BOMB SCARE
BOMB SCARE
TheHISTORYandFUTUREof
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
With a New Afterword
J OSEPH C IRINCIONE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Publishers Since 1893
NEW YORK CHICHESTER, WEST SUSSEX
cup.columbia.edu
Copyright 2007 Columbia University Press
Afterword copyright 2008 Columbia University Press
All rights Reserved
E-ISBN 978-0-231-50940-4
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cirincione, Joseph.
Bomb scare : the history and future of nuclear weapons / Joseph Cirincione.
p. cm.
ISBN 978-0-231-13510-8 (cloth : alk. paper)ISBN 978-0-231-13511-5 (pbk. : alk.
paper) ISBN 978-0-231-50940-4 (e-book)
1. Nuclear weaponsHistory. 2. Nuclear nonproliferation. 3. Nuclear arms
control. I. Title.
U264.C57 2007
355.0217dc22 2006029174
A Columbia University Press E-book.
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References to Internet Web sites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor Columbia University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the book was prepared.
CONTENTS
F IGURES
: U.S. and U.S.S.R. Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles, 19481960
: U.S. and U.S.S.R. Nuclear Stockpiles, 19601980
: Nuclear Stockpiles, 19452006
: U.S. and Russia Stockpiles, 19862006
: Worldwide Nuclear Stockpiles
: Countries with Nuclear Weapons or Programs
T ABLES
: 1958 National Intelligence Estimate
: Countries with Nuclear Weapons or Programs, Past and Present
: The Fifteen Countries That Have or are Suspected of Having Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Weapons or Programs
: Proliferation Drivers and Barriers
: The Four Nuclear Threats
: Progress in Securing and Destroying Former Soviet Weapons, Launchers, and Materials
: Global Stocks of Plutonium and HEU
: The Fifty Countries With Weapons-Usable Uranium
: Nuclear Weapon States Capabilities
From the beginning, nuclear weapons have both terrified and fascinated us. Fear of the bomb motivated the first atomic program; the allure of the bombs power later propelled national leaders to build ever-larger arsenals. Today, fear of a nuclear attack by terrorists or another country has made nuclear proliferation the number one security threat facing the United States and many other nations. Yet several countries still maintain extensive nuclear arsenals developed for another era, develop plans for new weapons, and postulate new nuclear missions. Leaders in several other nationsmotivated by their own perceived security needs as well as by a desire for symbols of power and statuscovet the weapons now denied them.
This is a book about those weapons. More specifically, it is about how and why nuclear weapons have multiplied, and what can be done to slow, stop, and reverse their spread. This discussion makes one very important assumption: the proliferation of nuclear weapons is undesirable.
This assumption is far from universal. Since the early days of the nuclear age, there has been a vigorous debate among scholars and policy makers on this issue. Nuclear optimists contend that nuclear weapons are beneficial, that their presence enhances international stability, and that their spread is inevitable. Nuclear pessimists warn that nuclear arsenals create instability, that the risk of nuclear weapon useeither by intention or accidentis too great to accept, and that there is nothing inevitable about nuclear proliferation.
The optimists embrace the theory of nuclear deterrence, which holds that fear of a devastating nuclear counterstrike prevents states from attacking other nuclear states. Because of mutual deterrence, they argue, nuclear weapons prevent war between nuclear nations. Their presence enhances stability by discouraging rash or aggressive action. There is some compelling evidence to support this view. From 1900 to 1950, for example, one hundred million people died in wars. From 1951 to 2000, only some twenty million people suffered that same fate.
The pessimists disagree. They believe that we lucked out during the Cold War, when the two nuclear superpowers stood eyeball to eyeball, in former secretary of state Dean Rusks famous description of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
While presenting both sides of the debate, this book clearly aligns with the nuclear pessimists. Though no nuclear weapons have been used in war since August 1945, no one can guarantee that this good fortune will continue. There have been too many close calls in the past sixty years to warrant such optimism. The physical, economic, and political consequences of a nuclear explosion in any major city would be far beyond anything seen since World War II. The physical damage from the blast, heat, and radiation of a nuclear weapon would be enormous. A small atomic weapon of 20 kilotons (similar to those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki) would destroy or damage most buildings in a modern city and kill almost everyone within a 10-square-mile area, while a modern 1-megaton hydrogen bomb would kill most people within 150 to 600 square miles, depending on the ferocity of the firestorms created by the explosion. Radioactive fallout from the blast would kill thousands of others.
Profound societal damage would also occur. Physicist Charles Ferguson and scholar William Potter explain in a 2004 study:
Consequences stemming from a terrorist-detonated nuclear weapon in an American city would emanate beyond the immediate tens or hundreds of thousands of fatalities and the massive property and financial damage. Americans who were not killed or injured by the explosion would live in fear that they could die from future nuclear terrorist attacks. Such fear would erode public confidence in the government and could spark the downfall of the administration in power. The tightly interconnected economies of the United States and the rest of the world could sink into a depression as a result of a crude nuclear weapon destroying the heart of a city.
This threat stems not only from the 27,000 nuclear weapons held by eight or nine nations today but also from the possibility that new nations or even terrorist groups will join this deadly club. Many therefore conclude that we must find a non-nuclear alternative to global security. Upon receiving the 2005 Nobel Peace, Prize Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said, I have no doubt that, if we hope to escape self-destruction, then nuclear weapons should have no place in our collective conscience, and no role in our security.
This book reviews the history, theory, and current trends in nuclear proliferation before coming to several conclusions about current policy and how it can be improved to significantly reduce the global nuclear threats.
Our story begins with an historical look back for a very good reason: we forget most of what we learn. This is true of individuals and of nations. The first three chapters serve both as a narrative for an elaboration of the science and technology of nuclear weapons and as a reminder that many of todays challenges are new in form, but not in substance, from those of the past. Policies to address these threats have been debated for over sixty years. We now have a solid historical record to use in judging which strategies worked and which did not. Just as the policy choices made in the early days of the nuclear age shaped the Cold War nuclear threats, the decisions we make in the next few years will determine whether we will roll back todays challenges or launch instead into a new wave of proliferation.
