Kevin Major - Armored Warfare In The Jungle Environment

Until October 1989, the Army's main focus was preparing to fight a war in Central Europe against Warsaw Pact countries. The main focus of planning and resource allocations has been on fighting a war in the European theater. Based on the threat of the Soviet Union attacking into the West German plains, the Army has built an armored force that is designed to fight a high intensity conflict using heavily armored forces. The United States Army has prepared numerous contingency plans outside the European theater and executed three of these in the recent past in Grenada, Panama, and the Middle East during Operation Desert Storm. The role that armor played in the first two conflicts was limited to only the employment of one light armored battalion during the Panamanian conflict, Just Cause. Both Panama and Grenada were extremely short in duration which did not allow for the employment of additional armored assets, but did demonstrate a need for the Army to look beyond the European theater to additional areas of the world in which it might be deployed.

Many people feel that October 1989 signaled the end of the Cold War in Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since then, not only has the Berlin Wall fallen, but East and West Germany have united after forty- five years of separation. Many Eastern European countries have begun to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, and even the Soviet Union is moving toward a more open, democratic-type society.

Because of these events in Europe, some members of Congress suggested that the United States should immediately reduce the defense budget and significantly decrease the size of the Armed Forces. One specific recommendation included removing all the Army's tank forces from the active Army and placing them in the Reserve Components. This suggestion focused on the premise that the Army's tank force was primarily oriented toward Europe. Congressmen argued that with a reduced European threat, the United States would not have a need for heavy armored forces in the active Army component. Additionally, the cost to operate an armored unit in the active Army is significantly more than in the Reserve Components. Subsequent to these Congressional discussions of active duty armored reductions, the United States deployed two heavy corps to the Middle East in reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. United States armed intervention in this theater of the world had been a possibility for many years due to the instability of the countries in the area and the growing demand for the abundant natural resources in this part of the world. The deployment of armored forces in reaction to the Iraqi threat to United States' interests demonstrated the need to fully understand the total role armored forces have in the Army, both active and reserve, especially in light of down-sizing all military forces by 1995.

Considering the locations the United States has been in conflict in this century and the role armor performed, it is important to closely examine the role of armor today. Armored forces are well suited for desert operations, as demonstrated by the North African campaign in World War II and the deployment to Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Storm. The desert's vast, open terrain allows armored forces to maximize their potential for mobility, long range fires, and shock action that they are designed to perform. On the other hand, the jungle environment is extremely confined in most areas, hindering observation and fields of fire for long range weapon systems, but mobility and shock effect remain important factors to consider. Armor was used extensively in the Pacific Theater during World War II and in Vietnam, but how armor was employed and what missions armored forces were assigned to accomplish must be understood in order to determine what the role for armored forces is in current times.

In order to commit military forces to any environment, there must be political interests and justification for such a contingency. Communism has continued to spread into Central America, threatening U.S. interests, and most Americans would not have predicted the United States' 1989 intervention in Panama, which is considered a jungle environment. There are similar areas around the world that are of interest to the United States where the Army's forces could be committed. In these jungle environments, the role that armor would have is currently uncertain.