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Introduction
The twenty-two days from 6 to 27 May 2010 changed British politics, and changed my life.
In just five days, a coalition government was formed for the first time since the Second World War. After years of expectation of a great alliance of the LiberalLabour centre-left and in defiance of the general assumptions of most politicians and political commentators, the coalition that emerged was actually between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives.
I was fortunate enough to have a vantage point as these remarkable events unfolded. Indeed, I was one of those at the centre of the discussions and negotiations which led to the formation of this historic coalition. Just over two weeks later, however, my own political career moved rapidly from triumph to disaster, and I will not claim that it has been easy to treat those two impostors just the same.
In the twenty-two days covered in this book, I went from being a Liberal Democrat parliamentary candidate to being re-elected as the Member of Parliament for Yeovil, with a record majority for that constituency. I then helped to negotiate the coalition agreement, before joining the Cabinet as Chief Secretary to the Treasury the first Liberal/Liberal Democrat to hold that post and the first Liberal Treasury minister since 1931.
Alongside the Chancellor, I implemented within ten days the governments commitment to slice 6bn off public spending, and embarked upon some of the early work necessary to deliver an emergency budget statement. Then, after twenty-four turbulent hours, I resigned from the Cabinet and entered the record books once again, but less gloriously, as the shortest-lived holder of a Cabinet Office for 200 years.
A cartoon published in The Times just after my resignation has me reaching the peak of Everest, with my front foot about to rest on its snow-capped peak, on which sits a giant banana skin.
This was a turbulent and traumatic period for me, and those close to me. I regret, of course, the personal hurt experienced, as well as the fact that I am no longer able to contribute to the coalition government I helped bring into being. Waiting eighty years for a Liberal government to come along, and then not being part of it is a pretty frustrating experience.
I offer this memoir as a contribution to the historic record of British politics, rather than as a personal indulgence. I remain a very private person, even after the events and revelations of late May, and in spite of the demands which fall on all those whose life is spent in public office.
My intention in writing this book is not to describe an all too brief Cabinet career.
It is, instead, to inform those who are interested in this important period of British politics, and to make sure that an accurate account is left of what really happened in May 2010, before memories fade, myths grow and evidence is lost.
I also wish to ensure that an accurate and honest account is left of how the Liberal Democrats made difficult decisions after 6 May, before others seek to put their own spin on our motives and judgements. I am pleased to say that the other members of our negotiating team are too busy delivering in government to have time themselves for this task.
I have contributed in the Appendices a detailed written record of the key documentation involved in the coalition negotiations. I have considered carefully whether this breaks any implicit understanding of confidentiality, since some of these documents are being published for the first time. However, their contents have already been openly discussed by key participants in the talks. I do not, therefore, think that the arguments for secrecy are particularly strong. In any case, I hope that students of British politics will find these papers to be of interest.
In this book, I do not pretend to be providing a rounded account of the coalition talks, seen from all sides. That work is for others to complete. My account is very much my own, and is written from my perspective and that of my party.
Doubtless this will mean that I have missed some other important aspects of the negotiations, including the significance of direct talks between the party leaders. I have seen transcripts of some of these discussions, but not all were formally recorded in this way. No doubt the weight which I attribute to certain events will also be open to dispute. But that is a hazard common to all historical records.
I have put into quotation marks some of the words used by the key players in this political drama, but only where I have been able to rely on the written transcripts of some of the meetings, or my own notes made at the time, or indeed my clear memory of some parts of our discussions. Where these sources are not available, I have sought to summarise the conversations that took place, rather than seek to artificially reconstruct them.
I have also included an account of my all too brief period in government, in order to give a flavour of how the coalition established itself and began meeting the challenges facing it. Many of the most important early challenges relate closely to the responsibilities of the Treasury, where I was a minister.
I finish with a brief assessment of the coalition to date why it came about, its strengths and its weaknesses, and the challenges that lie ahead.
I would like to thank all those who helped me to cope with the events surrounding my resignation, including those many thousands of people who are not known personally to me, but who wrote, e-mailed or telephoned their support and encouragement.
I would particularly like to thank my family and friends, my constituency party in Yeovil, including Chairman Cathy Bakewell MBE, my agent Sam Crabb, Jill and Garry Shortland, and Tim Carroll, as well as my brilliant office staff of Sue Weeks, Sarah Frapple, Claire Margetts, Sadye McLean, Tom Powsey and Jeremy Gale. On the 28th and 29th of May I also particularly benefited from the loyal support of Paddy and Jane Ashdown, Jeremy Browne MP, Jonny Oates, Olly Grender, Julian Astle, Sean Kemp and Nick Clegg MP.
Finally, thanks to those who have read all or parts of this book, to check on my recollections and to suggest improvements: Olly Grender, Julian Astle, Paddy Ashdown, Jonny Oates, Tom Powsey, Danny Alexander MP, Andrew Stunell MP and Chris Huhne MP. I am particularly grateful to Alison Suttie, who supported the Lib Dem negotiating team and sat in on almost all of our meetings. Alison lent me copies of her detailed, contemporaneous, notes of these meetings and of some of the discussions between the party leaders. These notes saved me from many an error, and they have added enormously to the detail and reliability of this account.