Peter Taylor - Talking to Terrorists: Face to Face With the Enemy

The popular perception of terrorists and terrorism is often at variance with the reality. In combating the threat, be it from the IRA, Al Qaeda or other insurgent groups, the keystone of any governments strategy is to demonise and marginalise the enemy, in the hope of denying it moral and political legitimacy and eroding support for its cause. Over the years Ive seen governments attitudes change following their recognition that the terrorists had a cause whose roots had to be addressed, and that a compromise had to be reached if there was to be a stop to the unending shedding of blood and haemorrhaging of human and financial resources. Recognising reality is a prerequisite of ending conflict. As Ive found on my journey, its also a prerequisite of reporting and analysing terrorism. The recognition of these facts did not come early for me, but gradually emerged as the result of a long process in which I engaged with some of those who were regarded as terrorists at the time. Occasionally I was caught up in their attacks. Yes, the journey was long, difficult and at times dangerous. But whatever the setbacks and frustrations along the way, it was always revela-tory, not just in my understanding of the terrorists themselves but in my acquaintance with governments efforts to combat them.

At the outset, I recognise the need to define my terms most importantly of all, what is a terrorist? The legal definition of terrorism is the use of violence for political ends. But what colours the perception of the word depends on two primary considerations. First, what were the circumstances out of which that violence grew? These can range from the denial of civil rights to Catholics in Northern Ireland, the inequities of Apartheid in South Africa or the uprooting of Palestinians from their homeland, to the plight of Muslims living under occupation following the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan by America and other Western nations. The IRA never regarded themselves as terrorists, and took exception to those who described them as such. They argued that their armed struggle was a legitimate strategy to achieve a political end that was, they maintained, unattainable by peaceful constitutional means.

Another consideration that makes the word difficult to define is that some terrorists go on to become Presidents and Prime Ministers. Theres a long history of the transformation of terrorists into statesmen. In 1963 in Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, believed to be one of the leaders of the Mau Mau insurgents who fought British colonial rule, became the countrys first Prime Minister after independence. In 1977 in Israel, Menachem Begin, the leader of the Irgun, who resisted the British presence in Palestine, became Prime Minister. In 1994 in the Middle East Yasser Arafat, the leader of Fatah, became President of the Palestinian National Authority covering the West Bank and Gaza. In the same year in South Africa, Nelson Mandela, the former leader of the African National Congress, became the nations first black President. And in 2007 in Northern Ireland Martin McGuinness, formerly the IRAs most prominent leader, became Deputy First Minister in the provinces power-sharing government.

All judgements about the word terrorist are subjective. Its a word I try to avoid using in my work and its one that is effectively banned on the BBCs World Service and by Reuters, since many listeners, viewers and readers around the globe may not agree with the definition as applied to certain conflicts, not least that in the Middle East. But it cant be avoided in writing a book with the title Talking to Terrorists. A terrorist is, literally, a person who uses the weapon of terror to target a states political, social and economic institutions. Invariably terrorists are driven by a mixture of political, social or religious grievances that they seek to rectify by the use of violence either to overthrow the state or to force it to address the issues that lie at the root of the recourse to violence. The IRA finally recognised that its atavistic aim of driving the British out of Northern Ireland was not going to be achieved by violent means, and in the end settled for compromise. But the politically uncomfortable reality remains that it was the IRAs military campaign that finally forced the British government to negotiate. Although the IRA would split hairs to deny it, the fact is that the IRA waged a terrorist campaign to try to achieve its end. So were the IRA terrorists? In the strict sense of the word, the answer has to be yes, however vehemently they and their political wing, Sinn Fin, would deny it.