July Crisis
This is a magisterial new account of Europes tragic descent into a largely inadvertent war in the summer of 1914. T. G. Otte reveals why a century-old system of Great Power politics collapsed so disastrously in the weeks from the shot heard around the world on 28 June to Germanys declaration of war on Russia on 1 August. He shows definitively that the key to understanding how and why Europe descended into world war is to be found in the near-collective failure of statecraft by the rulers of Europe and not in abstract concepts such as the balance of power or the alliance system. In this unprecedented panorama of Europe on the brink, from the ministerial palaces of Berlin and Vienna to Belgrade, London, Paris and St Petersburg, T. G. Otte reveals the hawks and doves whose decision-making led to a war that would define a century and which still reverberates today.
T. G. OTTE is Professor of Diplomatic History at the University of East Anglia.
July Crisis
The Worlds Descent into War, Summer 1914
T. G. Otte
University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom
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T.G. Otte 2014
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First published 2014
Printed in the United Kingdom by Clays, St Ives plc
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data
Otte, Thomas G., 1967
July Crisis : the worlds descent into war, summer 1914 / T. G. Otte.
pages cm
Summary: Definitive new account of the catalytic events that led to the outbreak of
war. Thomas Otte argues that neither martial culture nor the alliance system played
a decisive role for much of the crisis. Instead he reveals the fatal flaws, failings, and
miscalculations of those who led Europe into war Provided by publisher.
ISBN 978-1-107-06490-4 (Hardback)
1. EuropeHistoryJuly Crisis, 1914. 2. World War, 19141918Causes.
I. Title.
D511.O83 2014
940.311dc23 2013047702
ISBN 978-1-107-06490-4 Hardback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
In memory of
August S., killed in action, 1 September 1916 ,
Henry S., missing in action, presumed killed, 12 April 1918 ,
two great-grandfathers, who fought on opposite sides .
Contents
Illustrations
Maps
Preface and Acknowledgements
And so theyve killed our Ferdinand, said the charwoman to vejk... Which Ferdinand, Mrs Mller?, he asked... Oh no, sir, its His Imperial Highness, the Archduke Ferdinand, from Konopite, the fat churchy one... They bumped him off at Sarajevo, with a revolver, you know. He drove there in a car with his Archduchess.
Jaroslav Haek
The First World War has cast a long shadow over the twentieth century, and beyond. One hundred years on, the horror of the conflict still commands attention, and will probably never cease to do so. How and why the civilized world, seemingly so secure in its material and intellectual achievements, could have descended into a global conflict has continued to intrigue not just historians, but also the general public. It has certainly puzzled me ever since I first developed an interest in the past. And the more I studied the period of the long nineteenth century, the more it became clear to me that the answer, in so far as there can be one, is not to be found in les forces profondes , the vast impersonal forces, that some think shape historical processes, but, rather, that the reasons, in so far as they can ever be fathomed, may be glimpsed in the doings of men (and they were all men in 1914), their flaws and failings, their calculations and miscalculations. It would be difficult to improve on Marxs insight that people make their own history, if not under circumstances of their choosing. Politics more especially are subject to the ambiguities of free will and the play of the contingent. In that lies hope for the future; but it is also a reminder of mans shortcomings. What follows here is an attempt to make sense of the events of Europes last summer.
People also matter in a less abstract sense. In the course of researching and writing this book I have incurred debts of gratitude to various people, and it is a great pleasure to acknowledge this debt. Anyone working on the origins of the First World War will be acutely conscious of the immense intellectual debt that is owed to those who have laboured in this particular vineyard before. To an extent the footnotes bear testimony to my debt to the wider scholarly community. A number of friends and colleagues, however, need to be singled out for special thanks. Keith Neilson once more proved a trusted source of advice and help. He made time during his own busy schedule to read the whole manuscript of this book, and it is immeasurably better for it. There was little that escaped his hawkeye. I am grateful to Bruce Menning, who generously shared with me his thoughts and ideas about the late imperial Russian military, and who patiently answered my many questions. Chai Lieven kindly sent me a copy of Basil Strandtmanns unpublished memoirs, and was the source of invaluable insights into the nature of the Russian state. Pursuing the Russian theme, my colleague at UEA, Peter Waldron, offered various thoughts and suggestions, for all of which I am grateful. I owe a special debt also to Roy Bridge, who volunteered his services as my very own k.u.k. Erz-privilegierter Haus-, Hof-, und Staatskopist , and from whom I have learnt so much about the Habsburg Empire over the years. I also greatly benefited from discussing Berchtold and Austro-Hungarian diplomacy with Sam Williamson. Lothar Hbelt, as always, came up trumps when I was stuck for an answer. I am grateful to Alma Hannig for sharing with me her thoughts on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. My colleague Jan Vermeiren provided insights into Ambassador Tschirschky and his entourage. Guenther Roth very kindly provided me with a copy of one of Kurt Riezlers letters. Zara Steiner and Erik Goldstein have been constant sources of encouragement and constructive criticism, and for that I am more grateful than they can know. Similarly, Vernon Bogdanor has kept me thinking about Asquith, Grey and the nineteen men around the Cabinet table in Downing Street. His judicious comments ensured that I was not satisfied with the obvious answers. It is a pleasure to acknowledge my gratitude to Simon Kerry for his thoughts and material on Lord Lansdowne. Sven Bergmann, as ever, was ready to pinprick my carefully formed ideas, and for that I thank him, too. Researching 1914 meant reading innumerable numbers of old books, and pulling yet another weighty tome off my shelves all too often reminded me what a gap my friend and fellow bibliomaniac Hans Seelig has left. I am grateful to Arnold Rosen for letting me talk about a subject about which I care so much. Over the years I have benefited also from conversations with Holger Afflerbach, Chris Clark, Laurence Cole, Mark Cornwall, Gnther Kronenbitter, Andrew Lambert, Margaret Macmillan, John Maurer, Annika Mombauer, William Mulligan and David Stevenson. I am grateful to all of them.