Colvin Ian - Flight 777 : the Mystery of Leslie Howard

Andrew Colvin

E ver since Icarus, air accidents have always provoked curiosity way beyond the relatively small number of people who die in them compared with the number killed on roads. Having finally convinced ourselves on take-off that these heavy beasts can actually fly, we also find it difficult to understand why they crash on the unfortunate occasions that this happens. The Second World War produced a number of air incident mysteries which have invited all sorts of conspiracy theories without receiving any clear answers.

There was the saga of Rudolf Hess and his ambiguous journey to Scotland. In June 1940 there was the shooting down at Tobruk of the Italian air ace and Governor of Libya, Marshal Italo Balbo, just eighteen days after Italys declaration of war, to which he had been vigorously opposed. In 1942 Prince George of Kent was killed when a Sunderland flying-boat crashed into a Scottish hillside, in circumstances which were obscure and inadequately investigated. Then in 1943 there was Flight 777, the subject of this book, followed on 4 July 1943, by the death of General Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister in exile, shortly after take-off from Gibraltar.

In deciding to republish this book, we approached the subject with open minds to see how Ian Colvins work had stood the passage of time, the subsequent revealing of some information which was secret in the 1950s and investigations made by others since. Our analysis was that it was remarkably accurate. Colvins conclusion was that of an open verdict, but with a number of unanswered questions. He was clear that there had been an order for the Luftwaffe to intensify operations on account of Churchills visit to North Africa and return to Britain, but did not subscribe to the theory of mistaken identity of Chenhalls. Whether that intensification order was to include civilian planes has not been explained but if, as alleged, the rumour that Churchill was to pass via Lisbon and even use a civilian flight reached Germany, then it would have been logical to extend the net.

Some survivors of the Luftwaffe air crew protested their innocence, in the sense that this civilian plane G-AGBB was not considered by them the specific target of a planned attack. Thanks to the work of Ben Rosevink and Chris Goss, contact was made again with aircrew, though Hintze had not been interviewed before and was not mentioned by Colvin. Having read the reports, documents and copy correspondence kindly lent by Rosevink, and allowing for a number of inconsistencies and approximations, it seems quite likely that Hintze and Friedlein were being truthful to the best of their recollections. However, that is not the end of the story. Colvin seems to have been fobbed off with Robert Kowalewski as a substitute for Major Hemm, the man most likely to have given any direct line order. Colvins investigations took place at a time when the incident of shooting down this civilian plane could have been indicted as a war crime, and one would understand Hemms reluctance.

What emerges is that, although Hintze claims that he led the squadron that day (contrary to Colvins account), Bellstedt and Wittmer-Eigenbrodt were the pilots of the two higher-level spotter planes, and it was Bellstedt who led the dive into attack. Whether others followed his example is really a side issue. On the basis of the information available to date, we simply do not know whether Bellstedt had received any instructions from Hemm which were not disclosed to the rest of the squadron, or whether he was in radio contact with base. Nor do we know on what basis the flight plan was devised that would bring the squadron into the quadrant of airspace at the same time as the Ibis , though Ronald Howards information was that the planes on the Lisbon run had been regularly sighted by the Germans in the past.

No evidence has been found, or has survived, of instructions targeting the Ibis , yet there are still many matters which just refuse to go away, both in relation to the flight and to Leslie Howards mission. The catalogued files on Howard are no longer closed, but it is believed that there are still some previously uncatalogued Security Service files to be released as well as copy documents which may be found elsewhere.

The qualities of several of the passengers might have justified, in German eyes, an attack. For some passengers, their work was over so it would have been more a matter for vindictive satisfaction than a major step in the war; for Howard, Israel and, perhaps, Shervington nothing was over. Was there someone who was expected to be on the plane who did not in fact board? We do not know the names transmitted to Germany on the afternoon of Monday 31 May in that this communication has not been made available, and there is conflict between the different accounts. Father Holmes was taken off, but when? There are at least two versions. Then there is the uncorroborated assertion that Foley, an officer of MI6, should have been on that flight.

Colvins inclination was that Leslie Howard was not a deliberate target. Whether or not that is right, there remain questions about Howards mission. Despite Roosevelts unconditional surrender edict, contacts with German intelligence were taking place in the Iberian Peninsula; Howards role would not have been for traditional espionage or gathering of intelligence, but he could have opened some sensitive negotiation. Another strand came to light with the publication by Jos Rey-Ximena of El Vuolo de Ibis, claiming that Conchita Montenegro used her influence and contacts to introduce Howard to Generalissimo Franco, thus contributing to keeping Spain out of the war. If that were the mission, it might explain some of the nervousness of Howard at the prospect of going to Spain. Keeping Spain out of the war was an important goal, pursued by many in Madrid, but would that have been the only item on the agenda? There is no trace elsewhere of any meeting between Howard and Franco; if it did take place in all the chaotic friction generated between Starkie and his guest, then Leslie Howard would have been a far cleverer operator than the distracted, vague image would credit. Yet there is one curious detail: the picture of Conchita Montenegro appears in the original edition, but she is not mentioned once in the text. Was there an objection on her part? The Countess Miranda is not a proper substitute and seems an amalgam of several women.

Colvin concludes with the consideration of the intercepted message and what is the proper reaction on being alerted to something which could have catastrophic consequences for the persons affected. Whilst a message could well have indicated a suitable target, who knew how that would have been processed through the German system and whether it would have been translated into an order to attack? The Ultra decrypting of German radio messages was a vital defensive weapon in the war. Its secret was to be protected at all costs. In his final paragraph Colvin summed up the moral dilemma that faced the decision makers about a weapon whose very existence remained an official secret until 1974.

Since writing the above postscript, some further details can be added. Whilst they do not decide the issue as to whether the attack was a deliberate target, or whether there was a decision not to act on the information apparently received through an Enigma intercept, they raise questions as to what various people, and particularly British intelligence, thought they were doing in the Iberian theatre. Of three names which need no introduction, Kim Philby, Graham Greene and Guy Burgess, Philby and Greene had responsibility for disinformation in Iberia, whilst Burgess was involved in obtaining the necessary authorisation from the Ministry of Information for Chenhalls to travel. As for Chenhalls, his sister Joan Chenhalls MBE, was a member of MI5, which may have made the mistaken identity story rather easier. Then there was the presence in Portugal of Foley of MI6. Was he instrumental in the bumping of Derek Partridge, son of an MI6 man in Washington from that 1 June flight, and also perhaps an intervention in favour of Father Holmes? All this leads to the elusive key question whether Leslie Howard had a broader mission in his visit, with negotiating contacts which would not have been possible outside the Iberian neutrality.