J. Douglas Harvey - Boys Bombs and Brussels Sprouts

Copyright 1981 by McClelland and Stewart Limited

All rights reserved

The Canadian Publishers
McClelland and Stewart Limited
25 Hollinger Road
Toronto, M4B 3G2

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Harvey, J. Douglas, 1922
Boys, bombs, and brussels sprouts
eISBN: 978-1-55199-477-2
1. World War, 1939-1945 Aerial operations, Canadian. 2. World War, 1939-1945 Personal narratives, Canadian. 3. Harvey, J. Douglas, 1922- 4. Canada. Royal Canadian Air Force Biography. 5. Air pilots, Military Canada Biography.
I. Title.
D792.C2H37 940.54 4971 0924 C81-095046-4

v3.1

For Our Children

Did I really drop 68,000 pounds of bombs on Berlin?

Show me the damage.

Did I really boo a man called Mackenzie King?

Who was he?

Did I really make love to a girl on top of a barrage balloon?

Where is the balloon?

Where is the girl?

Was there a bunch of Canadian kids who flew bombers night after night, over Germany?

Does anyone know?

There is no official history of Canadas only bomber force, called No. 6 Group.

This book is not an attempt to correct that historical lapse. The humour, the foolishness, the pettiness, the cowardice, the terror, the stupidity, the ignorance, the shame, and the lust of men seldom, if ever, appear in official military histories.

The contributions made by Canadian bomber crews in World War Two have never been acknowledged and are little known or appreciated.

Little, if anything, has been written about the only bomber force Canada ever had No. 6 Group of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Most Canadians have never realized that in World War Two the Royal Canadian Air Force was the worlds fourth largest air force and No. 6 Group its largest fighting component.

Canadians should know. They should know the valiant deeds and magnificent achievements of the young men and women who so splendidly upheld the spirit and courage their fathers had shown in World War One. These young Canadians, who carried the old traditions into a new form of battle in the aerial war over Europe, set standards of bravery that equalled or exceeded anything previously known, and they did it with tremendous lan.

In order to set the scene it is important to remember that in 1939 the Royal Air Force had only a few small aircraft classified as bombers and hardly enough crews to man them. The Royal Canadian Air Force had neither. The emphasis, if any, in the early war days, was on fighter aircraft and the defence of Britain against invasion from Germany.

It wasnt until the smoke and flame of Dunkirk, the Battle of Norway, and the Battle of Britain had receded that bombing Europe really became a reality in the thoughts of the military planners. The moral arguments over the inhuman nature of bombing cities, debated so fiercely in the British Parliament and in the British press, finally found resolution in the peoples desire to give something back. (The arguments, however, persisted throughout the war, and indeed are still heard today.) Unable to invade the Continent, the Allies had little opportunity to strike at Germany unless they used bombers. Until the armies were strong enough to cross the Channel the main thrust against Germany would have to be through the air.

Bomber Command, while charged with this enormous responsibility, was given little or no priority. Ill equipped until 1943 it could not do much more than annoy the European coastal ports. Its small Hampden, Whitley, and Wellington bombers hadnt the speed, range, height, size, or navigational equipment to strike at large targets with the force necessary to inflict major damage. Yet they tried and tried again. When they were decimated in daylight raids by the swarming German fighters, they turned to bombing by night. Under cover of darkness they eluded many fighters, but failed to find many targets.

For three long years the bomber force grew slowly. Pathetically slowly. Aircrew and aircraft were needed for coastal squadrons to fight the Battle of the Atlantic and for operations in the Mid and Far East. Fighter Command still held priority with the aircraft factories. There were few large airfields, few training facilities, and very few aircrew. The stalemate, which saw the German and British armies dormant, separated by the Channel, dragged on as Bomber Command slowly gathered its strength.

Canada, which had little more than a paper air force in 1939, some 4,000 all ranks, somehow sent three squadrons to Britain by 1940 and then turned the RCAF into a national air training scheme. The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, (BCATP), was primarily based in Canada and from its hastily built training schools and airfields came the aircrew who would provide the force needed to tip the scales against Germany.

Today little, if anything, is known about the Canadian effort in the BCATP. Its airfields, scattered across Canada, lie unmarked, built over or unrecognized by the new generations. Unable to join the tiny RCAF in the early war years, Canadians and Americans had enlisted in the RAF and eventually 25 per cent of the force was Canadian while 45 per cent of all Commonwealth flyers were Canadian.

Prior to 1942, as the RCAF built up its strength, the squadrons it formed in England flew as part of the RAF. But the growing demand for recognition of the Canadian war effort, first by the Canadian Army, who wanted their own leaders and some control, and then by Canadians in general, led to the formation of the RCAFs own bomber group.

On January 1, 1943, the RCAF formed No. 6 Bomber Group, collecting its squadrons from the RAF. Eventually it consisted of fifteen heavy bomber squadrons, located two to a base on seven airfields in Yorkshire, the northeast corner of England. The RCAFs Pathfinder squadron, No. 405, was located south of the group at Gransden Lodge.

Like the RAF, the RCAF flew British made aircraft, the small twin-engined Hampdens, Whitleys, and Wellingtons, but not the giant four-engined Stirlings. Experienced Canadian aircrew transferred from the RAF to lead the newly formed squadrons.

As the ground stalemate continued, Britain looked more and more, if reluctantly, to Bomber Command for its offensive weapon. The massive build-up of bases, supplies, crews, and aircraft began slowly, since the other services fought viciously over the desperately short supply items and skills then available. It was only when Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Harris took command in late 1942 that Bomber Command became a visible fighting force.

An Englishman who had spent some early years in Rhodesia, this career RAF airman devoted himself day and night for the rest of the war to one single-minded purpose the destruction of Germany. His determination was unequalled by any Allied commander. Winston Churchill and his Cabinet had little faith in bombers nor did they relish the constant moral questions raised in the House of Commons about bombing civilians. But time and events were on Harris side. Hitler had turned his attention towards Russia; the aircraft factories were finally turning out four-engined bombers; and the flow of aircrew from the training schools began reaching Britain. Research boffins had focussed their talents to invent airborne radar, bigger and better bombs, and more accurate means of navigation.

Perhaps the greatest ally Harris had, although unwittingly, was Stalin, who was demanding that Britain invade Europe to relieve the German pressure against Russia. Unable to invade Europe by sea, Churchill gave more and more support for Harris bombers. It took until mid-1943 for Harris to build Bomber Command into a believable force.