Peter King - A Social Philosophy of Housing

Peter King
Centre for Comparative Housing Research De Montfort University

First published 2003 by Ashgate Publishing

Reissued 2018 by Routledge
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Copyright Peter King 2003

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ISBN 13: 978-1-138-72624-6 (hbk)
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Writing philosophically about housing poses one with an immediate problem. I can explain this with an anecdote. A while ago I completed a paper on duties and the role of social housing organisations (parts of which feature in this book), and sent it off to an academic housing journal. The paper was quickly returned with the comment that it was very interesting theoretically but it did not contain enough housing content. Thinking I was being clever, 1 therefore sent if off to a philosophy journal. It came back just as quickly with the comment that it was too policy-based and therefore not philosophically sophisticated enough. The editor suggested that I might try a housing journal! Both journal editors were doubtless correct in their judgements, but this anecdote does point to a problem with discussing housing philosophically, namely, just who is one writing for?

It is very difficult to satisfy both housing researchers and philosophers at the same time. If one concentrates too much on philosophical concepts, housing researchers may lose interest or not be able to follow the significance of the debate. Yet to concentrate too much on the specifics of housing policy may be of no interest to philosophers and a too literal connection between policy and theory can be seen as nave.

Partly this is a problem of specialisation, in that disciplines have developed their own literature, vocabulary and methods, and this makes it difficult for two different disciplines to talk to each other at the same level. Thus if one uses one set of literature or vocabulary, one may exclude the other. But it is also a matter of perceived relevance and interest - what is interesting to one researcher may not register with another. This is particularly the case when one discipline concentrates on concepts and the other is data-driven. To an extent the gap between these interests may be too great to bridge.

Yet housing is not a discipline in itself. As Jim Kemeny (1992) has argued, housing is a subject-based field. As a result housing research is undertaken from the standpoints of different disciplines. Geographers discuss the same subject as sociologists, political scientists and economists. This is one of the reasons why housing research is interesting and illuminating. But one worries sometimes whether, in order to talk to each other, researchers do not take the lowest common denominator approach. This involves the almost complete eradication of discipline-based theory and an emphasis on policy discussion. What would be a pertinent question, therefore, is whether geographers talk to other geographers about housing.

What is clear is that philosophers are not conversant with the housing literature or the key issues. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of housing researchers do not turn to philosophy to guide their work. This means I risk the possibility of being ignored by both sides who might see that my appeal is elsewhere.

This might lead to the suggestion of why I bother to discuss housing philosophically. Clearly the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and therefore I shall leave the arguments and approach of this book to do its own convincing. Yet I do believe that the effort is worthwhile. I believe there are considerable insights to be gained from a philosophical approach to housing, not least of which is the key epistemological distinction between the private and public perception of housing. I consider this to be a fundamental insight into housing, and one that could not be gleaned using the methods of the disciplines more conventionally applied to housing.

This book is intended to be a summation of much of the work I have undertaken over the last fifteen years or so. In essence it seeks to develop themes and issues such as the role of individual action, the private nature of housing and notions of competence I have discussed before. Hence concepts such as need, choice and rights reappear. But my aim in this book is to bring these concerns together into what I hope is a cohesive whole. This can be seen, therefore, as an attempt to draw several strands together: to relate the existential concerns of The Limits of Housing Policy (1996) with the more analytical approach of Housing, Individuals and the State (1998). This has meant some shifts in emphasis and the use of different theoretical approaches. However, there is a consistency of interest that runs through this body of work. In many ways this work is an attempt to readdress the existential concerns of the first book in the analytical language of the latter. Having said this, the argument is developed considerably and takes on board new issues, particularly the notion of responsibility.

In the planning stage of the book I had envisaged it as being much longer, and I had intended to consider a number of other concepts I have touched on before. However, as the main line of argument developed I decided to cut out large sections of the work which, it seemed to me, would have detracted from this main line of reasoning. Fortunately the finished book is much shorter and, hopefully, more focussed.

Whilst this is not necessarily intended as my last word on these issues I see this book as drawing a particular phase in my thinking on housing issues to a close. Unlike some other researchers, I am not claiming to have 'done' housing and move on to other things. What I am suggesting is that I have said all I can on the issues of individualism and housing for the time being at least, and perhaps forever. This, as fallible as it is, is intended as a definitive statement of the individualist argument. There are, however, still plenty of housing issues with which to concern myself, particularly the role that social and political thought can play in understanding housing phenomena.

This book is therefore a development out of and beyond my previous work. Accordingly, several parts of it have been published previously in earlier forms. What I have sought to do is to bring this material together and develop it further. Thus, even though parts of this book have already been published, the whole presents a new and distinct contribution, or at least, that is my hope. I am, of course, grateful to the various editors and publishers for their permission to reuse this material.