William T. YBlood - Hunter-Killer: U.S. Escort Carriers In The Battle Of The Atlantic

Hunter-Killer

This book has been brought to publication
with the generous assistance of
the United States Naval Academy Class of 1945.

William T. YBlood

Hunter-Killer

U.S. ESCORT CARRIERS IN THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

BLUEJACKET BOOKS

Naval Institute Press
Annapolis, Maryland

This book has been brought to publication by the generous assistance of Marguerite and Gerry Lenfest.

Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

1983 by the United States Naval Institute

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

First Bluejacket Books printing, 2004

ISBN 978-1-61251-246-4

The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows:

YBlood, William T., 1937

Hunter-killer.

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. World War, 19391945Atlantic Ocean. 2. World War, 19391945

Aerial operations, American. 3. World War, 1939-1945Naval operations,

American. 4. Aircraft carriersUnited States. 5. Anti-submarine warfare. I. Title.

D770.Y34 1983 940.545160973 83-13166

The longest continuing battle of World War II was the Battle of the Atlantic. Many books have been written about the battle, primarily about the U-boats and the convoy escorts. Unfortunately, there has been a sort of veil, a murkiness, covering the operations of the U.S. Navys escort carriers in that arena. About the only thing most people know about the escort carriers in the Atlantic is that the Guadalcanal captured U-505. But the jeeps were much more involved in actions in the Atlantic than that one isolated incident would indicate.

A passage in the recently declassified Tenth Fleet/Op-20-G history of communications intelligence in the Battle of the Atlantic, while not specifically concerning escort carriers, places their role in this far-reaching battle in a clearer perspective.

The peculiar nature of the U-boat war, or the Battle of the Atlantic, it states, does not lend itself readily to the stirring descriptions which may mark the history of a series of major fleet engagements. It is not an impressive succession of majors but an attrition of minors. To the Allies this battle may have been inglorious, for it was a battle to deliver supplies. When seen as a whole, however, these minor engagements add up to a major battle upon whose outcome week by week the future prosecution of the war abroad depended. Whether striking or hiding, however the U-boat turned to or from attack it always threatened and exacted countless hours of ceaseless watch and patrol. An engagement, which goes on so long, is so devoid of spectators and correspondents, and is so far to the rear of the battle lines is apt to recede in memory with the passage of time, for it lacks the classical unities of the drama, being neither one in place nor the time nor the action.

Thus it was with the escort carriers in the Atlantican attrition of minors... being neither one in place nor the time nor the action. It is hoped that this book will lift the veil, help to blow away the fog of war that covered the actions of the jeeps in the Atlantic.

I would especially like to thank Dr. Dean C. Allard and his assistants at the Naval Historical Centers Operational Archives Branch for all their help. Without it this book couldnt have been written. I am also indebted to the many ex-CVE veterans who contributed material. Not all of their stories and comments could be used, but, once again, without them there could be no book. A special thanks to my editor, Constance MacDonald, for her very fine efforts. Finally, with deep appreciation, I must thank my wife, Carolyn, my daughter, Laura, and especially my son, Kent (who took on some of my burden by helping with the typing of the manuscript). They all gave me inspiration and encouragement when I needed it.

Hunter-Killer

On 3 September 1939, when German troops surged across the Polish border and World War II was ignited, the German Navy had only fifty-seven U-boats. Just twenty-two of these (the 626-ton Type VII and 1,032-ton Type IX) were really operational. The rest were smaller types useful only for training or coastal work. Kommodore Karl Doenitz (promoted to Rear Admiral and Flag Officer, U-boats, or Befehlshaber der U-boote, in October) had stated prior to the outbreak of war that at least 90 submarines would be needed in the Atlantic and 300 needed overall. Hitler (believing the war would be short) did not authorize a building program for some time, however, to the later good fortune of the Allies.

On the same date on the other side of the Atlantic, a weapon that would later come into direct conflict with the U-boat was hardly a gleam in the eye of U.S. naval planners, let alone built. This weapon was the escort carrier. Still, the seeds that germinated into the escort carriers of World War II had been planted years before.

Just after World War I the Americans became interested in British activities in the field of aircraft carrier development. In 1916 the British had converted a merchant ship to a carrier and thus obtained the 15,775-ton HMS Argus, which could carry twenty aircraft and steam over 20 knots. (It is interesting to note that the Argus could steam a bit faster and was a bigger vessel than the World War II Bogue-class and Casablanca-class carriers.) Noting the success of the Argus, the Americans began planning their own aircraft carriers. The first fruit of these plans was the Langley, converted from a seven-year-old collier.

Conversion of the ship began in 1919, and the Langley was commissioned on 20 March 1922. The Langley displaced 11,050 tons, had a flight deck 534 feet long, and could steam at a leisurely 15 knots. The Covered Wagon was frankly considered an experiment, but the tests she was involved in regarding equipment, training, and operational techniques led directly to the successful U.S. carriers of World War II.

During World War I the British had also been experimenting with conversions of light cruisers to carriers, though when the war ended these studies were discontinued. The idea of a cruiser-hulled carrier kept generating interest, however. When the Washington Fleet Conference of 1921-22 imposed limits on the total tonnage of aircraft carriers for the great naval powers, and the 1930 London Fleet Conference placed further limits on the building of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, the idea of small carriers was rekindled. Several loopholes in the Washington agreement left the Americans with the chance to use up to 25 percent of the alloted cruiser tonnage for conversion to ships with flight decks. However, in the mid-1920s the Navys General Board decided that it would not be a good idea to sacrifice a cruiser for a carrier that would displace less than 10,000 tons. The minimum displacement for a satisfactory carrier had to be 14,000 tons.