Nik Cornish - The Russian Army in the First World War: Rare Photographs from Wartime Archives

Officers of the 17th Arkhangelogorodsky Infantry Regiment.

First published in Great Britain in 2014 by
PEN & SWORD MILITARY
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Copyright Nik Cornish, 2014

PAPERBACK ISBN: 978 184884 752 1
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Contents

Acknowledgements and Photograph Credits

This book is dedicated to my mum, my partner Angie, my children Alex, Charlotte and James and all those service personnel of the Russian armed forces who fought and died during the First World War in what W.S. Churchill so rightly called the Forgotten War the Eastern Front, 191418.

I should like to extend my sincere gratitude to the following chums who gave so kindly of their support and time during the writing of this book: Norbert Hofer, Dmitry Belanovsky, Stephen Perry and Andrei Simonov thanks lads!

Images are taken from the following sources:

Courtesy of the Central Museum of the Armed Forces, Moscow via www.stavka.org.uk: p. 15 T, p. 25 B, p. 26 all, p. 27 T, p. 28 T, p. 39 all, p. 41 all, p. 50 T, p. 77, p. 78 T, p. 81 B, p. 82 all, p. 84 B, p. 85 B, p. 92 T, p. 93 T, p. 94 B, p. 95 B, p. 97 all, p. 98 B, p .111 B, p. 113 T, p. 120 B, p. 121 all, p. 122 T, p. 123 all, p. 125 T, p. 129 T, p. 136 T, p. 139 T, p. 140 T.

From the fonds of the RGAKFD, Krasnogorsk via www.stavka.org.uk: p. 13 B, p. 24 B, p. 35 all, p. 57 B, p. 78 B, p. 80 T, p. 83 T, p. 85 T, p. 96 B, p. 99 T, p. 105 B, p. 108 B, p. 109 all, p. 110 all, p. 111 T, p. 113 B, p. 120 T, p. 125 B, p. 126 T.

From Nik Cornish at www.stavka.org.uk: p. 13 T, p. 14 all, p. 15 B, p. 21, p. 22 all, p. 23 all, p. 25 T, p. 28 B, p. 29 all, p. 30 all, p. 36 all, p. 37 all, p. 38 all, p. 40 all, p. 41 all, p. 42 all, p. 43 all, p. 48 all, p. 49 all, p. 50 B, p. 51 all, p. 52 all, p. 53 all, p. 54 all, p. 55 all, p. 56 all, p. 57 T, p. 63, p. 64 all, p. 65 all, p. 66 all, p. 67 all, p. 68 all, p. 69, p. 70 all, p. 71 all, p. 72 all, p. 79 all, p. 80 B, p. 81 T, p. 83 B, p. 84 T, p. 86 all, p. 92 B, p. 93 B, p. 94 T, p. 95 T, p. 96 T, p. 98 T, p. 99 B, p. 100 B, p. 106 all, p. 107, p. 108 T, p. 112 all, p. 114 all, p. 122 B, p. 124 all, p. 126 B, p. 127 all, p. 128 all, p. 129 B, p. 130 B, p. 136 B, p. 137 all, p. 138 all, p. 139 B, p. 140 B, p. 141 all, p. 142 all, p. 143 all, p. 144 all.

Courtesy of S.J. Perry: p. 24 T, p. 27 B, p. 100 T, p. 104, p. 105 T.

Preface

The concept that underpins this book is simply to provide the general reader of military history with a heavily illustrated overview of the First World War from a Russian perspective.

I hope that this book goes some way to de-mystifying the operations in that theatre and sheds light on events other than the Battle of Tannenberg, the cataclysmic events of the Russian Revolutions of 1917 and the subsequent horror of the Russian Civil War. Furthermore, some readers may be encouraged to a deeper study of this neglected backwater of the First World War indeed, it will certainly reward those with an interest in the exotic.

The Russian army fought on two fronts against three empires, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, all of which fielded not inconsiderable armies. It also dealt with a major internal uprising towards the middle of 1916 when the non-Russian population of Turkestan rose up against the Tsar in protest against the introduction of conscription.

During the last twenty years or so it has become much easier to access sources in the former Soviet Union, indeed, with political constraints removed, the study of the First World War and the Russian contribution to the Allied cause have become acceptable, even popular, in Russian academic circles. If this book helps to generate Western efforts in this direction, then it will have succeeded in achieving one of my aims.

For the sake of comparison with events on other fronts I have used the Gregorian calendar thus avoiding the irritation of adding thirteen days to Russian dates. The Gregorian replaced the Julian calendar under the Soviet regime in February 1918. I apologise to purists as many, more academic, books tend to use the Julian system until February 1918 whereas the majority of memoirs use the older dating style. Austria-Hungary is referred to as Austria and its Chief-of-Staff as von Hotzendorf not Conrad, as is quite often the case.

The images used throughout are, with few exceptions, drawn from archives in Russia and the states of the former USSR.

Introduction

For generations the Russian armies that marched to war during the summer of 1914 have suffered from the popular Western perception that they were ill-prepared, poorly led sheep marked for slaughter at the hands of the Kaisers superbly officered, well-equipped troops while the Tsar and his family occupied their time with mysticism and domesticity. However, this view of the Russian army is somewhat at odds with the reality.

During the course of the preceding century Russias military record had been an interesting one. Having contributed significantly to the defeat of Napoleons armies between 1812 and 1814, her strategic objectives re-focused on the dismemberment of the Ottoman Turkish Empire via the Caucasus and the Balkans and expansion into central and eastern Asia from bases in Siberia. The latter campaigns had no significant impact on Russias theory of war or the composition of her armies. However, the three wars fought against the Turks, 18289, the Crimean War 18545 and the Russo-Turkish War of 18778 did leave their mark, particularly the latter as it led to the beginnings of military modernisation with the introduction of a new field gun, infantry rifle and machine gun. Furthermore, it highlighted the weakness of the armys supply network and lack of medical facilities. Unfortunately, it also decided for many European military theorists that any subsequent wars would be short.

Russias next war was with the coming power in Asia Japan. By this time, 1904, the new rifle and artillery piece had been issued in large numbers, as had several dozen machine guns of different types. During this conflict the war revolved around two points. First, a significant part of the Japanese army in Manchuria was tied down besieging the Russian naval base at Port Arthur. Secondly, the majority of the Japanese troops were attempting to bring the Russians to battle. The war of movement ended with a series of engagements known collectively as the Battle of Mukden which was fought between 20 February and 10 March 1905. The Japanese plan was to outflank the Russians from the west, hold in the centre and to the east, then trap them in a double encirclement. As this plan unfolded the Russian commander and Minister of War, General A.N. Kuropatkin, responded indecisively and ineffectively. Attempting to control over 300,000 men spread along a front of 120km proved almost impossible. The field telephone system often broke down or their diaphragms froze and communications officers fell back on mounted couriers and runners. As a result of this problem and the lack of any roads not churned to mud by the thaw, it proved difficult to move reserves with any speed. Furthermore, the fall of Port Arthur, at the cost of 60,000 Japanese casualties over the four months of the siege, had released Japanese reinforcements and Kuropatkin ordered his men to withdraw before they were encircled.