Major John D. Dill - Fire Support In The Pusan Perimeter

This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHINGwww.picklepartnerspublishing.com

To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books picklepublishing@gmail.com

Or on Facebook

Text originally published in 2001 under the same title.

Pickle Partners Publishing 2015, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publishers Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Authors original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern readers benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

FIRE SUPPORT IN THE PUSAN PERIMETER

by

MAJ John D. Dill

Contents

Five years after emerging victorious from World War II, the United States became embroiled in the Korean War. In August of 1950, despite the relative industrial and technological disadvantages suffered by the enemy North Korean Peoples Army, the American Eighth Army was nearly defeated and pushed into the sea while trying to defend a toehold on the Korean peninsula around the port of Pusan. The poorly trained and equipped U.S. soldiers and marines defending the Pusan Perimeter relied heavily on fire support assets to stem the tide and defeat the North Korean attack.

This monograph asks if the fire support, including both artillery and air fires, provided to the Eighth Army Infantry and Armor units was effective. It also examines the reasons for the success or failures of fire support by contrasting the use of fire support by different Army and Marine Corps units as they defended the perimeter. Additionally, the monograph addresses the question of how the force development process shaped the success or failure of the Pusan fire support effort. Finally, the monograph discusses lessons from the Pusan defense that are applicable to current fire support and force development.

The monograph concludes that the fire support effort in the Pusan campaign was effective. However, because of the force reductions and training lapses that occurred after World War II in the United States Army and Air Force, it was not as effective as it could have been. The time taken to relearn the lessons of World War II and to rebuild units to doctrinal war time strength needlessly cost lives. The Pusan perimeter fight contains valuable lessons for current fire support leaders as they grapple with challenges similar to those faced by their predecessors in the summer of 1950.

Fire support has always played a critical role in Americas wars. From the earliest days of the American revolution when Henry Knoxs newly formed artillery regiment dragged captured British guns from Fort Ticonderoga to the heights above Boston and forced the British to abandon the city, Americans have understood the role of firepower in winning wars. As technology developed, the definition of fire support grew from cannons with lineage traced back to Henry Knoxs muzzleloaders to encompass naval and air delivered fires as well. Today, Field Manual 101-5-1 defines fire support as Clearly, fire support is an integral part of the American way of war.

The collective and coordinated integration and synchronization of the fires and effects of armed aircraft, land-based and sea-based indirect fire systems, and electronic warfare systems that directly support combat forces against ground targets to delay, disrupt, destroy, divert, damage, and limit enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of operational and tactical objectives.

In 1945, the United States emerged victorious from the largest war in history with the dominant combination of fire support doctrine, technology, material, and soldiers. From the invasion of Normandy on, the U.S. pummeled the German Army with massed artillery fires and close integration between the ground and air forces. Five years later, the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) nearly defeated the United States. The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) appeared from thirty-five years of colonial servitude to the Japanese in 1945 to challenge the most powerful nation on earth. Although the North Koreans received most of their arms from Communist Russia and China, the weapons and the technology dated from World War II. America had developed weapons that could effectively counter those in the hands of the enemy. However, most of these weapons were located in the United States, not with the units committed to fight from Japan. Thus, from August 5 until September 22 1950 American units, with their South Korean allies, teetered on the edge of destruction, defending a small perimeter centered on the port city of Pusan. This David and Goliath match up, by all conventional standards of national power, should have been an easy victory for the United States. What happened to the overwhelming American firepower that enabled the victories of World War II?

The story of fire support in the Pusan perimeter mirrors the overall story of American forces in the war. The decline of fire support began well before the Eighth Army was crowded precariously into the southwest corner of Korea. The seeds of disaster were sown during the general demobilization of the American military after World War II. These seeds were watered with the mistaken belief that the atomic bomb had removed the need for large conventional forces. According to the prevailing view in Washington, long range atomic bombing would handle all wars of the future. The Armys sole function was to function as a constabulary force.

The net result of this philosophy and action was poor readiness. In the fire support area, it manifested itself most obviously in the decision to fill combat divisions in Japan to only two-thirds of their authorized strength in personnel and equipment. Most Field Artillery Battalions (FABs) manned and equipped only two firing batteries instead of the three called for by both tables of organization and doctrine. Air Force units in Japan, organized under the Far East Air Force, believed that their primary mission was the Air Defense of Japan, not CAS. U.S. Army units in Japan were likewise misinformed, believing that they were there solely as an occupation force. Both services discovered that this misperception would cost them dearly in 1950.

Events early in the war also shaped the battle for Pusan. When the North Koreans attacked on June 25, 1950, they quickly routed the South Korean Army. The Republic of Korea (ROK) forces were not ready for the armored onslaught on the North Koreans. The same poor intelligence and lack of strategic vision that hobbled the American Army had kept the South Korean Army from developing into an effective fighting force. Although in isolated instances the ROK soldiers were able to stem the tide, for the most part they fled to the south. Their army was ill equipped, ill led, and ill trained. Their 65,000 combat troops had no tanks, only 89 working howitzers, and no air support. Its senior officers were incompetent. Most importantly, it lacked any reasonable way (baring suicide attacks) of stopping a tank. In contrast, the North Koreans had a well-armed, led, and trained army of 89,000 combat troops. It had 150 Russian made T-34 tanks, 122mm towed artillery along with 76 mm self-propelled guns, and a 132 plane air force. Of these advantages, the most important one was the armor. The tanks, despite their WWII vintage, were unstoppable against the ROK forces and quickly terrified them. By June 28, only three days after the initial attack, the South Korean Capital of Seoul had fallen. Half the troops and 70% of the weapons in the ROK Army were destroyed, captured, or missing. Thus, the United States immediately faced a decision it had not expected or prepared to make. It was obvious that unless America aided the South Koreans, the country would fall to the communist North. President Truman ordered General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, in Japan, to assist in the defense of South Korea.