Critical theory and feeling
Critical theory and contemporary society
Series editors:
David M. Berry, Professor of Critical Theory and Modern European History University of Sussex
Darrow Schecter, Reader in Critical Theory, University of Sussex
The Critical Theory and Contemporary Society series aims to demonstrate the ongoing relevance of multi-disciplinary research in explaining the causes of pressing social problems today and in indicating the possible paths towards a libertarian transformation of twenty-first century society. It builds upon some of the main ideas of first generation critical theorists, including Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse and Fromm, but it does not aim to provide systematic guides to the work of those thinkers. Rather, each volume focuses on ways of thinking about the political dimensions of a particular topic, which include political economy, law, popular culture, globalization, feminism, theology and terrorism. Authors are encouraged to build on the legacy of first generation Frankfurt School theorists and their influences (Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Weber and Freud) in a manner that is distinct from, though not necessarily hostile to, the broad lines of second-generation critical theory. The series sets ambitious theoretical standards, aiming to engage and challenge an interdisciplinary readership of students and scholars across political theory, philosophy, sociology, history, media studies and literary studies.
Previously published by Bloomsbury
Critical theory in the twenty-first century Darrow Schecter
Critical theory and the critique of political economy Werner Bonefeld
Critical theory and contemporary Europe William Outhwaite
Critical theory of legal revolutions Hauke Brunkhorst
Critical theory of libertarian socialism Charles Masquelier
Critical theory and film Fabio Vighi
Critical theory and the digital David Berry
Critical theory and disability Teodor Mladenov
Critical theory and the crisis of contemporary capitalism Heiko Feldner and Fabio Vighi
Previously published by Manchester University Press
Critical theory and epistemology Anastasia Marinopoulou
Forthcoming from Manchester University Press
Critical theory and legal autopoiesis Gunther Teubner
Critical theory and contemporary technology Ben Roberts
Critical theory and sociological theory Darrow Schecter
Critical theory and demagogic populism Paul K. Jones
Critical theory and feeling
The affective politics of the early Frankfurt School
SIMON MUSSELL
Manchester University Press
Copyright Simon Mussell 2017
The right of Simon Mussell to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Published by Manchester University Press
Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA
www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978 1 5261 0570 7 hardback
First published 2017
The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Typeset by Out of House Publishing
Contents
The cover of this book is a lie, for no book has a single author. Over the past decade, I have had the good fortune of sharing ideas with many friends and comrades. Their generosity and engagement have made this book possible. Our interactions some fleeting and sporadic, others more sustained have moved me, both affectively and intellectually. In this regard, I am particularly grateful to Darrow Schecter, Doug Haynes, Chris OKane, lise Derroitte, Antonia Hofstaetter, Gordon Finlayson, Federica Gregoratto, Tim Carter, Zoe Sutherland, Christos Hadjioannou, Annabel Haynes, Daniel Steuer, Silvia Panizza, Teodor Mladenov, Arthur Willemse, Danny Hayward, Phil Homburg, Keith Tester, Marc Botha, Jennifer Cooke, Chris Allsobrook, Matthew Feldman, Verena Erlenbusch, and Jana Elsen.
At a time when there is much talk of the intangible and immaterial qualities of the arts and humanities, we must not lose sight of the material conditions that surround and enable any act of writing. For all its abstraction, this book could not have been written without the concrete support of my family and friends. I am forever indebted to them.
Finally, I am especially grateful to Julie Taylor for her love, encouragement, and intellectual stimulation over the years. The book is dedicated to her.
Whatever material has made it into the following pages bears traces of this collective experience. Needless to say, responsibility for the texts inevitable shortcomings lies solely with me.
Once the last trace of emotion has been eradicated, nothing remains of thought but absolute tautology.
Theodor W. Adorno
For most of its history, political philosophy has been distrustful of feelings. Its adherents have often cordoned off the mind from the body, thought from feeling, active subjects from passive objects. From the pre-Socratics onward, the bulk of philosophical tradition has been concerned with policing the boundaries between reason on the one hand, and emotion on the other. In turn, this division gives rise to an axiological hierarchy in which reason is placed over and above emotion. Where reason is respected for being universal, objective, and principled, emotion is rejected for being particular, subjective, and unruly. For many philosophers, the emotions constitute a threat to the procedural march of reason, having the potential to derail the calm process of rational deliberation with their unpredictability and volatility.
Numerous examples from the ancient world can be said to have established a precedent for this rationalist philosophical discourse. Plato famously banished the poets from his ideal republic because they awaken and nourish feelings, induce pathos, and impair reason. Aristotle wrote of the importance of catharsis, the arousal and subsequent purgation of fear and pity via the aesthetics of tragic drama, which would serve as a useful safety-valve so that such affects would not encroach upon the properly rational life of the polis. The Stoics believed that feelings denoted incorrect judgements about the world and ones place in it; emotionality was seen as a false step that the mature and learned individual would soon overcome through acceptance of ones circumstantial limitations. For instance, in The Enchiridion, Epictetus offers the following guidance: When therefore we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never attribute it to others, but to ourselves; that is, to our own principles. An uninstructed person will lay the fault of his own bad condition upon others. Someone just starting instruction will lay the fault on himself. Some who is perfectly instructed will place blame neither on others nor on himself.
But perhaps the most revealing moment in philosophys anti-emotional narrative is to be found in Platos dramatic account of the moment when Socrates drinks the fatal hemlock:
Crito had turned away even before I did, when he was unable to restrain his tears. Apollodoros had been crying throughout the entire time, and when he howled with grief and anger at that moment in particular, nobody who was present could help breaking down, except Socrates himself. And he said, What a way to behave, you remarkable men! I sent the women away mainly for this reason, so that they would not make such an offensive sound, because I have heard that one must meet ones end in calmed silence. So be quiet and collect yourselves.