Anthony Arnold - Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective

AFGHANISTAN

The Soviet Invasion in Perspective

REVISED AND ENLARGED EDITION

ANTHONY ARNOLD

Arnold-Heinemann

Cover photograph: Photri

The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, founded at Stanford University in 1919 by the late President Herbert Hoover, is an interdisciplinary research center for advanced study on domestic and international affairs in the twentieth century. The views expressed in its publications are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, officers, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution.

Hoover Press Publication 321

Copyright 1985 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission of the publisher.

Reprinted from "Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective", revised edition, by Anthony Arnold. With permission of Hoover Institution Press. Copyright 1985 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University.

Revised Edition, first printing, 1985

First edition, 1981; second printing, 1982

First Indian edition, 1987

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Arnold, Anthony.

Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion in perspective.

(Hoover international studies)

(Hoover Press publication)

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. AfghanistanHistorySoviet occupation, 1979 2. AfghanistanForeign relations Soviet Union. 3. Soviet UnionForeign relationsAfghanistan 4. United StatesForeign relationsAfghanistan. 5. AfghanistanForeign relationsUnited States. I. Title. II. Series.

DS371 2.A76 1985 327.470581 85-808

ISBN 0-8179-8212-4

Price: Rs. 65.00

Published by Gulab Vazirani for Arnold-Heinemann Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd., AB 9, Safdarjang Enclave, New Delhi-110029, and printed at Gopsons Papers Pvt. Ltd., A-28 Sector 9, Noida.

Editor's Foreword to the Revised Edition

In this revised edition of his book on Afghanistan, Anthony Arnold brings up to date the Soviet invasion and the struggle for that be-leaguered country. The Afghans continue to fight bravely, albeit crudely, without sufficient modern weapons, proper training in tactics and command, or adequate communications and transport. Arnold cogently and forcefully traces events in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1984 and he provides clear answers to two fundamental questions: Are the Soviets committed to taking and keeping Afghanistan within the Soviet empire? What are U.S. policy options?

The Soviet position in Afghanistan is not irreversible, according to Arnold. He believes the Soviets have left the door open for a retreat from Afghanistan under certain conditions. The United States, therefore, should not write off the Afghans as lost forever to the Soviet empire. Afghan resistance, though important, will not be the key to Soviet withdrawal; rather, divisions within the Soviet Union and the bloc, and world opinion, will be more important. The Soviets cannot be beaten by the Afghans, but resistance at home to the war plus international pressure may force a Soviet pullout. The costs of the war are great; an end to the struggle would thus bring great economic savings, stop draft resistance, and regain world popularity and respect for a unique pacific act.

U.S. policy should aim to internationalize the Afghan struggle, that is, to gain support for the mujahideen at the U.N., in Paris, London, Bonn, Cairo, and such places. Pressure on the Soviets must be in creased worldwide. The Reagan administration has budgeted $280 million for Afghan resistance, and this active supportwith arms and moneymust continue if Afghanistan is to be liberated. No U.S. forces are required and none should be promised. If U.S. support is firm, Pakistan may prove more helpful to the Afghans than at present. They have to be united and better trained with antitank and antiaircraft missiles to raise the price for the Soviets of staying in Kabul. But we do not wish to create an Afghan client state linked to the West; this would be impossible for the USSR to accept. A free but neutral Afghan nation should be the objective, not only for the Afghan people but also for the West.

Editor's Foreword to the First Edition

From being one of the least known countries in the world, Afghanistan has been catapulted into the world limelight since the Soviet invasion of December 1979. It is premature to assess the full significance of that event, if for no other reason than the fact that its ultimate success remains in doubt. The Afghans, against all odds and logic, go on fighting. USSR troops, after a year of battle, appear no closer to victory than they were at the outset.

It is not too early, however, to observe and comment on the events that led up to the invasion or to point up some of the unique features of the situation that already have become apparent.

In invading Afghanistan, the Soviet Union appeared to be setting a new and more aggressive pattern in its foreign policies. If one compares certain military occupations by Stalin in 1939 and 1940 (eastern Poland, the Baltic states, parts of Finland), one must acknowledge that all of these lands once had belonged, rightly or wrongly, to tsarist Russia. Despite opposition to Soviet rule by the vast majority of their populations, Stalin, as de facto heir to the tsars, could lay claim to at least some historical right to the territories.

Afghanistan, by contrast, had never before been conquered or occupied (except for temporary cross-border bridgeheads) by either tsarist or Soviet troops. The invasion thus represents a precedent of considerable significance, one that seems to presage a willingness by the USSR to project its military power abroad with less constraint than in the past.

That the USSR had decided to do so cannot be explained by any single factor. Though one may argue as to the relative importance each of the following considerations held in Soviet eyes (indeed the relative weight of each probably differed in the minds of principal Kremlin decisionmakers), all undoubtedly played some role:

Changing Correlation of Forces Soviet perceptions of their own military power and growing relative strength vis--vis the West clearly represented an important factor. The temptation to experiment with Soviet armed forces directly (rather than via proxies such as the Cuban troops in Africa) must have been strong. One can even speculate that ranking Soviet military officers could have wanted to expose their units to combat conditions as a means of giving them real-life experience obtainable in no other way.

Strategic Importance of Afghanistan Though a poor country, Afghanistan's strategic locationat the gateway to Middle East oil reserves, close to warm water ports, and on the flanks of China and Pakistanprovided both economic and geopolitical incentives for intervention.

Ideological Investment After the 1978 coup, the USSR had an ideological investment in the Kabul regime, an investment that was threatened by mounting domestic Afghan insurrection. Although not technically obligated under the Brezhnev Doctrine to intervene, the USSR clearly would have been embarrassed if noncommunists had overthrown Hafizullah Amin.