C. Edward Skeen - Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812

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by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

Copyright 1999 by The University Press of Kentucky

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Skeen, Carl Edward.

Citizen soldiers in the war of 1812 / C. Edward Skeen.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-10: 0-8131-2089-6 (alk. paper)

1. United StatesHistoryWar of 1812Manpower.

2. United StatesMilitiaHistoryWar of 1812.

3. United States. ArmyRecruiting, enlistment, etc.War of 1812. 4. United States. ArmyMobilizationHistory19th century. 5. United States. ArmyMilitary lifeHistory19th century. I. Title.

E359.3.S481998

973.52dc2198-7953

ISBN-13: 978-0-8131-2089-8 (alk. paper)

This book is printed on acid-free recycled paper meeting
the requirements of the American National Standard
for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials.

Manufactured in the United States of America

In the course of a study like this one, many individuals and institutions ultimately have a role in producing the finished product. The University of Memphis provided me with a semesters leave to work on the research for this study. I also gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the librarians in the microforms department of the Ned R. McWhirter Library of the University of Memphis, where the bulk of my research was done. I thank Dr. Devlin S. Fung and his students in the Department of Geography Laboratory for Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems, University of Memphis, for the maps in this book.

I am grateful to those who read chapters or the entire manuscript and gave advice, critical and encouraging, which was mostly accepted but on rare occasions rejected. I thank you all for allowing me to impose on your time. These people include my colleague and friend Major L. Wilson, whose judgment I always value. Donald R. Hickey graciously read my manuscript and gave me sound advice. My friend David N. Lumsden read and critiqued an early version. I owe my greatest debt of gratitude to Thomas H. Appleton, Jr., for his expert editorial talents. Finally, I had the support of my family. My daughters, Marianne Medlin and Laura Kuns, were unfailing in their interest and encouragement. My wife, Linda, to whom I dedicate this work, willingly endured long hours of hearing about the militia and no doubt learned a great deal more about militia than she ever wanted to know. She knows that shes okay in my book.

In a recent work, Donald Hickey enumerated more than a dozen topics on the War of 1812 needing further historical inquiry. One subject he did not mention was the militia. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of the soldiers employed during this war were militia, and their role and contribution during the War of 1812, surprisingly, has never been systematically studied or properly evaluated.

Perhaps the reason for the neglect is the difficulty of preparing a comprehensive study of the various state militia encompassing all aspects of their participation in the War of 1812 (e.g., state-by-state accounts). Such an undertaking would be a daunting, perhaps impossible task, given the paucity of sources. I intend to pursue here only the modest objective of describing the federal utilization of militia to supplement the military forces during the War of 1812, surveying their performance in general, and reviewing the operational aspects of militia participation at the state level. For purposes of this work, I define militia to include drafted (or regular) militia plus volunteer militia companies (as distinguished from twelve-month volunteers in federal service). Finally, because the militia system obviously failed to provide an adequate force, particularly to prosecute the war vigorously, I will also attempt to explain the reasons for this failure.

The militia system broke down at the state level largely because the Constitution divided responsibility for the militia. While the federal government was empowered to use state militias to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, and to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, state governments had the right to appoint the officers and train the militia according to the discipline prescribed by the federal government. There was, however, no coordination of training or organization of militia at the state level nor any clear definition of the proper relationship of state versus federal authority over the militia in wartime. Consequently, during the War of 1812 issues were raised concerning who was authorized to call militia into service; who paid them; who equipped and organized them; and how and where they were to be used. Obviously there were many other questions relating to the use of the militia during the War of 1812; I have noted only the most significant.

It is well known that the state militias were not prepared to fight a war in 1812. Long years of neglect by the states, or indifference on their part, meant that when Congress called on April 10, 1812, for 100,000 militia to be held in readiness for possible duty, many states were unprepared. State legislatures often passed elaborate militia laws, but public apathy, indifference, and even hostility led to a situation where there was no efficient, reliable militia force to prosecute the war. A congressional report in 1804 (still valid in 1812) asserted that there were few points on which any two militias were similar, making impossible the interchangeability of units which was regarded as the essence of any national reserve force. As late as 1812, despite the threat of war, which had been growing for several years, some states were effectively forced to organize their state militias from the ground up.

Ultimately, the problem with the utilization of militia was a question not of their willingness to fight but rather of their ability to fight. Incredible as it may seem, there were many reports that militia showed up not only without weapons but shoeless, barely clothed, and lacking blankets, camp equipment, or any of the articles necessary for a military camp. Also, perhaps equally incredible given our modern perceptions of frontiersmen, many militia not only had no musket but did not even know how to use weapons once they had been issued. Such raw militia could hardly be expected to master the twenty-three distinct motions required to prime, load, ram, and set a firelock in a flintlock musket in the brief time before they were marched off to engage the enemy. When properly organized, equipped, and capably led, the militia could be a formidable fighting force, as they showed at New Orleans. Militia were rarely properly trained or prepared to perform their military duties, however, and in numerous cases during the war militiamen broke and ran before the enemy had even engaged them in battle. Examples include one of the earliest battles at Brownstown and conduct by the militia on the west bank at the final Battle of New Orleans.