Boundford. - Hitlers fortresses ; German fortifications and defences 1939-45

HITLERS FORTRESSES

GERMAN FORTIFICATIONS AND DEFENCES 193945

EDITED BY

CHRIS McNAB

At the beginning of World War II, defensive systems such as these seen in the Vosges Mountains in 1915 were critically out of date. (Topfoto)

I nevitably, the experiences on the Western Front during World War I had a strong influence, both negative and positive, on Germanys post-war defence doctrine. The positive aspect of World War I to the German military, from the doctrinal standpoint, was the development of what is informally known as the elastische Kampfverfahren (elastic defence, lit. elastic battle procedures). By 1916 it had been realized that solid multi-layered trench systems and an unyielding defence, aimed at holding on to every metre of ground, were impractical. Massive six-day artillery barrages would shatter both defences and the defenders. General der Infanterie Erich Ludendorff endorsed a more in-depth defence. While still relying on continuous interconnected trench lines, the defences were subdivided into three zones: (1) combat outpost zone with minimal lookouts to warn of attacks and keep patrols from penetrating deeper; (2) 1,5003,000m-deep main battle zone with complex trench systems concentrated on key terrain (rather than rigid lines covering all areas) intended to halt the attack; and (3) rear zone with artillery and reserves. While the battle zone still relied on trench lines, to establish the new defences the German troops actually withdrew (previously unheard of) in some sectors to more easily defended terrain, placed many of the trenches on reverse slopes to mask them from enemy observation and fire, and established strongpoints on key terrain. The establishment of the combat zone, supported by long-range artillery, disrupted Allied attacks. After fighting its way through the outpost zone the attack would often exhaust itself in the battle zone. Rather than attempting to halt the attack outright, penetration of the battle zone was accepted. The attack would become bogged down among the defences, battered by artillery fire and counter-attacks. This was first implemented in April 1917, and by wars end in November 1918 the defences were completely rearranged under this concept. It had proved itself, and was adopted by the post-war Reichsheer in 1921.

There were negative influences too of the experiences on the Western Front. The horror, misery and prolonged stalemate of trench or positional warfare (Stellungskrieg) encouraged many, like Hans von Seeckt, to find another way to wage war. Some form of mobile offensive was preferred and defence was regarded as necessary only for local holding actions or a temporary situation until the initiative was regained and the offensive resumed.

The elastic defence was codified in the two-volume manual called Fhrung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen (Leadership and Combat of the Combined Arms), published in 1921/23. This codification managed a compromise between those who still favoured the elastic defence (the old trench school) and those espousing a more mobile form of warfare. The manual stated that either form of warfare could be employed depending on the situation, but it clearly preferred the elastic defence, with improvements. These entailed more depth (both within each zone and in the distances between zones), and in fluid situations it called for a fourth zone forward of the three traditional ones. This was an advanced position of light mobile units, infantry and artillery, which would disrupt the attack and force the enemy to deploy early into battle formation. The advance units would then withdraw and constitute part of the reserve. Anti-armour defence was addressed, but there were few effective anti-armour weapons at the time, being prohibited for the Reichsheer by international treaties. What anti-armour defence there was took the form of artillery concentrations and obstacles. The combat outpost zone would consist only of individual and infantry weapon positions not connected by trenches.

Such was the theory. In practice, Generaloberst Hans von Seeckt, acting chief of staff, strongly discouraged any officer (with some being relieved of duty) from practising the elastic defence. Seeckt desired a mobile war of manoeuvre and shunned defence. Though Seeckt resigned in 1926, his successors continued to abide by his views, which remained in effect until the early 1930s. The practice of the elastic defence was permitted in exercises though. The rearmament of Germany in 1933 gradually saw the means become available to utilize a highly evolved form of mobile warfare. This was by no means army-wide, as the new Deutsches Heer (German Army) was still largely an infantry force relying on horse artillery and horse-drawn supply columns (4,0006,000 horses per division). The infantry divisions 27 rifle companies may have walked, but the division did possess a degree of mechanization via truck transport for headquarters, signal, anti-armour and pioneer elements. Divisional reconnaissance battalions too were increasingly mechanized, receiving motorcycles and scout cars, though horses and bicycles were still relied on.

The new defence doctrine, laid out in Truppenfhrung (Troop Command) in 1933, allowed the four previous zones a greater use of anti-armour obstacles, minefields, anti-armour guns behind the main battle position, and tanks assembled in the rear zone to support counter-attacks. The use of armour as a mobile counter-attack and manoeuvre force was not fully appreciated at this time, however, as German tanks had played no role in defeating Allied tank breakthroughs in World War I. They would be held in the rear to engage enemy tanks that had broken through and to destroy them piecemeal as they wandered through the rear zone. There was disagreement on the employment of anti-armour guns. While some might be attached to the advanced-position forces, most were to be positioned behind the main battle position to block tank breakthroughs. Others urged that they be positioned forward to pick off approaching enemy armour and break up the attack early. Individual infantrymen were to attack roaming tanks with anti-armour rifles and hand mines, which proved to be inadequate. As the Blitzkrieg (lit. lightning war) concept developed, the German Army became so offensively orientated that anything appearing too defensive in nature was at risk of being minimized.

This being said, Germany did invest, and invest heavily, in defensive structures, although the value and tactical purpose of these often sat awkwardly with Hitlers perspective on warfare. As this volume will show, the Third Reich sank millions of Reichsmarks, huge amounts of manpower and awesome volumes of concrete and steel into major defensive outworks. During the 1930s, the focus was on building up the Westwall (West Wall) on Germanys western border, and (to a lesser extent) the defences along the border with Poland. In many ways, however, the commitment made to these defences was less than total, and during the first two years of World War II they were largely irrelevant anyway. Poland was conquered in a rapid Blitzkrieg campaign in 1939, and Western Europe fell to an ascendant Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces) in 1940. Offence seemed to be the motive power of German success, so the defensive mindset took second rank in the thinking of the High Command.

Nevertheless, as Hitler turned his attention to the Soviet Union in 1941, and spurred on by British coastal raids, Hitler authorized the construction of his Atlantikwall (Atlantic Wall), a massive system of defensive works along the western European coastline, stretching from Norway to Spain. Then, as the tide of the war turned against Germany from 1942, the defensive impetus became more urgent. The West Wall was revitalized, and further defences built along the Rhine; the Atlantic Wall received fresh investment and a reinvigorated leadership; the so-called PantherWotan Line was partially built as an (inadequate) buttress against the Soviets from the east; various cities and enclaves were declared to be