First published 1993 by Westview Press
Published 2018 by Routledge
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ISBN-13: 9780813318745 (pbk)
This book is a history of the war in Hau Nghia province, Republic of Vietnam, during the period of 19631973. Hau Nghia, formed in October 1963, was a small entity even in Vietnamese terms. Furthermore, because it was a South Vietnamese administrative unit only and not recognized by the National Liberation Front (NLF), Hau Nghia no longer exists. Therefore, on the face of things, it might appear that a lengthy study concerning the course of war in Hau Nghia makes little sense. However, an examination of the conflict in this small province is valuable on two levels for students of the Vietnam War.
First, the province was the key administrative unit in rural South Vietnam. The provincial administrations had far more authority over the local population than did lower political entities, such as the district or village. Individual province chiefs, usually field-grade army officers, wielded the power of a satrap. Anything done in Saigon that touched the lives of rural citizens went through the province capital for direct implementation or delegation below. Hence, economic planning, public works, primary education, and health care were administered on the province level. More importantly, during the period in question, most political initiatives and many of the military efforts aimed at destroying the Communist-led insurgency in South Vietnam were either planned or controlled at the province level. American combat divisions normally established their tactical areas of responsibility, and thus the course of their operations, on the basis of provincial boundaries. American Province Senior Advisors (PSA) were among the most important individuals in the massive advisory effort. Therefore, a province study has great value. Although the major decisions of the war were made in Saigon or Washington, an examination of a microcosm of the struggle at the province level makes possible a clear and basic understanding of the military and political dynamics, the nuts and bolts of revolutionary warfare, that characterized this unique and crucial struggle.
Secondly, Hau Nghia is an excellent province to examine. Situated between Saigon and Communist bases along the Cambodian border, Hau Nghia intrinsically had great strategic importance. Furthermore, unlike many provinces in the Central Highlands, Hau Nghia was almost entirely populated by ethnic Vietnamese, so it is not necessary to consider the special circumstances caused by the presence of non-Vietnamese hill tribes. Unlike the cities and some coastal areas, Hau Nghia was inhabited mostly by peasants who represented the largest and politically most important segment of South Vietnams population. In addition, though it was usually present and always important, the big-unit war, so prominent just south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), did not totally engulf Hau Nghia and make the local insurgency unrecognizable due to the constant infusion of outside forces. Conversely, in contrast to some provinces in the Mekong Delta where American units never operated and the war remained at a much lower level, in Hau Nghia province, Americans played a large and critical role. Most importantly, Hau Nghia was in the heartland of the insurgency. For political and strategic reasons, it was typical of the type of area in which Saigon had to prevail if it had any hope of long-term survival. Therefore, both sides made a great and sustained effort to triumph there. From beginning to end, the battle was fierce and closely reflected both the ebb and flow of the general struggle and the structural strengths and weaknesses of the contending forces.
This project has a somewhat curious genesis. A year before the fall of Saigon, which surprised me along with everyone else, I was stimulated to think deeply about the war through my acquaintance with several American officers and civilians who had been a part of the large advisory effort in rural Vietnam. These men were disappointed and bitter because of their experience. As I later found out, they and many other veterans of the pacification campaign believed that the mode of operations developed by the U.S. military command in Vietnam was inappropriate to the political struggle in the rural areas because it relied far too heavily on the application of conventional military power.
In the view of these officers, dependence on military measures had two very serious defects. First, an overemphasis on the military sphere caused a poor allocation of human and financial resources. The armys fixation on wasteful big-unit search and destroy operations led to the neglect of less costly and more sophisticated measures that could have brought security and well-being to rural Vietnam. Changing the political orientation of the peasantry from hostility or apathy toward Saigon to genuine support should have been the object of U.S. efforts, and Americans should have pursued the destruction of the enemys military units only when it suited this larger political aim. Military operations should never have been allowed to become an end unto themselves. Second, these officers maintained that the violence coming from U.S. and South Vietnamese military operations was both counterproductive and morally reprehensible. The big-unit war brought grief, suffering, and material destruction to the Vietnamese countryside. Innocent victims of the violence were driven to either hatred of the government or numb war weariness. In either case, the enemy benefited. Small pockets of goodwill developed by various aid projects were often destroyed in an instant by something as catastrophic as a needless air strike or as minor as a thoughtless American soldier shooting a water buffalo. My friends also were saddened deeply by the harm done to the U.S. Army. Although not defeated militarily, its effectiveness was impaired and its reputation damaged by this degrading, fruitless conflict.
At the time, I was very impressed by these arguments because they were intellectually cogent and showed a high degree of ethical sensitivity. The collapse of South Vietnam proved beyond all doubt that something had gone very wrong, and it added greatly to my desire to make some contribution toward understanding the debacle. Therefore, upon receiving funds from the Center for Military History in Washington, D.C., I decided to write a history of the war in Hau Nghia province that would illustrate how an inappropriate use of force shackled the American war effort and contributed to defeat. Implicit in this argument was the belief that a more rational effort made toward nation building in rural South Vietnam might well have led to a favorable outcome of the war. Such a point, I believe, would have been worth making.
