Norman Polmar - 15 Mar

ADMIRAL GORSHKOV

ADMIRAL GORSHKOV

The Man Who Challenged the U.S. Navy

Norman Polmar
Thomas A. Brooks
George Fedoroff

Naval Institute Press
Annapolis, Maryland

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

2019 by Norman Polmar

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Polmar, Norman, author. | Brooks, Thomas A., author. | Fedoroff, George (George E.), author.

Title: Admiral Gorshkov : the man who challenged the U.S. Navy / Norman Polmar, Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Navy (Ret.), George Fedoroff.

Description: Annapolis, Maryland : Naval Institute Press, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018042638 (print) | LCCN 2018043734 (ebook) | ISBN 9781682473320 (ePDF) | ISBN 9781682473320 (ePub) | ISBN 9781682473306 (hardback) | ISBN 9781682473320 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Gorshkov, Sergei Georgievich, 19101988. | Soviet Union. Voenno-Morskoi FlotBiography. | Soviet Union. Voenno-Morskoi FlotHistory. | AdmiralsSoviet UnionBiography. | Sea-powerSoviet UnionHistory. | Soviet UnionHistory, Naval. | BISAC: BIOGRAPHY & AUTOBIOGRAPHY / Military. | HISTORY / Military / Naval. | HISTORY / Europe / Russia & the Former Soviet Union.

Classification: LCC V64.S65 (ebook) | LCC V64.S65 P65 2019 (print) | DDC 359.0092 [B] dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018042638

Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper). Printed in the United States of America.

27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 199 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

First printing

Maps created by Chris Robinson.

Modern naval battle consists of the inter-weaving of complex phenomena. The arena of this battle is the many miles of expanse in the depths of the seas and oceans, their surface, and the air which extends above them. The mightiest power engineering and radio-electronics and effective means of struggle compete here. But it is primarily the contest of people, the contest of minds.

Editorial, Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], 14 April 1970

CONTENTS

by John Lehman

FOREWORD

G reatness in a leader moves history. That view is not accepted by economic determinists, communists or geopoliticians, who believe massive tides and forces, not individuals, determine outcomes. The life of Sergey Gorshkov refutes the latter view.

Joining the Navy at age 17, a decision opposed by his distinctly academic family, Gorshkov rose and survived amidst revolutions, two world wars, repeated purges, plots, and endless intrigues to build and lead one of the great navies of the 20th Century.

As a non-political junior officer serving in surface combat, he was a disciplined, professional, and natural leader who rose quickly to command destroyers, cruisers, squadrons, and then fleets. During World War II, he was almost always in combat, alternating with staff positions where he made crucial decisions. With seemingly flawless political instincts, he realized that to succeed and survive in the Navy that he loved, he had to join the Communist party and be politically reliable. In this, he proved to be quite adept, impressing future leaders like Nikita Khrushchev while avoiding making enemies. During the Stalin purges of the late 1930s he saw many of his naval superiors executed or sent to the gulags.

Admiral Gorshkov had a vision of what kind of navy his country needed to be a great power, and he had the grasp of technology and its rapid development that was needed to guide weapons and warship procurement. At first the Soviet Navy benefited from Josef Stalins pursuit of naval superiority over the imperialists and the plans to build a massive conventional fleet. However, when Stalin was succeeded by Nikita Khrushchevnot unlike Harry S. Truman succeeding Franklin D. Roosevelta navalist replaced by a landsman, the Soviet Navys budget was decimated and warship construction virtually halted. Gorshkov, now appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, was wise enough to hold his tongue and bide his time.

That time soon came with the Cuban Missile Crisis during which Khrushchev was humiliated by the American naval blockade. Soon, with Khrushchev succeeded as head of the party and government, the successors to the leader realized that as a super-power the Soviet Union must pursue naval parity if not superiority. Admiral Gorshkov was the man to move things in that direction. The Soviet Government soon embarked on a building program developed by the admiral and his highly capable aircraft, warship, and submarine design bureaus.

Under his firm leadership the Gorshkov navy emerged. In 1970 he directed a massive, multi-ocean naval exercise called Okean-70 that created global shockwaves, ending any doubt that the Soviets were determined to challenge the naval supremacy of the United States. It was the largest peacetime naval exercise ever conducted with more than 200 surface ships and submarines, plus land-based naval aviation, carried out in multiple theaters of operations.

In little more than a decade after the Cuban Missile Crisis, with the U.S. Navy depleted and demoralized by Vietnam, in 1974 the just-retired Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, declared that the U.S. could lose a war at sea against Admiral Gorshkovs larger fleet.

Despite these forebodings, the post-Vietnam military reductions and Watergate scandal prevented any American reaction, and American and NATO naval policy became defensive and reactive.

This situation began to change with a new administration in Washington in 1981: a new, bipartisan forward-thinking naval strategy was funded and enacted which resulted in a rapid rebuilding of U.S. naval strength and a new strategy that undertook offensive naval exercises around the Soviet periphery. The U.S. Navy demonstrated that geography and superior NATO technology would give the West the capability of defeating the Soviet fleet and neutralize their conventional superiority in Europe. With the declining Soviet economy, hastened by the collapse of oil prices, it became clear to President Mikhail Gorbachev that the Soviet regime was nearing bankruptcy. Thus, when Admiral Gorshkovs reaction to the new U.S. naval strategy was to call for major increases in spending for the Soviet Navy, Gorbachev decided to send him ashore. The Admiral was retired in December 1985, one month short of the 30th anniversary of his appointment as Commander in Chief.

This riveting account by Messrs. Polmar, Brooks, and Fedoroff will be the definitive source on this great naval figure for decades to come.

John Lehman U.S.