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. He had regained for the German empire all its lost lands from previous defeats as well as vanquishing his historical European enemies. His only exception was England.
Hitler achieved his conquests with a speed that shocked the world. The German militarys development of blitzkrieg , the lightning swift coordinated offensive combining the Air Force and Army in a ruthless, quick, and overwhelming land and air attack on its opponents was proving to be the most devastating method of war yet devised.
At 1600 hours on 18 June 1040, Winston Churchill addressed the House of Commons and said: The Battle of France is over. I expect the Battle of Britain is about to begin. {1} But Hitler did not want a major conflict with Britain at that moment. Rather, his focus was on Russia. To Hitler, the Russian conflict was inevitable. He believed communism was an evil that he must destroy. {2} However, having recognized the undesirability of a winter offensive, Hitler wanted to wait until the Spring of 1941 to invade Russia. {3} He also recognized the difficulty of successfully waging a two front war. Therefore, Hitler wanted matters resolved with England as soon as possible.
For over 20 years, Hitler had known that to get the living space Germany needed, he would have to go east into Russia. {4} Long before the German attack against France, Hitler knew he would have to attack Russia before she grew strong. And, Germany might as well carry out the attack while her military was at its height of self assurance and success. Yet, Hitler had sworn he would never engage in a two front war and his instincts continually told him to avoid that eventuality. Therefore, a way had to be found to quickly take Britain out of the war. {5}
Hitler first mentioned the possibility of invading Britain on 21 May 1940, in a discussion with Grand-Admiral Raeder, Germanys Naval Commander-in-Chief {6} But there was not unanimous agreement on invading Britain. General Jodl, Chief of Operations at OKW, however, felt that an invasion might not be necessary. He believed that because of the German successes so far, England could no longer expect victory. Rather, England was now continuing the fight only for... the preservation of its possessions and its world prestige she should... be inclined to make peace when she learns that she can still get it now at relatively little cost. {7} Hitler agreed with this assessment and set out to write a peace speech for the Reichstag. To Hitler, it was imperative to get England out of the war before the planned Russian invasion set for the Spring of 1941.
But, England refused to concede defeat. As Winston Churchill said in his June 18 address to the House of Commons:
The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say: This was their finest hour. {8}
On 2 July 1940, frustrated that Churchill would not come to terms, Hitler ordered his military forces to plan the invasion of England. {9} However, he still hoped Britain would reach an accommodation that would make the invasion unnecessary. He was anxious to settle the British question quickly.
There was considerable disagreement among the Army, Navy, and German Air Force as to the desirability and method of invading England. Grand-Admiral Raeder, the Naval Commander-in-Chief, told Hitler he could not advocate invasion unless there were no other way to get Britain to agree to peace terms. Raeder preferred a naval blockade rather than an outright invasion. {10} The Army, however, was of mixed feelings. Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chef of the German Army, in an 11 July 1940 meeting presented an eager presentation to the Fuhrer on various army proposals for the invasion. General Halder, the Chief of the General Staff stated that the project was not wildly impractical, which indicated less than enthusiastic support. {11} Reich-Marshall Herman Goring, however, was extremely enthusiastic. He was convinced the Luftwaffe could so totally defeat England by itself with no help from the German Army or Navy: