In Fond Memory of Albert George Khoury (19481971)
eISBN 978-0-86356-821-3
First published 2011 by Saqi Books
This eBook edition published 2011
Samir Khalaf and Roseanne Saad Khalaf 2011
Copyright for individual texts rests with the authors.
Reclaiming Youthfulness first published in Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East by Asef Bayat 2010 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University
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Introduction
On the Marginalization and Mobilization of Arab Youth
Samir Khalaf and Roseanne Saad Khalaf
Upon submitting our manuscript in early April 2011, startling manifestations of the new Arab Spring were unfolding. The sudden mobilization of mass protest, though long overdue, took observers by surprise. Even seasoned and well-informed scholars had become resigned to treating the profound misgivings of the status quo as an inescapable reality in Arab society. This is not unusual given the seeming docility of disenfranchized groups alongside the power of despotic regimes to reproduce their tyranny.
Soon it became apparent that the uprisings could not be dismissed as merely the short-lived protests of embittered and marginalized groups venting their wrath. The days of autocratic regimes seemed to be coming to an end. Already, the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, with limited bloodshed, succeeded in dismantling the aggrandizing and corrupt leadership of Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Though seemingly leaderless, protestors in both countries revealed remarkable technological savvy and creativity. More significant, the uprisings displayed this generations unprecedented level of political awareness and activism.
The great philosophers of the Enlightenment would hardly hesitate to endorse the moral consciousness expressed in the postings which flooded cyberspace during the uprisings. Inevitably amateurish and makeshift, they still displayed attributes of moral secularism and civil vibrancy. They were largely informed by the same universal values which have inspired other revolutions: dignity, autonomy, justice, accountability, transparency, tolerance, and solidarity with the weak. In some respects, the uprisings might well represent a nascent post-ideological generation.
Many of the young who took to the streets displayed at times admirable and contagious recalcitrance and outright defiance. The Iranian Revolt of 1979 and the Islamic movements of the 1980s and 1990s are history. The common concerns which sparked the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya were not ideological or religious. Nor did they evince any manifest interest in class consciousness or economic deprivation. Instead, their unifying ethos is the denouncement of poor governance, oppression, and the recklessness and impunity of tyrants. In short, the kleptocracy and graftocracy of their countries, despised elites and their families. Even regimes considered immune to the mass discontent which gripped the region that is, Syria, Jordan, and Morocco are currently witnessing some of the embryonic manifestations of mass unrest.
The case of Morocco stands out because it is markedly different from the experiences of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. It initiated serious reforms at least a decade earlier by a king (Mohammad VI) generally admired by his people and seen as irreplaceable. He was in support of the liberalization of the press, and womens rights, and fairly open about the years of oppression by his predecessor (King Hassan II). Yet, marginalized youth were still discontented about widespread corruption and human rights violations. Hence, to many of the protesters on February 20, 2011, the problem does not lie with the monarchy but with the political and economic elite who benefit from the status quo and enjoy political impunity. Perhaps this explains why the protest lacked the outburst of rage and anarchy visible elsewhere in the region.
In sharp contrast, the Egyptian and Libyan protestors were explicitly calling for the removal of Mubarak and Gaddafi, lifting the emergency laws, curbing state torture, and holding fair and free elections. Underlying their demands were expectations of the higher order in support of dignity, freedom, and justice. The social media may have helped in inciting the kernel of the protests, which ultimately succeeded in overthrowing Mubarak, yet what mobilized people in the streets were legitimate grievances intrinsic to the misbegotten neo-liberalisms rampant among the Egyptian elite.
It was not though, as sensationalized by the media, a Twitter or Facebook revolt. Most revealing in this regard are the changing perspectives of once-radicalized Islamists. For example, movements like Libyas Islamic Fighting Group or Egypts Jamaat Islamiya are now expressing a new-found keenness for peaceful politics; they are keeping their distance from al-Qaida and expressing outright opposition to militant and radical strategies.
In Yemen as well, the bloody tug-of-war between civilian protestors and government forces is also exacerbating the pressures on Ali Saleh. The violence beleaguering the country is clearly an expression of the several explosive fault lines deeply entrenched in its tribal structure, along with North-South rivalry. So far, Ali Saleh has refused to step down, vowing to remain in power until January 2012 when parliamentary elections are scheduled.
The case of Syria is very telling and may well disclose the harbingers of more foreboding transformations. The fact that many Syrians bear no personal grudge or animosity towards their president now seems irrelevant. Unfortunately, Bashar al-Assad appears disinclined to heed demands emanating from the uprisings that, after all, reveal one inescapable reality. Once the threshold of popular discontent is reached, regimes become incapable of holding back the tide of outrage. What begins as an expression of ordinary grievances in the case of Syria, the Baaths monopoly of power, lifting the countrys emergency law of 1963, high levels of corruption, and the pervasive climate of fear and intimidation consecrated by its draconic secret agencies are bound to grow into irrepressible demands for freedom, dignity, and justice. Alas, in his long-awaited speech (March 31, 2011), Assad made only vague promises to introduce reform. Instead, he heaped blame and culpability on foreign conspiracy and meddling.