Larsen - On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century

ON LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Edited by Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner

Stanford Security Studies
An Imprint of Stanford University Press
Stanford, California

Stanford University Press

Stanford, California

2014 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University.

All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press.

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

On limited nuclear war in the 21st century / edited by Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner.

pages cm (Stanford security studies)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8047-8912-7 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN 978-0-8047-9089-5 (pbk. : alk.paper)

1. Nuclear warfare. 2. Limited war. 3. United StatesMilitary policy. I. Larsen, Jeffrey Arthur, 1954editor of compilation. II. Kartchner, Kerry M., 1956editor of compilation. III. Series: Stanford security studies.

U263.O5 2014

355.02'17dc23

2013033802

ISBN 978-0-8047-9091-8 (e-book)

From Jeff to grandson Kai Weston Larsen, in the hope and belief that his generation will continue to find ways to avoid the scenarios discussed in this book.

From Kerry to Britt Weiler Kartchner and Reece Hansen; Michelle, Trevor, Brayden, and Max; Brittany and Chelsea, for their love and support, and in the hope that history need not repeat itself where nuclear weapons are involved.

The editors express special thanks to the Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), the Air Force National Security Division (A5XP), and Science Applications International Corporation for their early sponsorship of the study series that led to this volume.

Contents

, Thomas C. Schelling

, Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner

Jeffrey A. Larsen

Andrew L. Ross

Elbridge A. Colby

Paul I. Bernstein

Paul I. Bernstein

Thomas G. Mahnken

Kerry M. Kartchner and Michael S. Gerson

George H. Quester

Schuyler Foerster

Bruce W. Bennett

James M. Smith

James J. Wirtz

Figures, Tables, and Map

Figures

Tables

Map

Foreword

WHETHER A NUCLEAR WAR, IF ONE EVER OCCURS, can be kept limited may depend on who reads this book. That a nuclear war, if it were to occur, could be limited is not always judged a good thing. During the Cold War the possibility that the president of the United States might authorize nuclear weapons to be used selectively was opposed by hawks as hold back SAC, a pusillanimous doctrine. It was also opposed by doves as possibly too much a temptation to a president facing a crisis or a troubled ground war. The judgment of the editors of this volume, and my judgment, is that both arguments have merit but that in the possible wars that we can imagine in the future, and not necessarily wars in which the United States is engaged, nuclear restraint ought to be encouraged and facilitated. And this book may help to encourage and facilitate, by calling attention to the important policy of mutual restraint, and increasing the likelihood that if nuclear use is ever contemplated the people making the decisions will have thought seriously about it before the moment of decision.

Depending on how you count, there have been, since 1945, eight or nine wars in which one side had nuclear weapons and chose not to use them (involving the USA, USSR, Britain, Israel, India, and Pakistan). Thats one kind of limited nuclear war, limited nuclear because the weapons were available and undoubtedly influenced both sides in the war. Another kind of limited nuclear war would be one in which both sidesIndia and Pakistan perhaps, or Iran and Israel, or North Korea and the United Stateshad nuclear weapons and chose not to use them. That, too, I call nuclear because nuclear decisions have to be made almost continuously. The third kind would be one in which both sides have nuclear weapons and use them but do so discriminatingly, with restraint, each side presumably ready to escalate along some axis if the other side appears to change the rules.

That third kind is what most of the chapters in this book are primarily concerned with. It is also, if it actually happens that the two sides can successfully arrive at an understanding, a remarkably cooperative and intellectually impressive enterprise. The two sides must arrive, probably tacitlyno overt negotiationat a common understanding of what the limits are to be. Limits could be placed on numbers of weapons, explosive yields, delivery means, targets selected, geographical areas, offensive or defensive use, advance warnings, height of bursts, and direct response to enemy action. But how to arrive at some number of weapons, or some yield limit, or some targets that are out of bounds without formal negotiation seems almost impossible. Perhaps somewhat direct negotiation, in the form of announcements or domestic discussion that the enemy can overhear, can help in arriving at a common understanding of what the proposed limits are.

Fifty years ago I published a couple of papers on this problem and reached a conclusion in one of them that it was hard to find any specific limit on nuclear weaponsnumbers, yields, or targetsthat was sufficiently conspicuous that both sides could confidently identify it as obvious. I referred to such a limit as a focal point. I conjectured that the only focal point for the number of weapons was zero. And I thought that both parties to the tacit agreement, or understanding, would recognize zero as the only compelling limit that could be arrived at without explicit negotiation. All that was assuming no prior communication between the parties, either before the war or before the introduction of nuclear weapons, not even communication that takes the form of public discussion intended to be overheard.

This thought brings me to the first sentence of this foreword: whether a nuclear war, if one ever occurs, can be kept limited may depend on who reads this book.

Exploring alternative possible limits, identifying plausibly agreeable limits, communicating suggestions or proposals, or just being seen and heard to discuss the idea of mutually recognized limits and how they may be arrived at is a likely prerequisite to arriving at understandings of how nuclear limitationincluding the limit of no nuclear usecan be overtly or tacitly identified as common understanding. This book is the only one I know that can induce national leaders, or their advisers, to take seriously the prospect of minimizing mutual damage in a nuclear war.

I hope this book gets read by governments everywhere that possess or contemplate possessing nuclear weapons.

Thomas C. Schelling, College Park, MD

Contributors

Bruce W. Bennett is a Senior Defense Analyst at the RAND Corporation, where he started by working on strategic nuclear warfare in the 1970s. He specializes in strategy formulation, force requirements, and responding to asymmetric threats such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He is also an expert on Northeast Asian military issues, having visited the region over ninety times and written much about deterring North Korean WMD use. He received a PhD in policy analysis from the Pardee RAND Graduate School.

Paul I. Bernstein is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at National Defense University in Washington, DC, specializing in nuclear policy, deterrence, proliferation, arms control, missile defense, and regional security. He is engaged in a range of research, policy support, and professional military education activities, and is a regular guest instructor at National War College, Eisenhower School of National Security and Resource Strategy, Joint Forces Staff College, Army War College, and Defense Nuclear Weapons School. He holds a masters degree from Columbia University.