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First published in Great Britain in 2006 by Pen & Sword Military
Digital Edition by Pen & Sword Digital 2011
Copyright Brian Todd Carey, Joshua B. Allfree and John Cairns, 2006, 2011
ISBN 978 184884 632 6
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Chapter 6
Late Medieval Warfare: The Return of Heavy Infantry
The Rise of the Swiss Battle Square
Although medieval commanders had long known the importance of foot soldiers as the backbone of their defensive formations, the return of heavy infantry capable of well-articulated offensive action began with the Swiss, who rediscovered this weapon system in their struggle with the Austrian Habsburgs and the duchy of Burgundy. As early as the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Swiss had developed heavy infantry who fought in a battle square that rivalled the best from the classical period and profoundly affected the development of European warfare in the late Middle Ages and beyond.
Fighting on foot came naturally to the poor Swiss mountaineers, suiting both the rugged terrain of their homeland and their limited resources. Isolated from the feudal mainstream of western Europe by the Alps and organized into small rural valley communities, the Swiss subscribed to the old Germanic tradition whereby all able-bodied men were expected to participate in their Waldstaaten or forest canton militia (Map 6.1). Also in the old Germanic tradition, Swiss cantonal societies were organized around clans, with clan leaders and aldermen serving on local councils that ruled through laws of their own making. Consequently, Swiss society was more democratic, less rigid and more unstructured than medieval societies elsewhere. But as the Middle Ages waned, the democratic ideals of the poor, rural forest cantons came under attack by the periodic encroachments of the neighbouring Habsburgs of Austria and Burgundian lords who wanted to impose their own feudal structures on the Swiss cantons.
Forced to take up arms to maintain their self-determination, the Swiss developed a militia-based tactical system shaped by their own social and economic realities. Like classical Greek citizen militia of two millennia before, the Swiss adopted the battle square or phalanx, based on a simple, distinctive heavy infantry doctrine and drilled themselves in its application. Before the late medieval period, these cantonal armies were essentially defensive in design and capability, but as the fourteenth century unfolded, Swiss militias gained the training, discipline and experience necessary for effective offensive action, and the Swiss heavy infantry tactical system was born.
Map 6.1The Swiss Wars.
The Swiss phalanx went through a period of evolution in size, composition and armament during its history. The early Swiss phalanx was composed of two or more cantonal contingents, called banners , because this is where the standards of the contingents were displayed. Each banner was commanded by its own officers and was divided into subunits called fahnleins , or little flags, of between 50 and 150 men. Fahnleins were further subdivided into ten-man squads called rotten or sections. In the early fourteenth century, when the Swiss Confederation was still small, the cantonal phalanx contained perhaps 900 heavy infantrymen arrayed in a formation of 30 ranks by 30 files. But as more cantons joined the confederation in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and a national army was born, the size of the battle square increased to 50 ranks by 50 files and around 2,500 men.
The articulation of the Swiss phalanx was excellent, with the battle square organized in deep files. Before the battle of Laupen in 1339, the normal configuration of Swiss forces was the keil or wedge formation. This tactical array was less a wedge than a column, narrower than it was deep. When attacked by enemy cavalry, the pikemen in the keil faced outwards and lowered their pikes, creating a bristling hedgehog that would be difficult to approach on horseback. By the battle of Laupen, this formation evolved into a true battle square, with the columns becoming squarer as the width of the formation increased.
By simply following the man ahead, the Swiss battle square could maintain its integrity, avoiding gaps like the smaller Roman maniple of the classical age. And like legionaries in the Roman maniple, Swiss infantrymen did not form a line on the battlefield, but usually arrayed in three squares in echelon or in a chequerboard formation reminiscent of the Roman quincunx. These squares consisted of a vanguard or Vorhut , smaller than the main body and often including skirmishers armed with crossbows or handguns; a main body or Gewalthut much larger than the advance guard; and a rearguard or Nachhut , which was usually smaller than the main body as well. The Swiss drilled, marched and even advanced to the attack to the sound of the drum, with some authorities stating that the troops marched in cadence. Swiss drill was sophisticated enough to defend the square in all directions when halted, but unlike usually immobile medieval heavy infantry, the Swiss stressed the offensive, and the militias drilled constantly to improve articulation, producing a battle square comparable to the Macedonian phalanx in manoeuvrability, cohesiveness and shock power.
Initially unarmoured and with no shield, the early Swiss militiaman fought with a halberd , a broad-headed axe with an 8 foot handle that had a point for use as a short pike, and a spike opposite the axe blade to hook a cavalrymens reins or puncture his armour. This weapon proved its worth on the battlefields of Morgarten, Laupen and Sempach in the fourteenth century, but subsequent battles in the fifteenth century between the Swiss phalanx and enemy formations showed the weakness of the short-hafted halberd as an offensive weapon, especially against well-armoured cavalry charges. The Swiss infantryman responded to this threat by adopting a long-hafted pike 10 to 18 feet long with a 10 inch long spearhead, giving him a formidable reach. By 1425 the pike was replacing the halberd as the primary offensive weapon of the Swiss army. By the end of the fifteenth century over two-thirds of the Swiss infantry were armed with this polearm.
When arrayed in a defensive posture for battle, the Swiss infantry square utilized the first four ranks of pikemen to create a hedgehog or hollow square formation, levelling their pikes outward on all four sides to discourage cavalry charges. Each of the five ranks held their pikes at a slightly different angle to achieve the hedgehog effect, with the first rank kneeling down and holding their pikes near the ground, the second rank stooping down and supporting the butt with their right foot, the third rank holding the pike at waist level, and the fourth rank levelling the spearhead at the enemys head. The men behind these ranks held their pikes sloping upward to the front to protect the square from missile fire. If the phalanx was advancing in an offensive manoeuvre, all pikes were held at chest level with the spearhead pointed slightly downward for a downward thrust.