First published in Great Britain in 2010 by
PEN & SWORD AVIATION
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Copyright Jon Sutherland and Diane Canwell, 2010
ISBN 978 1 84884 318 9
eISBN 9781844688883
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Introduction
T he photographs in this collection belonged to First Sergeant Wilhelm Plieschen, who served with the 2nd Company of the Fallschirm-Maschinengewehr-Battalion, as part of the 7th Flieger Division. The album is in three parts; the first charts the progress of the unit through the Balkans, taking the men from Austria, through Romania and Bulgaria, and into Greece. Although the men at the time did not know it they were destined to be airlifted to Crete. Indeed, Plieschen would find himself involved in the German attempt to seize Rethymno on 20 May 1941. It was to be a desperate and dangerous experience and many of his fellow paratroopers would be killed. The album then moves from Crete to the early experiences in Russia, probably in 1942.
The Germans had used their airborne soldiers or Fallschirmjger on attacks in the west in 1940. They had been utilised against Denmark, Norway, Belgium and Holland. Perhaps the most stunning exploit was the capture of the Belgian fort Eben Emael with a garrison of 1,200 men with heaavy weapons, artillery and antiaircraft guns all silenced by sixty-eight German Fallschirmjger.
At the beginning of the war the Germans were aware of the potential of either parachute or glider-borne troops. It had been glider-borne men that had seized the Belgian fortress. Paratroopers were used to take airfields and bridges across Holland.
Not all of the assaults were successful; they were often risky operations. Everything relied on securing a drop zone and breaking out from it after securing a suitable landing zone for reinforcement. The Germans had seen a notable success in Norway, at Narvik. Some of the drop zones had been easily overrun, but in other cases the British forces had simply withdrawn from the area.
By the time that it was Hollands turn to feel the brunt of the German offensive it was clear that there were many objectives across the country that needed to be seized ahead of ground forces. Several bridges and a airfields were earmarked and the Fallschirmjger was also charged with the task of trying to capture the Dutch royal family. An important lesson was not learned by the Germans in this operation; although many of the objectives were seized relatively quickly, fierce counter-attacks from Dutch troops proved that the Fallschirmjger would struggle to hold onto the gains unless reinforced. One of the key problems was the lack of heavy weapons.
By 1941 the Fallschirmjger was recognised as being a potential key to tricky operations. Much to the annoyance of the Germans they had become embroiled in the Balkans. Mussolini, irritated and somewhat ashamed of the German successes in the west, perversely chose to attack Greece, although his army was in no fit state to launch such an operation. The net result saw the Greeks throwing the Italians back over the Albanian border and threatening to overrun the hard-pressed Italians. With German plans to launch a major offensensive against Russia, they found themselves pulled into a situation that needed to be resolved with the maximum speed. Having attacked Greece the Italians had given the British ample opportunity to reinforce the mainland. Germany could not countenance British bombers being in range of their newly acquired Romanian oilfields. Consequently, not only did the Greeks have to be overrun, but the British also had to be ejected from the Greek mainland.
German troops poured across the Greek borders and Greek and Commonwealth forces began to slowly retreat. Hitler authorised the launching of Operation Hannibal on 26 April 1941. Fallschirmjger would seize the bridge at Corinth and cut off the retreating enemy and prevent their evacuation. The bridge carried the only road that crossed the Corinth Canal, linking mainland Greece with the Peloponnese Peninsula. Fallschirmjger pioneers landed in gliders close to the bridge and immediately began to remove demolition chargeges. The bridge was partially destroyed during a counter-attack, but by then many more Fallschirmjger had been dropped and they could secure the bridge area. As a result, 12,000 Commonwealth and Greek troops were cut off and captured, for the loss of sixty-three Fallschirmjger killed.
An even more ambitious operation was to be launched less than a month later. Once again the Germans recognised that the Mediterranean would continue to be under threat from Commonwealth forces as long as Crete remained unoccupied. The entire 7th Flieger Division of four regiments plus pioneers of paratroopers, the Luftlande Sturm Regiment of four battalions (glider troops) supported by the 5th Mountain Division, would be launched at the Greek island. Glider troops would land on the west of the island, around the airfield of Maleme. Later, air-dropped units and German mountain troops would support them once drop zones and landing fields had been seized. More troops wouould drop around Chania, the former capital of the island. Additional troops would target the other two major centres of population on the island Rethymno and the new capital, Heraklion.
What the Germans did not know was that their top-secret communications had been intercepted by Ultra. The operation was difficult enough, but this was compounded by the fact that the Germans lacked enough transport aircraft to make one decisive airlift. This meant that the troops being landed around Maleme and Chania would have to bear the brunt of all counter-attacks until the aircraft flew back to their bases, refuelled and then dropped the second wave of troops around Rethymno and Heraklion in the afternoon. Some of the drops were delayed and some of the drop zones were changed, but one of the major problems was that many of the Fallschirmjger were scattered across the countryside.
The Fallschirmjger faced mainly dispirited and poorly equipped British andnd Commonwealth troops. The handful of depleted Greek regiments on the island only had a smattering of rifles and virtually no ammunition. Nonetheless, a spirited and nearly decisive defence was put up, primarily by the New Zealanders, as well as some British units and Cretan irregulars. The Germans were very lucky in being able to take control of Maleme airfield; it was the key to winning the battle for the island. With the airfield open to German air traffic and reinforcement, the battle of Crete was as good as lost for the Allies.
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