1991 The University of North Carolina Press
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Manufactured in the United States of America
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hamilton, Richard F.
The bourgeois epoch : Marx and Engels on Britain, France, and Germany / Richard F. Hamilton.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.
ISBN 0-8078-1976-X (cloth : alk. paper). ISBN 0-8078-4325-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Social classesEuropeHistory19th century. 2. EuropeSocial conditions17891900. 3. Marx, Karl, 18181883. 4. Engels, Friedrich, 18201895. I. Tide.
HN380.Z9S64365 1991
305.5'094dc20 91-50252
CIP
To Henry Ashby Turner, Jr.
PREFACE
My first extensive reading of Marx and Engels occurred in the early 1950s when I was a graduate student in sociology at Columbia University. Apart from the second and third volumes of Capital, I read all that was available in English (including some of the then hard-to-find early writings). As was expected of us, I read widely in the work of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. I also read, among others, all of the works of Thorstein Veblen and all of Talcott Parsonss writings up to and including his 1951 opus, The Social System. In my spare time, what little there was of it, I read widely in literature, in the work of Dostoevsky, Conrad, and Thomas Mann, among others.
My reading of the academic literature had to be rapid and, a necessary correlate, without much depth or understanding. One had to cover a lot of ground for the sake of forthcoming examinations. While reading Marxs Eighteenth Brumaire, I wondered about his portrait of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. How would other authors treat the man and his policies? What facts would be included or excluded? What factors would be emphasized? What framework would be used? In short, how would other treatments differ from Marxs portrayal? I found a biography of Louis Napoleon in Butler Library and read it quickly. But the welter of material was all too complicated. There was no time for a detailed comparison of the texts. There was no time for critique or assessment. I made a mental note: it was something to be done, a task for some future research.
One evening, after a hasty supper in the Lions Den, I overheard a conversation between some history graduate students. One of them said: Those sociologists dont know any history. I recognized the truth of the conclusion. It took me some time, more than I care to think about, to remedy the problem in my own mind and work.
Of all the reading done back then, I most regret the time spent on the work of Talcott Parsons. It was, as Herbert Marcuse once pointed out to me, empty formalism. C. Wright Mills translated some of those formalisms and showed the commonplace observations lying behind the portentous language. Not many years later, other writers and schools appeared offering new baroque theoretical systems. And again, many otherwise intelligent students went to work learning the intricacies of that new filigree discourse. The pathology, the predilection for exotic language and exotic logics, seems most prevalent in the social sciences, although in recent decades it has appeared also in the literary sciences. As a countering mensure, should anyone be interested, I recommend the reading of solid narrative histories. A knowledge of those histories will provide a much better guide to ones understanding of human affairs than all of Parsonss abstract and general formulations or those contained in any of the more recent systems.
Marx and Marxism effectively disappeared from the social sciences of the 1950s and 1960s, making at best a ritual appearance. But then, unexpectedly, in the early 1970s, Marxism gained a significant following and, for better or worse, has received more attention since. That statement, to be sure, needs specification: Marxism gained attention and favor in the United States, in Canada, in Britain, in the Federal Republic of Germany, and in some other minor outposts of the capitalist world. One writer has noted that the attraction of Marxism, of Marxist thought, appears to increase with distance from Marxist practice. That revival, ultimately, in a dialectical process, led to the writing of this book. Like many others, I was led to reread the texts and to think once again about the basic claims. On this occasion, however, I found the time for an assessment. While not dealing specifically with The Eighteenth Brumaire, this book does pursue the basic intent of that research task noted some forty years ago.
Accountants have provided us with a useful notion, that of zero-based budgeting. Until recently, the general practice was to judge budgetary allocations against the previous years experience. But that assumes the wisdom of the previous experience. Zero-based budgeting requires justification of the entire effort. That new budgeting principle may be applied in the scholarly effort. It is useful to think in terms of zero-based theorizing. Many texts treat favored theories as sacrosanct. Students in sociology, for example, are introduced to the classical theories and, in effect, are told that respect and proper obeisance are in order. Those theories (and their authors) are canonized. They are, by general agreement, set above the common run of scholarly achievements. Many accounts, for example, make reference to Webers Protestant ethic, treating the ethic as an obvious explanation for economic development (or the lack thereof). But the linking of a thesis with an esteemed author is no substitute for actual investigation. The practice avoids the question of validity: has the thesis been supported? Zero-based theorizing focuses on this question of support, of empirical adequacy. What the canonization assumes, basic adequacy, is thereby put to the test.
This strict requirement is entirely in keeping with the expressed rules of scholarship, with the regular calls for doubt, skepticism, and fundamental criticism of received views. The requirement seems so obvious as to need no justification. Should there be any lingering anxiety, should some justifying authority be needed, one might note that the requirement was vouched for by Descartes, the eminent philosopher. Or, to cite another eminent figure, Karl Marx (as will be seen) once declared his motto to be de omnibus dubitandum, which may be translated as an elemental commanddoubt everything.
Many people have helped in the various stages of development of this work. Although in some instances the specific contributions made were to chapters that do not appear here, I nevertheless wish to express my appreciation to all who have given of their time and wisdom. I also wish to thank the Ohio State University for the financial support it has provided.
Henry A. Turner, Jr., friend and co-worker, to whom the book is dedicated, has been extremely generous with his time and effort. Others who have read, commented, and advised on all chapters are Chandler Davidson, G. William Domhoff, William Form, Williamson Murray, Rick Ogmundson, and Michael Smith.
For expert advice and counsel on specific chapters, I wish to thank the following: on Britain, Martha Garland, Michael P. Maxwell, and Clayton Roberts; on France, Peter Amann, Frederick de Luna, David H. Pinkney, and Mark Traugott; on Germany, Jeffry M. Diefendorf, Raymond Dominick, W. O. Henderson, Peter Hoffmann, Paul A. Rahe, and Helmut Smith.