In March 1996 British food specialists traveled to Brussels in a last ditch effort to stem the growing panic over the threat posed by mad cow disease (the common name for bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE). The fear that this disease, which has led to the destruction of over 16,000 cattle in Britain in the last ten years, can cause a similar disease in humans led to the European Union ordering the British government to stop exporting beef. The furor created by the crisis has had wide ranging economic and political implications. Within the United Kingdom, Conservative and Labour governments have been under pressure to calm public fears and balance calls for the costly destruction of existing cattle stocks with the economic concerns of farmers and agricultural specialists. Furthermore, the BSE crisis became an important element in the heated debate over Britains future role in Europe. Members of Parliament skeptical over the deepening of the European Union (EU) blasted the ban as part of a series of overreactions by European bureaucrats before scientists are able to determine any link between the disease in cattle and in humans. British farmers argue the competition from continental Europe has shaped cattle policy rather than BSE itself. For the other members of the EU, the fear of British cattle has had damaging effects of reducing domestic demand for beef and also led to moves by non-EU states, such as Iran and Egypt to stop importing beef from the whole of the EU.1
The debate over BSE illustrates the character of foreign policy under conditions of interdependence. The intense international and domestic debate over the political and economic consequences of decisions taken by governments and international organizations demonstrates the sensitivity between states and the interrelationship between foreign policy and domestic policy. Interdependence poses a challenge to diplomats. The scope and scale of foreign relations has expanded to include issues traditionally thought of as domestic politics and the content of these issues requires technical and specialist knowledge which diplomats traditionally do not possess. The policy decisions taken over the BSE crisis were influenced by the work of specialists in agriculture ministries. These civil servants studied the likely extent and effects of mad cow disease to assist their political masters but also to protect the interests of their domestic clientele. Furthermore, they engaged in extensive international negotiations to reach a scientific consensus rather than merely aiding the work of diplomats. Complex and technical issues such as BSE bridge the foreign and domestic policy arenas and cannot be left to diplomats alone.
This book examines the challenges confronting the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) as we enter the next century. This analysis concentrates on challenges from within the policy making system. It is argued that changes in the external environment have led to a transformation of the foreign policy making system in the United Kingdom, and other advanced industrial states, so that officials stationed throughout the executive are engaged in the preparation and implementation of policy. Interdependence has raised questions over the control and leadership in foreign policy making and even brought the logic of a separate diplomatic service into question. This work provides an overdue examination of the changes which have taken place in British foreign policy making as most studies continue to rely upon straightforward descriptions of the sectoral division of labour established in Whitehall. This work is also relevant for other advanced industrial states as investigations and reforms have been proposed in other countries, such as the USA and France in response to the demands of interdependence.
While this study examines the challenges to diplomats from within the bureaucracy there are other significant challenges facing foreign ministries. Firstly, there has been a tremendous increase in the number of international organizations and regimes which are engaged in international relations. This development, along with the emergence of non-governmental actors such as multinational corporations, have led some scholars to predict a decline in the state. Although this decline remains the focus of much scholarly debate the realist paradigm must be modified to recognize the important role played by IGOs and NGOs. Secondly, transportation and communication developments have encouraged international summitry where state leaders play major roles in international negotiations. This has been necessitated by interdependence but also by the public opinion victories which can be achieved through a successful foreign policy. Despite the increase in ministerial meetings, government institutions still manage the day-to-day conduct of international relations.
Most recent studies of British foreign policy focus on the relative post-1945 decline of British influence in the international system (Reynolds, 1991; Pickering, 1998), with relations with particular regions, such as the EU (George, 1992) or with the special relationship with the United States (Bartlett, 1992). Recent studies of the foreign policy making process within the United Kingdom (Smith, Smith and White, 1988; Clarke, 1992; Allen, 1999) continue to emphasize British foreign policy in the context of decline and relative power. For other detailed analyses of the role of the FCO and other government departments one can seek out chapters in more general studies of the character of Whitehall (Hennessy, 1989; Pollitt, 1984) or go back to now outdated studies of the foreign policy machinery (Wallace, 1975; Boardman and Groom, 1975; Vital, 1968).
Therefore there is a need in the literature for an updated analysis of British foreign policy machinery under conditions of interdependence which examines both the FCO and the activities of Whitehall. The studies by Wallace and Vital were written during a period when scholars were able to claim that most government departments played only a minor subordinate role to the FCO in international negotiations and foreign policy making. This emphasis on an inner core of institutions (FCO, Defence, Treasury and Board of Trade) and the neglect of the rest of Whitehall presents a misleading picture of the foreign policy machinery today. International organizations, interdependence and membership in the EU have transformed the international roles of departments concerned with issues such as agriculture, employment and the environment. For example, departments such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) now see themselves as possessing the expertise and experience to operate with only minimal FCO involvement. In contrast, a department such as the Ministry of Defence, part of the traditional core of the foreign policy machinery, has been relatively unaffected by EU membership until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and its influence has suffered because of this.