Hall Gardner - World War Trump: The Risks of America’s New Nationalism

Writing this book, has, like many of my previous works, been like shooting at a moving target. But in this case, the Trump administration has been zigzagging through ever-changing policies like a vampire in flight. I would like to thank the American University of Paris library staff for their assistance with my book projects over the years, and Nina Bechmann and Mohammad Abdalhaleem for their valuable assistance in volunteering to check over my endnotes, as well as Soyoung Park and Anita Maksymchuk for helping build my website. And once again I would like to thank Isabel, who had to put up with me working on this project from early morning to late at night for several weeks. And my daughters, Celine and Francesca, whom I have generally neglected in the process. I would also like to thank my editor, Steven L. Mitchell, Jade Zora Scibilia, Hanna Etu, Cheryl Quimba, and Jackie Nasso Cooke for their support and help in working with me on this project, and for those at Prometheus Books who originally proposed the title, World War Trump.

Let us hope that this project is not in vainand that the Trump administration policies will not generate a global war. But, even then, it is crucial to begin to turn around the new arms race and concentrate on the real need for negotiated peace, development, and human fulfillment in the United States and abroadand on a truly healthy and inhabitable planet.

Even before Donald Trump's first one hundred days in office had finished, his administration was already confronted with a number of domestic and international crises. Trump's policy proposalsand efforts to implement those policies without full consultation with the parties involvedhave been met with significant domestic and international political opposition.

Trump's hastily conceived and executed foreign- and domestic-policy decrees; his often-incoherent statements, tweets, and actions with respect to Russia, Ukraine, Crimea, China, and Taiwan, and the ongoing wars in Syria and Iraq; his strong criticism of President Barack Obama's nuclear accord with Iran; his attempts to impose a ban on immigration to the United States from six or seven Muslim-majority countries of concern; his policies toward illegal immigration and Mexico and Venezuela; his efforts to extend the Global War on Terrorism to Afghanistan (again); his rejection of the COP 21 United Nations Climate Change treaty on global climate change; his failure to strongly condemn the white supremacist and neo-Nazi Unite the Right demonstration in Charlottesville, Virginia; his threats to totally destroy the country of North Korea in response to its nuclear weapons and missile programs; coupled with many other issues, have all generated considerable domestic and international controversy, protest, and dissent.

TRUMP'S MAJOR POLICY FLIP-FLOPS ON RUSSIA AND CHINA

It was not a very long time after he had become president that Trump had begun to alter many of his presidential campaign pledges, at least in respect to US foreign and security policy. Trump, who had depicted himself in simplified terms as essentially pro-Russian and anti-Chinese during the US presidential campaign, soon began to flip-flop on both positions, thus creating confusion as to what US global strategy should be toward its two major rivals.

In August 2016, with respect to Russia, presidential candidate Donald Trump had warned that US efforts to regain Crimea on behalf of Ukraine against Russia could result in World War III. Yet just two weeks after he became president, the Trump-Pence administration dramatically reversed course and took a much tougher approach toward the Russian annexation of Crimea and its political-military interference in eastern Ukraine. A year later, in August 2017, Trump reluctantly signed into law H.R. 3364, Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act, which strengthens sanctions placed on Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

Ironically, Trump's own contradictory foreign-policy proposals, plus congressional investigation into his alleged collusion and business deals with Moscow, and those of his associates, could potentially undermine his promised campaign efforts to achieve a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In addition to Trump's newfound support for Ukrainian claims to Crimea, which Moscow had rapidly annexed in 2014, other policies that could alienate Moscow include Trump's massive nuclear and conventional arms buildup, his opposition to the Iran nuclear accord, and his strong support for Saudi Arabia against Iran. And, in the long term, his push for US shale energy development, coupled with his support for the 2016 Polish-Croatian Three Seas Initiative, could potentially put the United States into direct rivalry with Russian energy exports to Ukraine and both eastern and western Europe.

Each of Trump's foreign-policy flip-flops are very problematic. Contrary to Trump's frequent declarations that NATO was obsolete, the Trump-Pence administration soon claimed that it will strongly support NATO, although it still expected allies to spend up to 2 percent of their GDP on defense. And, contrary to Trump's statements that he was indifferent to the European Union (although this was dubiously the case), Trump spokespersons began to claim that they strongly supported the European Union. (See .)

Prior to becoming president, Trump had stated that he did not care whether or not Ukraine joined NATO. Although Trump no longer appears to propose, as he did in November 2015, that Germany and the Europeans should play the major role in defending Ukraine, he has not yet stated whether he would seek to formalize Ukrainian neutrality or else bring Kiev into NATO. Instead of seeking a formal recognition of Ukrainian neutrality, the Trump administration, in part under congressional pressure, could decide to provide even greater US military assistance to Kiev in its struggle against Russian-supported autonomists in eastern Ukraine, thus further antagonizing Moscowif no diplomatic solution can soon be found. (See chapters .)

Both NATO and the European Union are in dire need of major reforms. Trump's policy flip-flops and unstatesmanlike emotional outbursts are not very helpful when concrete proposals are needed to solve complex problems. Most important, as discussed in this book, Trump needs to address the key issues of the proposed enlargement of NATO to Ukraine and Georgia, as they impact vital Russian security concerns. The United States and Europeans need to explore with Moscow the question as to whether alternative security systems for the Black Sea/Caucasus region and Ukraine can be implemented. And the world still needs to find ways to reduce, if not eliminate, step-by-step, nuclear weaponry where possiblein the process of de-escalating nuclear tensions with North Korea. (See chapters .)

With respect to China, Trump had initially planned to take a very confrontational .)

OTHER POLICY FLIP-FLOPS

Trump likewise flipped on his Syrian policy. In April 2017, in the midst of his dinner with Chinese President Xi, Trump opted for cruise missile diplomacy by firing 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles at a Syrian airbase. This action was ostensibly taken to punish the regime of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad for the purported use of chemical weaponry against the Syrian people in the ongoing civil war. The irony is that Trump had previously opposed similar missile strikes against Syria when Obama declared that Syria had crossed the red line in August 2013 after Damascus had previously been accused of using chemical weaponry. While Obama had opted not to strike, Trump decided to act: For Trump, Syria had now crossed too many red lines. Under domestic pressure to act, Trump felt he needed to show what he believed to be strength and decisiveness. But his cruise missile diplomacy did not result in any major changes in Syrian or Russian policies in that brutal war.