BATTLE DIGEST
Lessons for Todays Leaders Volume 1 * Issue 4
Early American Wars :
Little Bighorn
Date
June 25-26, 1876
LOCATION:
Montana Territory
OPPOSING FORCES
U.S. Army : 7th Cavalry Regiment (700 cavalry and scouts) under the command of Lt. Col. George A. Custer. (Custer was a subordinate of Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry, the overall commander of the operation with a total of 2,500 men.)
Allied Plains Indians : Sioux (including Lakota), Cheyenne, and Arapaho Indians (estimated 1,500-1,800 warriors) under the command of Chiefs Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, and Gall.
HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE
The Battle of Little Bighorn, despite its relatively small size, was the worst defeat for the U.S. Army in the Indian Wars. And although it was a clear tactical victory for the Plains Indians, it would be a significant strategic setback for their cause. The outrage caused by the Indian victory only intensified efforts by the U.S. Army and its Department of the Missouri to pacify the Native Americans and return those who resisted to their reservations. Within months of their victory at Little Bighorn, the Plains Indians were defeated in the Great Sioux War of 1876-1877 and their lands in the Black Hills of the Dakota Territory were confiscated.
The controversial career of George A. Custer ended with his death during the bloody defeat at Little Bighorn, popularly remembered as Custers Last Stand. His actions have been scrutinized ever since.
STRATEGY & MANEUVER
Actions by the U.S. Army After the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, the senior commanders of the Department of the Missouri, the command echelon of the Army responsible for conducting Indian Affairs in the region, realized they still had a problem. Factions of Plains Indians refused to remain on the agreed-upon land of the Great Sioux Reservation in the Dakota Territory. Some Indian non-compliance was retaliation for white encroachment into the Black Hills after gold was discovered. Nevertheless, after the government declared these Indian actions illegal, it was up to General Phil Sheridan, commander of the Department of the Missouri, to force compliance. Sheridan had faced a similar challenge years before in the Southern Plains War of 68-69. He understood that the Indians center of gravity were their camps. These were the source of their sustainment, and with their pony herds, their transportation. Instead of chasing down warriors, he would attack these centers of gravity with converging columns as he had done previously.
Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry, the Commandant of the Department of Dakota, was placed in charge of this operation in the spring of 1876. Senior army commanders generally agreed that the nomadic villages would eventually be in the area of the Yellowstone, Powder, Rosebud, and Bighorn rivers and creeks where game and other resources were plentiful. Terry would take independent columns (2,500 total men), converge on this area, and force the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho back to the reservation. (Map 1)
On 1 April, Col. John Gibbon led the Montana column out of Fort Ellis near Bozeman, Montana, with 450 infantry and cavalry. On 17 May, Terry personally led the eastern column out of Fort Lincoln, with over 900 men (most of whom were in Custers 7th Cavalry Regiment). And on 29 May, the final column, commanded by Brig. Gen. George Crook, left Fort Fetterman, Wyoming Territory, from the south, with 1,000 cavalry and infantry. (Crook would be stopped short after facing an aggressive attack on 17 June at the Battle of the Rosebud. Unfortunately, his message relating the event did not reach Terry until 30 June.)
Actions by the Sioux and Cheyenne The Plains Indians faction, under Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, and Gall, among other leaders, sought to remain independent and refused to abide by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. Not only were the Black Hills sacred lands, but the whole concept of land ownership was foreign to them. As they tried to continue their nomadic way of life, however, they faced the constant threat of attack.
While the mobility of the Indians was an inherent strength in their contest with the U.S. Army, it was also an impediment. Because their villages were their logistics hubs, they were obliged to defend them. This required them to be constantly vigilant for threats from any direction and put them on the strategic defensive throughout the Great Sioux War.
TACTICS OF THE BATTLE
Map 1: Campaign Overview
The Battle of Little Bighorn was Custers attempt to seize the initiative by quickly attacking his Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho adversaries before they could attack him or flee. The resulting twoday fight would end in complete disaster and defeat for Custer and his 7th Cavalry Regiment. As Custers initial attack broke down in the face of superior Indian numbers, and his divided forces were unable to effectively support one another, he failed.
21 June : As Terrys three columns converged, he linked up with Gibbons column from the west on the 21st. (Map 2) Unfortunately, Terry would not have the advantage of information from Crook further south, who had faced a group of these Indians on the 17th at Rosebud Creek. Crook found these tribes unafraid to attack his large force and even able to push him back. But up north, Terrys scouts had seen smoke rising in the south from the Little Bighorn River along with the discovery of an Indian trail leading that direction.
Terry issued his orders the following day. Thinking he had found the main camp, he ordered Custer to take his regiment south before swinging north up the Little Bighorn River. He would be the attacking force to drive the Indians into Gibbons forces, which would come down from the north and form a blocking position to prevent their escape. Gibbon, with slower moving infantry forces, would not be in place until 26 June. Terrys plan appeared to rest on the assumptions that Indian numbers were smaller than they were, and that they would probably try to retreat as they had done in previous engagements. With these assumptions, Terry used a classic hammer and anvil tactic that had proven effective in the past. From Terrys written order, its clear that he envisioned the two forces working in mutual support to prevent the Indians escape. However, it is also important to note that Custer was given wide discretion to act as the situation unfolded.
Prior to his departure from the main force, Custer was offered four companies of the 2nd Cavalry, but he declined. The 7th can handle anything it meets, was his reply. He also refused the Gatling gun detachment of the 20th Infantry Regiment which would have vastly increased his firepower. Custers watchword was speed, and he feared any augmentation of his force might slow its progress. As Terry and Gibbon moved southwest over the next three days, Custer drove his men hard to the south. (Map 2)
24 June: By the evening of the 24th, Custer was 25 miles east of the Indian village. After dispatching scouts to determine the exact location and strength of the enemy, he learned that the village had moved westward toward the Little Bighorn River. It appeared the Indians might be hemmed in against the stream if the battle were joined rapidly. The scouts also pointed out that it was perhaps the largest such village they had ever seen.
