Jonathan Goodhand - Central Asian Survey (assortment), Strategic Analysis (assortment)

Central Asian Survey (2000 ), (2), 265280

JONATHAN GOODHAND

Traditional neoclassica l analysis of conflicts viewed them as irrational. Since aggregate consumptio n and productio n decline, comparative advantages are lost and capital destroyed , why do people behave so inexplicably ? However recent writings on conflict have developed new insight s through the analysis of global processes that contribute to systemic conflict. Duffield argues that protracted conflict is symptomati c of new and expandin g forms of politica l economy.
Todays conflicts are characterized by long-term innovativ e adaptation s to globalization , linked to expanding networks of parallel (illegal ) and grey (semi- legal ) economic activity .
As Keen notes, conflict is not the irrational breaking down of societies and economies: rather it is the re-ordering of society in particular ways. In wars we see the creation of a new type of politica l economy, not simply a destructio n of the old one. Elite strategies in war economies may for example involve the control and export of high value commodities such as narcotics and precious stones; the opium and lapis lazuli economy in Northern Afghanistan are just two examples. Afghanistan may be on the peripher y of the global economy; how- ever, elites within the countr y profit from state breakdown and the deregulated environment at a local and global level. It has created the space and linkages for local assets like opium and lapis to be realized on global markets.
Clauswitz characterized traditiona l nation-state based war as the continuatio n of politic s by other means. However in many conflicts today it may not be so much about winning the war as about maintainin g ones sphere of influence. As Keen concludes, internal forms of war may now be better understoo d as the continuatio n of economics by other means. This analysis has important implica- tions in terms of our understandin g of contemporary conflicts and policy aimed
at preventin g or resolving endemic insecurity :

in conflicts where violence is decentralised and economically motivated, war cannot simply be declared or declared over. A lasting end to violence is likely to depend on meeting many of the needs of those carrying out acts of violence as well as the needs and

Jonathan Goodhand is an Associate of INTRAC, PO Box 563, Oxford OX2 6RZ, UK.

interests of some of the more highly developed actors, orchestrating and perhaps funding violence.

We will return to the policy implication s of this analysis at the end of the paper. However the next section examines a case study of the opium economy in North Eastern Afghanistan. It is an attempt to present the view from the village in terms of changes brought about by the opium economy and its impact on social relations within the village. An analysis of these changes then follows, in the light of the recent writing and analysis on complex politica l emergencies (CPEs) as outline d above. Although there is an emerging body of writing on conflict and insecurity , which helps map out the broad terrain of the new world disorder , there is a lack of fine-grained case studies which examine how global processes
impact on local actors and communities. A key conclusion of our work in North Eastern Afghanistan is that action has got ahead of understandin g and more detailed contextua l analysis is important for both improved understandin g and policy.

The Afghan conftict
The Afghan conflict is a potent example of contemporary conflict resulting from a complex mix of factors, caused by years of bad development , Cold War politics, militarization , and tribal and ethnic schisms. The conflict has been going on for 20 years. In the 1980s, one third of the populatio n were displaced and rural subsistenc e economies were deliberatel y destroyed . The withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1988 did not signal the end of the conflict. A process of
Lebanonisation followed in which the contradiction s within the resistance movement surfaced. The conflict thus mutated from a counter-insurgenc y war with an ostensibl y ideologica l basis into one characterized by warlordism and
banditary. Since 1995, the war entered a new phase with the emergence of the
Taliban who now control around 80 per cent of Afghanistan , with the remaining area controlle d by an alliance of oppositio n leaders from the previous govern- ment.
It is beyond the scope of the paper to examine in detail the histor y and dynamics of the Afghan conflict. However the following points are relevant to
our analysis later.
Conftict as process. Conflict is a social process in which the original structural tension s are themselves profoundl y reshaped by the massive disruption s of CPEs. As Tilly argues, war is a form of contentio n which creates new forms of contention . The Afghan conflict needs to be seen as less the outcome of a predictable pattern of causes and effects and more as a result of combination s of contingen t factors. During the course of the conflict there have been periods and

regions of stabilit y mixed with instability , and the boundarie s of the conflict are constantl y changing .
Systemic nature of the conftict. Received wisdom has it that Afghanistan has moved from a holy war into a civil war. However the reality is far more complex; Afghanistan is part of a multi-layered and inter-dependent conflict system, in much the same way as the Great Lakes region is part of a wider zone of instability . This conflict system is characterized by great volatilit y and constantl y shiftin g alliances which have a ripple effect on the whole system . This applies externally in terms of the competing interests of the surrounding countries and internally in terms of the fluid and shiftin g alliances between the warring groups.
Far from being anarchic and irrational the conflict system is being directed and influenced by actors with clear strategic objectives. This applies at all levels whether we are talking about the interests of Pakistan and Iran, warlords like Dostam and Massoud or local-level commanders. All have a stake in the current system.
The war economy. A war economy has developed in Afghanistan which means there are strong vested interests in the continuatio n of the current situation . As noted above, to a great extent non-stat e entities are competing with one another for the control of spheres of influence and resources, leading to the fragmen- tation of Afghanistan. Hard facts about how this economy functions are difficult to ascertain, althoug h one can outlin e a number of broad defining features.
Kabul has become an economic and politica l backwater; Kandahar is now the Talibans centre of power and most of the important transpor t and trading links of the provincial cities now radiate outwards to the neighbourin g countries rather than inwards to Kabul. Cross-border trade has been a strong centrifugal influence leading to the peripheralizatio n of the Afghan economy. The largest source of official revenue for the warring groups is custom s duties from the smugglin g trade between Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia which uses Afghanistan as a land bridge. The war is now affecting the economies of all Afghanistans neighbours .
Another important factor in the equation has been the competitio n between two oil companies, Bridas of Argentina and the US company UNOCAL, to build a gas pipelin e across Afghanistan from Turkmenistan to Pakistan. UNOCAL, however, recently pulled out of the initiativ e in response to US pressure.
The main source of unofficial revenue in Afghanistan is the drugs trade. Afghanistan has become the biggest producer of opium in the world. In 1998, opium productio n in Afghanistan rose by 9 per cent. The area under poppy cultivatio n was approximatel y 63,674 hectares while it is estimated that dry opium produce was 3269 tonnes. Many of the Afghan warlords have used drugs money to fund their military campaigns. However, approximatel y 90 per cent of drugs productio n is currently taking place in Taliban-held areas.