Jewish Voice for Peace - On Antisemitism: Solidarity and the Struggle for Justice

Foreword

Judith Butler

There are many ways to approach antisemitism. A study might be dedicated to understanding what antisemitism is, what forms it now takes, and how best to oppose it. Another might ask why there are conflicts about how best to identify antisemitism, and to try to situate and understand those conflicts in light of their underlying political aims. Still another might set forward the proposition that any analysis of antisemitism ought to be conceptuallyand politicallylinked to other forms of racism. And yet another might ask about how the demography and history of the Jewish people are represented in contemporary arguments about antisemitism, or how the history of antisemitism has changed in various times and places. Still another might ask about the conditions under which the charge of antisemitism is made, who makes it, for what purpose, against whom is it leveled and why, and how best to judge whether the charge is justified.

As one seeks to open up these important intellectual questions, one is invariably asked to respond to the urgent ethical and political questions: Is antisemitism wrong? And should it be opposed in all its forms? The simple and clear answer is: yes. While it is certainly true to say that everyone in this volume agrees that antisemitism is wrong and must be opposed, it is not at all clear whether there is more generally a single understanding of what constitutes antisemitism (which acts, practices, forms of speech, institutions) or how best to conceptualize its workings. Barring a common understanding of what antisemitism is, it is not at all clear what is being claimed when one explicitly opposes antisemitism. If we could arrive at a single or, at least, a minimal definition of antisemitism, then we would not only be able to explain what we mean when we say that we oppose it, but we would also be able to bring that definition to bear on particular cases in order to distinguish, for instance, between charges that are justified and those that are not.

In our contemporary world, there is a great deal of conflict about how to identify forms of antisemitism. First, antisemitism is sometimes cloaked as something else. It takes a fugitive form when, for instance, a discourse emerges that presumes that there is a group that owns all the banks, or that actively makes use of conspiracy theories to explain how political events take place. The word Jew hardly has to be mentioned to be already nefariously at work in such a discourse. The same can be said about any reference to the blood libela scurrilous rumor that has been tenaciously circulated against the Jewish people for centuries, justifying attacks on and murders of Jews in Eastern Europe. The more explicit forms of antisemitism not only subscribe to gross generalizations based on ostensible anatomical or physiological characteristics, the attribution of a Jewish character, concocted histories, or the projection of sexual proclivities, but also engage active forms of legal discrimination, for sequestration, expulsion, or active oppression or death. Genocide is the most extreme version of antisemitism. And boycotts against Jewish businesses, especially in the history of Germany, are also clearly part of the history of antisemitism. These are all examples of antisemitism, but they do not, taken together, give us a single definition that could serve our purposes. In fact, far more important than a single definition of antisemitism would be an account of its history and its various forms: the language, the attitudes, actions and practices, the policies. That is the only way to know what it is , and that means we cannot expect that a single definition will hold for all cases. Or rather, if we do establish a single definition, it will of necessity be so broad that we will not be able to say immediately how and when it should be applied. After all, the charge of antisemitism depends on the ability to identify antisemitism in its various instances, and here is where the matter of interpretation does come into play.

Given the contemporary framework in which the matter of antisemitism is discussed, the conflict about how to identify its forms (given that some forms are fugitive) is clearly heightened. The claim that criticisms of the State of Israel are antisemitic is the most highly contested of contemporary views. It is complex and dubious for many reasons. First: what is meant by it? Is it that the person who utters criticisms of Israel nurses antisemitic feelings and, if Jewish, then self-hating ones? That interpretation depends on a psychological insight into the inner workings of the person who expresses such criticisms. But who has access to that psychological interiority? It is an attributed motive, but there is no way to demonstrate whether that speculation is a grounded one. If the antisemitism is understood to be a consequence of the expressed criticism of the State of Israel, then we would have to be able to show in concrete terms that the criticism of the State of Israel results in discrimination against Jews. Of course, it would be a clearly antisemitic belief to say that all Jews share a single political position, or that all Jews support the State of Israel, or even that all Jews are the same as the State of Israel (the State either represents all Jews or there is no distinction between Jews and the Stateit is all a blur). The latter claim rests on a gross stereotype and fails to acknowledge the various viewpoints and political affiliations of Jewish people who have very different histories, locations, and aspirations.

Distinguishing among the very different historical trajectories of Ashkenazi, Sephardic, and Mizrahi Jews breaks up monolithic understandings of what it is to be a Jew, and so deprives antisemitism of its noxious habit of vulgar generalization. It also foregrounds the demographic and racial differences among Jews, and it calls into question the way that Jewish history is so often narrated through the lens of European history alone. That some Jews suffer discrimination on the basis of their Arab origins also foregrounds the way that both racism and antisemitism can operate in tandem, but also how intra-Jewish hierarchies are built. Doing a better job of gathering those various histories will not only disrupt antisemitic generalizations, but also replace forms of inequality with a more diverse understanding of who the Jewish people have been, and continue to be. Finally, Jews within the Diaspora and within Israel hold a wide range of views about the State of Israel and Zionism more broadly. Is that diversity of viewpoint to be accepted as part of being Jewish, or does a critical position qualify a personor his or her utteranceas antisemitic? Just as we assume a diversity of viewpoints among Jewish people, so should we assume it about Palestinians and their allies. Is there only one viewpoint to be ascribed to Palestinians? In any case, the notion that the critique of Israel by Jew or non-Jew is antisemitic only makes sense if we accept that the State of Israel is the Jewish people in some sense. Indeed, that particular identification would have to be very firmly consolidated for the position to take hold that criticism of the State of Israel is hatred for, or prejudice against, the Jewish people in general. Of course, when and where those criticisms are accompanied by explicit stereotypes, there are good grounds for seeing antisemitism at work.

But what about the fugitive forms that antisemitism takes? Could we not say that the criticism is silently fueled by antisemitic hatred? That claim is a complex one, since if we accept that antisemitism has conventionally taken fugitive forms, it is clearly possible that it could provide a motivation for some criticisms. But how would one ground that interpretation? On what basis would anyone argue that they know this interpretation to be true? Is the problem that no motivation besides hatred can be imagined for the person who criticizes the State of Israel? Or is it that only someone deeply insensitive to the historical suffering of the Jews would not see clearly that hatred continues, and now takes the form of the critique of the Israeli state. Whoever holds that view would have to explain whether every criticism of Israel is a sign of an antisemitic motive, or only some criticisms. What difference does it make whether what is criticized is Israeli policies, the occupation, or the structure and legitimation of the State itself? Are only those who voice the latter criticisms eligible for the charge of antisemitism, or does the charge include members of all three groups?