Stephen Napier - The Armoured Campaign in Normandy June-August 1944

( Courtesy of The History Press )

( Courtesy of The History Press )

The sun did not come up on the morning of 6 June 1944 along the Normandy coastline. Instead the darkness of the stormy night was replaced by an overcast sky above heavy seas still streaked with the white caps of breaking waves. As the light improved, the tense and increasingly awestruck German sentries saw that the once empty horizon was now filled with an armada of ships of every size and shape coming straight for them. The defenders manning the strongpoints of Hitlers Atlantic Wall were tired because of the constant false alerts since 0100 hours; now they could see with their own eyes that the alerts were real. Formations of low-flying aircraft with black and white stripes on their wings suddenly appeared out of the low-lying clouds and made straight for the defenders who immediately took cover. Most of the bombers missed their targets, however, as they were concerned about hitting the ships of the invasion fleet and their bombs detonated harmlessly in the areas behind the beaches.

Steadily the armada came closer, and the individual ships became more distinct. The outlines of grey behemoths became battleships and appeared along with the sleek lines of their smaller consorts such as cruisers and destroyers. In front of them were hundreds of smaller angular landing ships, rocket ships and landing craft, some of which were heading for the shore while others were performing a circular dance as they waited for their turn for the run in to the beaches. Suddenly the warships were lit up by flashes of gunfire along their lengths, and seconds later the howl of the approaching shells caused the defenders to hug the ground in their shelters and trenches closer. All along the Normandy coastline, giant mushrooms of dirt and debris erupted and the ground shook with the detonations of the shells. The air filled with smoke and dust and the strong smell of cordite. Amongst the terrified Germans, the religious (and some not so religious) began to pray for their salvation. Would the bombardment ever stop?

In the noisy, cramped landing craft of the initial assault wave, Allied soldiers huddled together facing the exit ramp, their helmeted heads bowed. Spray from the rough sea and the occasional desultory German retaliatory shell exploding nearby soaked most men before they had even landed. Those that werent seasick gripped their weapons more tightly; the religious and the suddenly converted amongst them offered silent prayers

Amongst the assortment of landing craft moving to the shore were dozens of what looked like small boats but which were actually amphibious tanks, an Allied secret weapon developed especially for this moment in history. As they moved sluggishly through the heavy seas, several disappeared from view altogether.

Since the United States had entered the war in December 1941 and were persuaded by the British and Churchill to follow a Germany first policy, the Americans had wanted to launch a cross-Channel invasion of France (Operation Roundup) from Britain. They considered this the shortest and quickest route to strike directly at Germany itself and honour promises made to the Russians to start a second front. However, once the Americans had committed to the British Mediterranean strategy in North Africa and Italy, Operation Roundup was repeatedly postponed until the British were finally forced to commit to a date of 1 May 1944 at the Teheran Conference in November 1943. Even then, the Italian Anzio landings caused a further postponement of a month.

The secret amphibious tanks were the first armoured units to touch down on French soil in a campaign that was expected to see the Allies victorious and the war ended by Christmas 1944. In this book, attention is devoted to the performance and deficiencies of the DD tanks; there are many fine accounts of the D-Day assault and the Funnies of the 79th Armoured Division already available, but the story of the DD tanks has not been told in full before. The attack on each of the invasion beaches is examined, with particular emphasis on the armoured debacle on Omaha Beach, where the assault almost failed.

Both green and veteran armoured units were fielded by the Allies in Normandy: a division from Canada, three divisions from Britain and two from the United States. The Canadian 4th Armoured Division, the Guards Armoured Division, the 11th Armoured Division and the US 3rd Armored Division were all inexperienced units, although a veteran regiment from North Africa (the 3rd RTR Royal Tank Regiment) had been incorporated into the 11th Armoured Division. Montgomery had transferred the veteran 7th Armoured Division the Desert Rats from Italy for the Normandy campaign. Independent tank brigades or battalions to support the operations of the infantry divisions were also deployed. Opposing the Allies were much-vaunted and experienced German panzer divisions (one untried in battle) against which only the British had fought previously and for whom they had developed a begrudging respect.

There are many accounts of the Normandy campaign already, but this is the first from the perspective of the armoured units and their generals, commanders and tank crews. It compares the intentions of both the Allied and German army and corps commanders in the major battles of the campaign with the outcomes of those battles and how they came about. It was in Normandy that the relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery became seriously strained, and the background to this irretrievable breakdown is explored.

The daily life of the tank crews is described as well as the organisation for the repair and replacement of tanks and crews after the devastating consequences of being hit by an armour-piercing shell.

Many historians have written only cursorily of tanks in Normandy, while others, in writing about the major operations such as Goodwood, have stated very different tank loss statistics. The main reference used by many historians is the Military Operations Unit (MORU) report No. 23 prepared in October 1946, which gives the daily losses for all the armoured brigades and their reconnaissance regiments for the four days of the battle. According to the MORU report, a total of 493 tanks were damaged, knocked out or destroyed, which has given rise to the accepted figure of around 500 tanks lost. Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel Roman Jarymowycz, for instance, writes that the plain before Borguebus was covered with nearly 500 burning British tanks. Anthony Beevor gives 200 tanks as lost but only writes about the first day, while Max Hastings claims 400 were lost. Others are more circumspect; Eversley Belfield and Major-General Essame give a total of 400 tanks lost but state that many were later recovered and repaired, while Major-General Belchem gives no account of the losses. Ian Dalglish also fails to give a total estimate of tanks lost, despite devoting a whole book to Operation Goodwood. John J.T. Sweet attempts a more rigorous analysis and arrives at the figure of 300 tanks stopped for all causes and 140150 tanks actually destroyed.

This book establishes for the first time the true number of tanks lost in Operation Goodwood and the other major battles of the campaign up to the closure of the Falaise Gap in August 1944. This is achieved by using official documents, reports, war diaries and regimental histories of the men and units involved, and, where possible, first-hand accounts of those tank men who were in the frontline. These have been obtained from research at archives in Britain, the United States and Canada.