Hermann Wilhelm Gring, (1893-1946).
This edition published in the United Kingdom 2012.
Copyright In new introduction Fonthill Media 2012.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission in writing from Fonthill Media Limited.
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Typeset in 11pt on 14pt Sabon.
Printed and bound in England.
Erhard Milch, (1892-1972).
Preface to the 2012 Edition
This remarkable book was written in 1942 and published in 1943 two years before the end of the War and yet its main predictions were correct. Thankfully the authors final prediction did not come true:
When the last desperate moment has come, the Luftwaffe can and probably will be used for the purpose of demolishing a good part of Europe. It will come at a time when the entire Nazi war effort is collapsing, and when the United Nations decline to make peace with Hitler or with one of Hitlers men. The Nazis then, I am afraid, will resort to actions and deeds compared to which everything they have done so far will seem humane. They will try to murder the four to six million prisoners of war who are today working in Germany, and who are more or less at their mercy. (The wholesale murder of Jews that is going on today is only a demonstration of what the Nazis are capable of doing.) There is no doubt in my mind that the Nazis will try to do away with as many inhabitants of the occupied countries as possible.
Perhaps the most striking part of this statement is the knowledge of the death camps; something that the Allies found difficult to believe to be true in 1942.
The book is a little-known work, and the anonymity raises questions. The reason for the author to hide behind a pseudonym is stated by Curt Reiss to be due to him having family in Germany. This may have been the case, but the author gives away so many clues, it would have been a dim-witted Nazi Party if they could not quickly and correctly deduce the true father of the piece. Books such as this would have got back to Germany via Spain, Switzerland or Sweden. The Nazi Party did not trade on niceties and would not have held back on arresting family members merely because the authorship was not explicit. It may therefore be assumed that this was not the true reason for the pseudonym. Unfortunately Curt Reiss died in 1993, and unless any other evidence is discovered, he will have taken the secret of the authorship to the grave. One possibility is that there was no Hauptmann Hermann, and that Curt Reiss was himself the true author, drawing on numerous sources from his circle of friends.
Whatever the truth of the matter, it remains that this is a valuable text full of fascinating information relating to the Luftwaffe. The author whoever he was was prescient, but also well-informed, and correctly highlighted the numerous failings of the Luftwaffe. The following extract is a sample of his interesting comments:
The Nazi flyer is very different from the German soldier, the German sailor, or the German man of the merchant marine. Most of these latter were either grown up or at least in their late teens when Hitler came to power. The flyers, on the other hand, are entirely a product of Nazi education. They believe much more strongly in Nazi ideas and in the Fhrer, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to influence them in any other direction. Men in charge of prisoners of war in Allied countries can testify eloquently as to the difficulties of dealing with these young Nazi flyers.
These young flyers are also very different from us, the generation of young pilots during World War I. The only thing we had in common was the hunger for adventure and the willingness to sacrifice ourselves entirely for the task.
When the generation of World War I started flying, it did so because here was something that could be built up. When after the war everything broke down, many of us started rebuilding again, in the face of great difficulties. These were idealists at least, most of them.
Perhaps the Nazi flyers are idealists of a kind, too. But they were early corrupted by Hitler and his Nazi ideas. They learned early that there was no particular reason to be decent, there were no moral ideals, there was only the idea of making Germany big and strong and of doing away with Germanys enemies, no matter what the cost to others. The Nazi flyers were seduced. Seduced so completely that it will be difficult, if not impossible, ever to win them back to any kind of normal life again. Those Germans who went over to Hitler because they thought that Hitler would be good for Germany may be saved from Hitler once they find out that the Fhrer was definitely not good for Germany. Those Nazi flyers, however, who went over to Hitler, seduced and hypnotized and in an indivisible religious, romantic, and mystic belief in the Fhrer and in Nazism, a belief that withstands any kind of rational argument they will never admit that they were wrong.
The author Hauptmann Hermann highlighted some profound and interesting points. 1) The Luftwaffe was not designed for a prolonged war; 2) The Luftwaffe did not believe in building spares or repair facilities; 3) The Luftwaffe made a serious mistake in not developing a heavy bomber. These points, along with countless other nuggets of information are amplified in the text.
The original 1943 publication did not include any illustrations. Fonthill have provided numerous illustrations in this completely new edition.
Introduction
The Luftwaffe the German Air Force will no longer have a decisive influence on the outcome of World War II, no matter how long it takes to beat Hitler.
It is more than two years since I first heard these words. The man who spoke them to me continued:
No doubt, we will hear of the Luftwaffe before the war is over. We will hear a lot. But dont let us be deceived. No matter what happens, the Luftwaffe can never be used as a strategic first-line weapon within the Nazi plan. It can play no role but that of a tactical and auxiliary weapon.
Even now, as I write these words, I wonder how many readers will feel that I am indulging in wishful thinking. Two years ago, when I first was confronted with these ideas, I was absolutely sure that the man who uttered them was talking through his hat. Two years ago Poland, Norway, Belgium, Holland, and France were defeated and occupied. Two years ago almost everybody in this country in fact, all over the world was convinced that the Luftwaffe was a formidable and probably an invincible weapon. True, the British had been able to accomplish the miraculous retreat of Dunkirk; but Dunkirk at that time was not yet recognized as the first defeat of the Luftwaffe. True, also, the Luftwaffe had lost the battle of Britain but that defeat, too, was not at all clear in all its implications. Therefore, the prediction that the Luftwaffe was through was not taken seriously at all two years ago. I know of no instance where the author of this prediction got more of a response than a polite shrug.