Hoover Institution on War Revolution and Peace - Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can

M y first debt goes to my editors, Peter Berkowitz and To d Lindberg, for originally asking me to write this book and then being so patient in waiting for its delivery. I also am indebted to Kathy Goldgeier for her terrific editing work on the final manuscript. I also would like to thank John Raisian, the director of the Hoover Institution, for his support of this project and of all the work I do. I also want to thank the Smith-Richardson Foundation for supporting another major research project of mine on the external dimensions of democratization that has contributed to many of the ideas in this book.

I am also deeply indebted to the army of research assistants who contributed significantly to this book. Kate Berglund, Jonathan Gatto, Sherri Hanson, Tatyana Krasnopevsteva, Erin Mark, Whitney Ping, Rokas Salasevicius, Jessica Schaffer, and Rachel Silverman all did terrific work. Laura Mottaz stands out for the number of years she has helped me with the research for this book, but also for her intellectual contributions to this project.

The idea for this book germinated during my two years in the Hoover Institutions Washington office and then came to fruition during my time as director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University. I value few things in life more than smart, engaging, congenial, and fun colleagues. I had/have them in abundance in both places. For helping to develop the themes in this book, I am especially grateful for conversations, debates, and arguments with Rachel Abrams, Peter Berkowitz, and Tod Lindberg in Washington, and Larry Diamond, Gerhard Caspar, Eric Jensen, Steve Krasner, Amichai Magen, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, and Jeremy Weinstein at CDDRL. The staff at CDDRL always kept my spirits up, and Tram Dinh in particular was instrumental in providing the administrative and editorial support needed to get this project done.

Finally, I thank Donna, Cole, and Luke, for enduring all the distractions and strains this project imposed on our family life. To them, I promise never again to write a book under deadline.

I dedicate this book to Cole and Luke, with the hope that whatever they eventually do in their lives, they will continue to think about the struggles of the many democratic activists we have been privileged to host at our home over the years. In some small way, I hope they too will join the world movements for democracy.

Michael McFaul wrote this book before joining the Obama Administration in January 2009. The views reflected in this publication are his alone and do not necessarily represent or reflect U.S. Government policy.

HOOVER STUDIES IN POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIETY

General Editors

Peter Berkowitz and Tod Lindberg

OTHER TITLES IN THE SERIES

Victorious and Vulnerable

Why Democracy Won in the 20th Century and How It Is Still Imperiled

Azar Gat

Unchecked and Unbalanced

How the Discrepancy Between Knowledge and Power Caused the Financial Crisis and Threatens Democracy

Arnold Kling

Race, Wrongs, and Remedies

Group Justice in the 21st Century

Amy Wax

Countering Terrorism

Blurred Focus, Halting Steps

Richard A. Posner

Confirmation Wars

Preserving Independent Courts in Angry Times Benjamin Wittes

Uncertain Shield

The U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform

Richard A. Posner

Warrant for Terror

The Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty to Jihad

Shmuel Bar

Fight Club Politics

How Partisanship Is Poisoning the House of Representatives Juliet Eilperin

Preventing Surprise Attacks

Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11

Richard A. Posner

I n response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush embraced the promotion of freedom around the world as a major foreign policy goal of his administration. Bush had not come to Washington to spread democracy around the world. On the contrary, before September 11, he championed modest foreign policy goals: building a national missile defense system, managing relations with China and Russia, and getting the United States out of the nation-building business. The September 11 attack, however, fundamentally altered Bushs perception of the threats to American national security, as well as his strategy for addressing them. Over time, promoting democracy abroad, or what Bush called his Freedom Agenda, emerged as a major component of his new grand strategy for fighting what he described as a global war on terror.1As he explained in May 2003,

The advance of freedom is the surest strategy to undermine the appeal of terror in the world. Where freedom takes hold, hatred gives way to hope. When freedom takes hold, men and women turn to the peaceful pursuit of a better life. American values and American interests lead in the same direction. We stand for human liberty.2

Bush devoted nearly his entire second inaugural address to explaining the mission. He first described why Americans should care about democracy abroad: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.3 Therefore, he argued, American foreign policy must seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and every culture, with the goal of ending tyranny around the world. In this speech, Bush used the word freedom twenty-five times, liberty twelve times, and democracy or democratic three times. The following year, The National Security Strategy of the United States, issued by the White House in March 2006, opened with the following:

It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.4

By the end of Bushs second term, political support for the presidents focus on freedom had waned. In the last year of his administration, the U.S. Congress cut budgets to several democracy assistance programs.5 Some presidential candidates and leaders from both parties either rejected or downplayed the importance of democracy promotion. Academia and the think-tank world produced a series of books and reports explaining why the Freedom Agenda had to end.6 Perhaps most importantly, American popular support for the mission faded dramatically. In 2002, a Pew Global Attitudes Survey revealed that 70 percent of Americans agreed that the US should be promoting democracy around the world. In a 2007 survey, only 23 percent of respondents believed the US can effectively help other countries become democratic, while 64 percent thought democracy is something that countries only come to on their own.7 Only 26 percent of respondents in a 2005 national poll agreed with the statement, When there are more democracies the world is a safer place, while 68 percent believed that democracy may make life better within a country, but it does not make the world a safer place.8 Americans also gave Bush poor marks as a democracy promoter. In a July 2006 poll conducted by NBC News and the Wall Street Journal, only 2 percent of respondents thought the Bush administrations efforts to promote democracy had been very successful; 37 percent thought his policies had been somewhat successful, 26 percent found them somewhat unsuccessful and 32 percent declared them to be very unsuccessful.9