Sinan Ülgen - Turkeys Nuclear Future

T he international landscape is undergoing significant changenew global and regional powers are rising, hundreds of millions of people around the world are climbing into the middle class, hyper-empowered individuals with the capacity to do great good and huge harm are multiplying, and more information is flowing more rapidly than ever before. Turkeys emergence over the past decade as a more independent and assertive foreign policy actor is indicative of this change and both the challenges and opportunities it presents to regional stability and international security.

This volume focuses on one of the most consequential aspects of Turkeys transformationits quest to enhance its energy security through nuclear power. Turkeys Nuclear Future provides a comprehensive and unique examination of the different yet interdependent dynamics of nuclear policymaking in Turkey. The volume also covers new ground by providing an insightful analysis of the countrys emerging role in the governance of the nonproliferation regime. Finally, the volume provides a detailed examination of how Turkey might react to Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons and how Turkey and key international actors can decrease the risk of a regional nuclear arms race.

I would like to congratulate George Perkovich, a vice president for studies at Carnegie, and Sinan lgen, a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, for putting together this collection of thoughtful and original essays on the nuclear policy of an important NATO ally at a critical crossroads. The book provides a wealth of new information and thoughtful commentary to help policymakers and experts understand Turkeys energy and national security policies and develop strategies to bolster the nonproliferation regime.

William J. Burns

President

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

I n regions where nuclear weapons are deployed and pressing security dilemmas exist, states nuclear policies often have, or could have, multiple dimensions. States in such circumstances may have civilian nuclear programs to provide energy or isotopes for medical and agricultural purposes. These civilian programs may be active and ambitious, or fledgling and focused on research and development. States in challenging security environments may also pursue military nuclear policies to deter potential adversaries. These policies may focus on alliance relationships whereby some states produce and control nuclear weapons, extending deterrence on behalf of their allies, which in turn may share responsibility by hosting nuclear weapons and participating in alliance policy planning. Or, states may seek to develop the option to produce their own nuclear weapons in the future, albeit with great complication due to the constraints that apply to parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The trajectories of states nuclear policies sometimes are uncertain. A civilian nuclear program may always remain purely peaceful and thus not merge into a military nuclear program. Or, what began as a civilian program could alter its trajectory and become part of a policy to acquire a nuclear deterrent. Between these two trajectories, a state may seek a hedge by acquiring some dual-use capabilities that are not excluded for non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT, without deciding to build nuclear weapons. Since 1970 when the NPT entered into force, only Libya, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and possibly Syria have deviated from their obligations as parties to the treaty and sought to develop nuclear weapons. The nuclear programs in Iraq, North Korea, and Iran began, at least ostensibly, as civilian efforts and were diverted to military purposes.

If a state decides to acquire its own nuclear weaponsas distinct from relying on an extended deterrent provided by an ally or alliesit will need a significant array of nuclear expertise and technological capabilities. Given that all non-nuclear-weapon states today are parties to the NPT, a state wanting to acquire nuclear weapons would probably seek to develop the necessary expertise and technical resources under the guise of a peaceful civilian nuclear program. To do otherwiseto abruptly undertake a crash nuclear-weapon programwould trigger alarms and countervailing action by the international community that would pose extreme risks to such a state. Alternatively, to seek to procure nuclear weapons from another state would pose other risks, and to be feasible would also require the prior development of expertise and infrastructure to make use of procured weapons and maintain them safely. Thus, an extensive civilian nuclear program, including the capacity to enrich uranium and/or extract plutonium from spent fuel, would appear necessary as a precursor for acquiring nuclear weapons. Such a program, in turn, would signal defenders of the nuclear nonproliferation regime to cast a wary eye.

Turkey exists in a nuclearized environment fraught with security dilemmas. Indeed, Turkey hosts several American nuclear bombs on its territory as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) deterrent. Along Turkeys southern border, Iraq had a major clandestine nuclear weapon program, Syria had a secretly under-construction plutonium production reactor, and Iran has been detected violating its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard obligations and conducting nuclear-related activities with possible military dimensions. Two of these neighbors, Syria and Iraq, have used chemical weapons in conflict, and Iran is believed to have the capacity to produce both chemical and biological weapons.

Turkey is a non-nuclear-weapon state in good standing under the NPT, with a robust civilian research and development program and extensive plans to host nuclear power plants on its territory. These plans call for established nuclear reactor vendors to build and operate plants in Turkey for many years before transferring them to Turkish operators who will gain the necessary expertise and experience in the intervening period. Turkey also wants to take advantage of its foray into nuclear energy to develop its own technological capacity. So Ankara has been interested in the transfer of nuclear technology and has not ruled out an interest in developing an indigenous capability to enrich uranium. All of this reasonably fits the profile of an advancing state and society with a robust modern economy whose need for diversely supplied electricity will grow significantly.