Thatcher - Statecraft: strategies for a changing world

William Collins

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First published in Great Britain by HarperCollinsPublishers 2002

Copyright Margaret Thatcher 2002

Maps and graphics by Peter Harper

Margaret Thatcher asserts the moral right to be identified as the author of this work

A catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library

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Source ISBN: 9780007150649

Ebook Edition MAY 2017 ISBN: 9780008264048

Version: 2017-06-01

This book is dedicated to Ronald Reagan

To whom the world owes so much

For as long as there have been states, there has been discussion of statecraft or statesmanship. Yet just the sense of so much history lying behind the tasks and goals of statesmen today is sobering and provides perspective.

The early twenty-first century also has its distinctive features that govern the nature of statecraft now. These can conveniently, if not altogether satisfactorily, be summed up by the expression globalism. In the course of the rest of this book I shall examine, test and explore the realities behind that term in its application to strategy, international interventions, justice and economics. And I shall do this for different countries and continents.

I must start, though, with the state itself. If you were to heed some commentators you would believe that globalisation spells the end of the state as we have known it over the centuries. But they are wrong: it does not. What it actually does is to prevent in some degree the state from doing things which it should never have been doing in the first place. And that is something rather different.

A world of mobile capital, of international integration of markets, of instant communication, of information available to all at the click of a mouse, and of (fairly) open borders, is certainly a long way from that world favoured by statists, of whatever political colour, in the past. It is nowadays, as a result, more difficult for governments to misrule their peoples and mismanage their resources without quickly running into problems. Unfortunately, though, it is still not impossible. Many African governments get away with kleptocracy. Several Asian governments get away with disrespect for fundamental human rights. Most European governments get away with high taxation and over-regulation. Bad policies inflict damage on those who practise them, as well as those on whose behalf they are practised, but bad government is still eminently possible.

That somewhat gloomy reflection should be balanced, though, by three much more positive ones. States retain their fundamental importance, first, because they alone set legal frameworks, and having the right legal framework is enormously important probably more important than ever for both society and the economy. Second, states are important because they help provide a sense of identity particularly when their borders coincide with those of a nation and the more globalised the world becomes the more people want to hang on to such identity. Third, states alone retain a monopoly of legitimate coercive power the power required to

It is on the states role in the maintenance of international security that I concentrate in this book. This, in itself at least until the events of Tuesday, 11 September 2001 was slightly unfashionable. Todays politicians, at least in the democracies, had become almost exclusively interested in domestic politics. Of course, in one sense that was understandable. In a democracy we first have to win the votes of the electorate before we strut the world stage unless we are European Commissioners. As Disraeli once put it, a majority is the best repartee, and he might have added the best basis for diplomacy. But the fact remains that the great issues of war and peace which traditionally commanded the attention of statesmen down the ages should again command them today and to a greater extent than they have in recent years. Riots, epidemics, financial crashes all can be very frightening and disruptive. But war is still the most terrifying and destructive experience known to man.

Foreign and security policy, though, concerns much more than the two opposing poles of war and peace. It concerns the whole range of risks and opportunities which the far-sighted statesman must appreciate and evaluate in the conduct of his craft. Above all, foreign and security policy is about the use of power in order to achieve a states goals in its relations with other states. As a

One example. In 1910 Norman Angell, the Nobel Prize-winning economist, wrote a celebrated book called The Great Illusion. In this he argued that because of global economic interdependence particularly between the great powers and because the real sources of wealth that lie in trade cannot ultimately be captured, warfare conducted for material advantage is always pointless. There is a small kernel of truth in this. Peace, not war, promotes commerce, and commerce is the driving force for prosperity other things being equal. But in the real world other things are quite often not at all equal. Aggression may make perfect sense to a tyrant or a well-armed fanatic in certain circumstances. It may even appeal to a whole nation. Trade protectionism, which stops countries from having access to the commodities they need for their industries, may also lead political leaders to launch rational wars. In any of these conditions there is precious little point in either victims or onlookers protesting that everyone would be better off without war. The only alternatives on offer are to fight, or to raise the white flag. Concerns for a safer world and attempts to secure it are admirable. But when, as in the case of Norman Angell, they lead a writer to believe, four years before the most terrible conflict the world has known, that it is absolutely certain and even the militarists admit this that the natural tendencies of the average man are setting more and more away from war then something is badly wrong.

He upheld the system and the values of the Prussian state, not those of a liberal democratic Germany. Whatever you think of this policy, it was not mere pragmatism.

Moreover, in the age of democracy the pursuit of statecraft without regard for moral principles is all but impossible, and it makes little sense for even the most hard-nosed statesmen to ignore this fact. Since Gladstones Midlothian Campaigns in 1879 and 1880 launched on the back of denunciations of Britains foreign policy as immoral politicians who try to appeal exclusively to national interest have repeatedly run into trouble with national electorates. And the rise of America, as a great power with an easily troubled conscience, has confirmed that trend.