First published in Great Britain in 2012
By Pen and Sword Aviation
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Copyright Dave Sloggett, 2012
9781783031542
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Preface and Acknowledgements
In the immediate aftermath of publishing its much-maligned Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) the United Kingdoms coalition government became embroiled in a military adventure in Libya. Somewhat unexpectedly this would shine an intense spotlight on the outcome of the SDSR. It would also provide an immediate opportunity to conduct a detailed assessment of its impact on the United Kingdoms ability to project military power onto the world stage using the outcome from the campaign to validate the decision-making that took place in the SDSR.
The Prime Minister, David Cameron, perhaps tiring of all the criticism of the SDSR, seemed really keen to prove his doubters wrong. At the time of writing, as aircraft from many of the coalition partners involved in the Libyan campaign return home and the newly-recognised National Transitional Council (NTC) gets down to work to create a new Libya, the final outcome is far from certain.
Gaddafis death draws part of a line under the mission. The regime has been replaced and plans are already in train in Libya to provide an opportunity for its people to elect their own government. Something they have been unable to do for over forty years. For many Libyans that will be a hugely welcome moment. However, not all the indicators emerging from Libya are positive.
The southern parts of Libya, traditionally loyal to the Gaddafi regime, remain largely unconquered. The border areas, which have the potential to provide a sanctuary to those who wish to seek retribution for the demise of the regime, are inherently difficult to secure; providing the kind of challenge that exists in Afghanistan. The Al Qaeda affiliate in the area, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is moving its focus towards the south east of Algeria. They may be intent on exploiting a post-Gaddafi situation in Libya to ferment an insurgency. The possibility for Libya to descend into the kind of chaos witnessed in Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion in 2003 haunts political nightmares.
The intervention in Libya had been seen to be necessary as forces loyal to the regime of Colonel Gaddafi had overcome an initial advance along the coast by rebels seeking to overthrow his regime, forcing them back towards Benghazi. The virus at the heart of the Arab Spring, the clamour for a new form of democracy based on Islamic ideals, had spread from Tunisia to Egypt. Regimes that had previously seemed stable had fallen. All bets, it would appear, were now off. Any of the regimes in the Middle East were now vulnerable.
Against this backdrop, and to the surprise of many including Colonel Gaddafi, the virus spread to Libya. Many Libyans had spontaneously risen up in local towns and communities across the country. An insurrection initially gained a foothold in some areas. But the regime was swift to mobilise its military to try and re-establish control over the rebel areas. The uprising had not been confined to a single geographic area. This complicated the regimes response. It had to adopt a mode of fire-fighting each uprising. The scenes that initially emerged from Misrata were especially disturbing and gave an insight into just how far the regime would go to hold onto power. This was a no-holds-barred approach to suppressing a rebellion.
A swift rebel advance from Benghazi across the desert towards Tripoli, and to provide a link up with other centres of the rebellion, was quickly thrown back. Gaddafis forces rapidly headed for a showdown with the main centre of the rebellion, Benghazi. The prospect of a massacre loomed large as Gaddafis rhetoric indicated he was hell-bent on revenge. A political consensus emerged at the United Nations that saw two resolutions adopted. The first creating an initial set of limitations on the freedom of manoeuvre of members of the regime, with specific actions to seize financial assets held overseas, the second authorising the deployment of a limited mission with an aim of enforcing a no-fly zone.
Working under the legal umbrella of two quickly formulated United Nations resolutions, the United Kingdom and French military working in tandem with a number of coalition partners launched a series of raids aimed at immediately degrading the Libyan air defence systems. Superiority over the Libyan skies was quickly achieved.
However, the initial objective of the campaign sanctioned by the United Nations, to secure the safety of the citizens of Benghazi, rapidly suffered the kind of mission creep that is often associated with contemporary wars. As the air and naval bombardment moved from suppressing the Gaddafi forces on the outskirts of Benghazi to helping them advance against Tripoli, a number of diplomatic arguments broke out. The mission, it appeared, had morphed. Regime change was now the order of the day.
For some countries, Russia being amongst the most vociferous, this was not what had been intended. Russia, of course, had an economic axe to grind. Its arms industry had a large number of orders that it was working on for the Gaddafi regime. Any attempt to replace him would have seen those orders potentially cancelled. Other countries, however, saw Libya through the blood and treasure invested in Iraq. They wanted nothing to do with what they saw as another potential nightmare, a war without any defined endpoint.
For David Cameron and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, some tough decisions had to be taken. Could they risk becoming involved in another military quagmire? In both countries the public would not be forgiving if what was sold as a limited military intervention to protect the people of Benghazi suddenly unfolded into a wide ranging attempt at regime change. The initial signs were not good. The imposition of an air exclusion zone swiftly saw NATO aircraft bombing Tripoli. The public and the media were almost duty bound to ask the question. How does bombing Tripoli save people in Benghazi several hundreds of miles away to the east?