Dorter Kenneth - The Transformation of Platos Republic

Throughout our examination of the Republic we noticed the way Plato employs sharply delineated models that maximize contrasts and enable us to make useful distinctions as clearly as possible, but then proceeds to transform those simplified models into something that captures more of the nuance and ambiguity of the world. The models, in other words, have an instrumental rather than dogmatic function. The two most dramatic examples were the tripartite soul, and the two world view of reality (being and becoming) with its cognitive counterpart (knowledge and opinion). Both began as rigid tri- or dichotomies, whose lines of demarcation almost immediately began to blur, until they both began to resemble continuums rather than discontinuitiesin one case a stream that flowed into different channels (485de), in the other a continuous line. The line is divided first once, then twice, then subdivided five more times in one of its segments (523a-531d) and three more in another (511b-c, 532d-533a), and we saw that there were borderline cases within all of the boundaries. Not only did the formal models turn out to be more fluid than their initial appearance indicated, however, but the converse was also true: the apparently casual elements of the dialoguethe order in which subjects were covered and the apparently random lists and sets of examplesdisplayed underlying formal order and patterns. In Platos art, as in his ontology, rational structure and the fluidity of appearances interpenetrate each other.

The Republic s distinctions between appetite and reason, and between being and becomingwhich are seriously meant, however much they may be oversimplifiedshow that the relative value of living a just or an unjust life cannot be measured by the gratification of our appetites, which involve self-cancelling pleasures and fill us with an insubstantial kind of reality. The supposed advantage of injustice, insofar as it may bring us more rewards of that kind, turns out to be illusory, like that of runners who fail to pace themselves and start the race impressively but finish in disgrace. On the other hand, because the distinction between the substantiality of being and the insubstantiality of becoming can never be as absolute as it seemed, there is no purely rational calculation that can provide us with the right course of action. We must combine a rational understanding of the being of goodness with an ability to recognize the mean in the sensuous play of becoming. The latter is achieved through long experience, while the former is achieved though a discipline that weakens our devotion to unnecessary appetites and divisive pleasures, and intellectual study that strengthens our rationality. To apprehend the principle which gives rise to our own reality and that of the world is to find a fulfillment that makes all other kinds of gratification insignificant by comparison (516d), and thus quiets our rebellious impulses and brings us into harmony with ourselves (518cd).

The implications of the purely political aspect of the Republic have been much debated, with the proposed city conceived at one extreme as nothing more than a metaphorical device by which to display the nature of the soul, and at the other as an earnest blueprint for an ideal government. The first view is supported by Socrates own description of his project as psychological rather than political in character (368c369a) and his seeming indifference to whether it can actually exist (472e, 592ab); but when the development of the city leaves the parallel with the soul behind, as in books 5-7, and Socrates takes the trouble to insist that it is not impossible for it to come into being (540d), it is hard to dismiss the kallipolis as unintended to have political as well as psychological relevance. It seems then that the political dimension serves two functions. The first is to make observable our inner life in general, and the nature of justice in particular, by constructing a visible analogue in the form of a city. The other is to show how the image of political justice thus achieved can serve as a model for a society that promotes the ability of its citizens to achieve the highest level of human fulfillment (500d501b). The negative effort of disciplined abstention and the positive effort of pursuit of knowledge, which we make as individuals, can be institutionalized respectively through censorship and education. Protected from corrosive influences, and directed toward the highest forms of knowledge and reality, we become free to focus our energies on the pursuit of wisdom. But censorship can only be justified hypothetically, where the wisdom of the rulers is assured. In other societies the Socrateses of the world become not the authors but the victims of censorship.

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